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(3) The equipment for the 4th Engr Bn moved through Qui Nhon Port and then on to Pleiku City on 27 July. On 28 July, the main body of 610 personnel also moved through Qui Nhon Port and to their base camp area "Dragon Mountain" via AR805350.

d. The 52d Artillery Group arrived in-country on 17 June with the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, the first 105mm self propelled artillery unit to arrive in the II CTZ. This artillery group has since moved to vicinity Pleiku City and with the 3d Bn, 6th Arty, 6th Bn, 14th Arty and 1st Bn, 30th Arty attached, has assumed the mission of "General Support of US, ARVN, and FVMAF Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone".

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. General: There was no major or significant change in intelligence production activities or techniques during this quarter. However, the location and disposition of Communist Main (Mobile) Force elements in the highlands and plateau area of the II CTZ became increasingly difficult to determine during the latter half of the quarter as the enemy forces in the area declined opportunities to engage or to maintain contact with friendly forces committed in the area.

b. Significant Sources, Agencies, and Techniques:

(1) Ground reconnaissance continued to be the most reliable and virtually the only means of confirming the presence and locations of enemy troops in an area of operations. However, the large areas of operations and the reluctance of enemy forces to become engaged during the latter part of the period, made locating the enemy in the highlands and plateau area increasingly difficult. This was noted particularly during Operations Beauregard in Kontum Province, Henry Clay in Phu Bon and Darlac Provinces, and Paul Revere in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces.

(2) Captured documents and enemy personnel continued to be the primary source of useful and reliable order of battle intelligence information. Documents captured by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, during Operation Austin VI provided excellent details on the Viet Cong structure in the VI Military Region (II and III Corps boundary region), the rationale and objectives of VC actions during the first quarter of 1966 in Lam Dong, and Quang Duc Provinces, and the details of intelligence and logistical preparations required by the VC prior to a major operation. Captives taken during Operation Hawthorne, again by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, confirmed the existence and presence of a new regimental size formation in Kontum Province, the 24th NVA Regiment, constituted from the newly infiltrated 42d NVA Regiment. Captives and documents taken during Operation Nathan Hale by elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 1st Cav Div (AM) confirmed the movement of the newly organized 18th Regiment, 325th NVA Division (designated the Hung Dao Regt by the VC and as the 18B Regt by US intelligence) into Phu Yen Province. Other documents continue to reveal more details on the activities and structure of the VC local forces and provincial organization and the relationships of this structure to the main or mobile forces under VC regional control. Despite the wealth of useful information provided by these sources,

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timely and accurate exploitation continued to be handicapped by the inadequate numbers of US personnel proficient in the Vietnamese language. Exploitation of these sources at the local level was dependent almost entirely on attached Vietnamese Army personnel.

(3) Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance was further handicapped during the period in the highlands and plateau area by adverse weather. The uncertainties of weather and lack of directly responsive acquisition resources precluded the use of repetitive cover necessary for comparative analysis. However, aerial photography continued to be used extensively for detailed studies of particular areas of interest. Infrared imagery (Red Haze) provided some indications of the possible presence of enemy in areas not known to be occupied by friendly troops or local civilians. However, again the absence of repetitive cover precluded further analysis of infrared imagery read-outs. Side looking airborne radar (SLAR) remained of no value to the I FFORCEV intelligence collection effort. Visual aerial reconnaissance was handicapped by weather and insufficient aircraft available to meet all requirements. Some relief in aircraft availability was achieved during the latter part of July with the arrival in-country of an additional 01 aircraft aviation company, the 183d Avn Co (01) with further improvement expected.

(4) Acquisition of counterintelligence information was accomplished essentially as in the previous quarter. The bulk of counterintelligence information continued to be received from other US and Vietnamese agencies, even though some progress was made in the development and recruitment of original sources. The lack of a clear cut distinction between counterintelligence information and other intelligence information in the broad sense in an insurgency environment became more obvious as efforts were made to categorize various types of VC initiated incidents during the period.

(5) There was no change in the techniques of processing information and in producing finished intelligence in support of current and planned operations.

## c. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Losses inflicted on the enemy by US, FVMAF, and GVN units in the II CTZ during the period 1 May - 31 July 1966 are:

### ENEMY LOSSES - II CTZ

FORCES	TOTAL KIA	MAY 66			CREW SERVED WPN
		VCC	INDIV WPN		
US	837	116	273		20
FVMAF	183	22	18		1
GVN	<u>272</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>195</u>		<u>15</u>
TOTAL	1292	235	486		36

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FORCES	TOTAL KIA	VOC	INDIV WPN	C- EW SERVED WPN
JUN 66				
US	1369	84	352	54
FWMAF	309	5	79	0
GVN	<u>438</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	2166	105	528	54
JUL 66				
US	186	29	144	7
FWMAF	96	9	47	1
GVN	<u>930</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	1212	154	327	12
GRAND TOTAL	4670	494	1341	102

(2) Enemy strength within the II CTZ as of 31 July 1966 consisted of:

20,000 NVA Troops

11,100 VC Regulars (4000 Main Force, 7,100 Local Force)

16,900 VC Irregulars

48,000 Total

(3) Disposition of NVA, Main Force and Local Force units are shown in Incl 4; of Local Force and Irregulars in Incl 5.

## d. Weather:

(1) Weather conditions in eastern II CTZ were good except for a few afternoon and evening thunderstorms. The most significant weather occurrence in this region during the reporting period was on 25 July when surface wind gusts to 55 knots limited aircraft operations at Tuy Hoa and An Khe. (This latter was due to the proximity of Typhoon "Ora" off the northeastern coast of the Republic of Vietnam).

(2) In the west, Kontum, Pleiku, extreme northern Darlac, Quang Duc, and western Lam Dong Provinces, the ceilings and visibilities were often below operational limits due to considerable stratus clouds, light drizzle, and fog. This condition generally occurred between 0200H and 1100H daily, followed by scattered afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers. The remainder of interior II Corps experienced partly cloudy skies with occasional afternoon and evening thunderstorms and rainshowers.

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(3) Effects on operations during May and June were mainly in the form of ineffective photo reconnaissance and Red Zone operations. Most of the missions affected were in the highland areas west of the Annam Mountains. Before the advent of the "Skyspot" system, numerous tactical air support missions were also weathered out in the same area. There were only five reported weather delays of troop movement during May and June, four of these in the western highlands and the other in the central mountains near An Khe. In July, the primary effect of weather was on troop movements. In the Paul Revere operational area, in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces, movements were cancelled on three days and delayed on five days due to weather. Troop movements were also delayed or cancelled on three days in operations Henry Clay in Mu Bon and Darlac Provinces and Hayes in Kontum Province. Almost all of the delays were for movements scheduled during the early morning hours.

## e. Significant Enemy Activities:

(1) Although there was some concern early in the period that the Communist forces would soon launch a "Monsoon Offensive" in the western highlands and plateau region, the Communist forces initiated no large scale operations during the period. Major encounters with Communist Main Force elements during Operations Austin VI, Paul Revere, Crazy Horse, Hawthorne, and Nathan Hale were the direct result of friendly efforts initiated to seek out and to destroy the enemy. Despite sharp reaction to initial encounters, the enemy chose in each case to break contact and to exfiltrate the area of encounter in small groups under the cover of darkness and/or protective terrain and vegetation when faced with a certain destruction promised by overwhelming friendly combat power. There was no indication, however, that the enemy had embarked on a program of total avoidance as units in the field continued to be subjected periodically to harassing small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fires and probing actions by small groups. Additionally, it was indicated strongly that Operations Hawthorne in Kontum Province and Nathan Hale in Phu Yen Province had disrupted enemy plans to employ the newly infiltrated 24th and 18th Regiments in attacks against CIDG camps in Kontum and Phu Yen Provinces, while Operation Austin VI in Quang Duc Province caught the tail of the movement of the 141st NVA Regiment from the II Corps Tactical Zone deeper into the III Corps Zone.

(2) The net balance of enemy order of battle adjustments during the period confirms that the infiltration of North Vietnamese Army units and troops into and through the II CZ continued during the period, leaving the total enemy troop strength within the zone at the end of the period not changed appreciably from that at the end of the previous quarter. The apparent decrease in troop strength as reflected in paragraph 2c(2) results in part from a re-evaluation of previously held figures rather than in any real reduction in enemy strength.

(3) Enemy efforts to maintain, establish, and/or extend control over the local population through intimidation and coercion continued unabated and at a persistent level during the period as local force elements and VC irregulars continued their program of terror, sabotage, harassment, and interdiction. Relatively weak Vietnamese

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Regional and Popular Force units and posts continued to be the principle targets of these harassing and limited objective attacks.

f. Enemy Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action: Based on the enemy's order of battle and trends at the end of the period, the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action were viewed as follows at the end of the period:

## (1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) Attack with one or more regimental-size formations in Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Kontum Provinces.

(b) Attack with up to two regimental-size formations in Phu Yen Province.

(c) Attack isolated outposts, installations, and units with up to reinforced battalion strength in any province in conjunction with attempt to ambush relief forces.

(d) Continue harassment, sabotage, assassinations, and probing activities throughout the II CTZ.

## (2) Discussion and Analysis:

(a) Throughout the month of July, attention was focused on the Phu Yen area except for the period 5-11 July when the center of attention was focused on the Tri-border area of Phu Yen, Phu Bon, and Darlac Provinces. This shift was initiated by the finding of mortar equipment, ammunition, and documents, which indicated the presence of elements of the 561st Infiltration Group. These elements, believed to be part of the 68th Regt (Artillery), were previously identified in Kontum Province at the end of May 1966. There also appeared to be increased activity around the Chu Mle Ya base area, southern half of Phu Bon Province; and on 9 July, ARVN forces in northeastern Darlac Province made contact with enemy forces, initially identified as elements of the DI Local Force Bn and the 301st NVA Bn. Operation Henry Clay, which commenced 2 July and terminated 30 July, moved westward from Phu Yen Province into that general area without significant enemy contact.

(b) Toward the middle of July, attention was once again drawn toward Phu Yen Province and continues to remain there at close of reporting period. Battalion size sightings continue to give indications of the enemy's presence in the area. The approaching rice harvest may be the reason for his presence; however, the enemy continues to avoid contact with US and FMAF. He appears to be seeking an opportunity to renew operations aimed at regaining control of the Phu Yen area. Such action would not preclude the initiation of new campaigns elsewhere in the II CTZ area.

## (3) Relative Probability of Adoption:

(a) Avoid contact with major GVN/FMAF while continuing to harass vulnerable units and installations; overrun isolated RF/TF outposts and district towns where chance of success is greatest. In

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conjunction, continue sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda.

(b) Attack, in strength of up to reinforced regiment, vulnerable forces and installations; possibly employing tactics of laying siege to a unit or installation in conjunction with an attempt to ambush possible relief forces.

(c) Launch multiple attacks in Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Phu Yen, and Darlac Provinces at one or more places simultaneously in up to reinforced regimental strength against vulnerable units and installations in an attempt to cause GVN/FMMAF to be committed piecemeal.

(d) VC/VA forces are not expected to defend in strength when pressed by GVN/FMMAF except in those instances where the defensive action is an integral part of a greater tactical scheme. Usually, they will avoid major engagements and allow local forces and guerrillas to maintain contact, thus retaining the option of choosing the time and place for decisive engagements.

## 3. (S) Operation and Training Activities:

### a. Plans:

(1) The 52d Arty Gp and also the 3d Bn, 6th Arty moved into the II CTZ, vic Pleiku City and were attached to I FFORCEV.

(2) The 13th BRU Battalion was placed under OPCON I FFORCEV.

(3) The 41st Civil Affairs Company, which had been OPCON to this headquarters, was attached during the reporting period.

(4) Inclosure 6 shows a 1 OPCON, assigned and attached units.

(5) The command relationship of major FMMAF forces in II CTZ is shown in Incl 7.

(6) There were 17 operational plans and 12 operational Frag Orders produced and distributed as shown in Incl 8.

(7) Two new major programs, directed by COMUSMACV, were implemented. These were the Road Runner, a program to progressively restore to GVN the control of main and secondary roads throughout all of RVN; and the combating of VC tax extortion, to strengthen the confidence of the Vietnamese in their government.

### b. Operational Activities.

#### (1) OPLAN 17-66 (AUSTIN).

(a) From 1-18 May 66 the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) conducted Operation Austin 6 (Incl 9) in an area never before penetrated by I FFORCEV. This search and destroy (S&D) operation was conducted astride the II and III CTZ boundary west from Gia Ngia. In this operation

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the enemy again refused to come to grips with US Forces. Intelligence estimates prior to the operation indicated two NVA Regiments in addition to the main and local force units were in the area of operations. There were numerous squad and platoon size contacts. The majority of the results were achieved in two company size contacts. As pressure was brought to bear, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to the west along a main trail running from RVN into Cambodia. The most significant item in this operation was the 75 tons of rice found far away from any major rice producing area in RVN.

(b) Combat losses for this operation:<sup>1</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>
KIA (BC)	101	KIA 9
VCC	6	WIA 18
Rallies	0	MIA 0
Crew Serve Wpns	6	
Indiv Wpns	33	

(2) OPLAN 25-66 (DAVY CROCKETT).

(a) The 1st Cav Div (AM) completed on 3 May, the reconnaissance in force phase of Mosby II (Incl 10) with the 2d Bde, which was conducted in the northeastern area of Kontum Province. The attention of the division was then immediately turned to the east, in Binh Dinh Province, where it had conducted the highly successful 42 day Operation Masher/White Wing ending 6 Mar 66. The 3d Bde after having completed on 28 April, a three day show of force operation, Operation Bee Bee, was returned to the Bong Song area to conduct Operation Davy Crockett (Incl 11). In addition to the Bong Song area (BS8613), the operation was conducted primarily in the Eagles Claw (BR7381) and in the Soui Ca Valley (BR8060).

(b) Davy Crockett began with the deployment of two infantry battalions and the 1st Sqdn 9th Cav (-) into the area of operation. Between 5 and 6 May, the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav (-) located an estimated enemy battalion. Each time, infantry battalions were heli-lifted into position to attack. In both instances, although significant casualties were inflicted on the enemy, the attacking forces could not maintain contact through the hours of darkness. Additional forces from the 1st Cav Div (AM) deployed into the area on 11 and 14 May meeting only light resistance. On 15 May the units began redeployment to home base (An Khe), closing on the 16th.

(c) As in previous actions the majority of the enemy casualties were assessed the first two or three days after initial contact. As the US build up continued in the area of operation, contact dwindled to light and sporadic by the 6th day of the operation.

(d) The most significant aspect of this operation was the success of the 1st Cav Div (AM) in applying the principle of surprise. This was possible for several reasons including: (1) the fact that area knowledge gained earlier in Operation Masher/White Wing reduced the need for extensive reconnaissance, (2) coordination with ARVN and GVN officials was delayed until shortly before D-Day and then

<sup>1</sup> I FFORCEV Mag 3649, DFC 182215 May 66, subj: SITREP 180001H to 182400H.

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made with those senior officers and officials concerned. Because of these actions the 1st Cav Div (AM) was able to commit two infantry battalions and the reconnaissance squadron into the area of operations without "telegraphing" the move.

(e) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>2</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC)	344	KIA	27
VCC	82	WIA	110
Ballists	0	MIA	0
Crew Serve			
Wpns	12		
Indiv Wpns	40		

(3) OPLAN 19-66 (PAUL REVERE).

(a) On 10 May the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div launched Operation Paul Revere (Incl 12). This was essentially a border surveillance operation in the vicinity of the Chu Long Mountain, Lu Co, and Plei Me Special Forces Camp. There were three major contacts in this operation during the period. On 29-30 May 2d Bn, 35th Inf and A Co, 1st Bn, 35th Inf were heavily engaged throughout the period with elements of 33d and 66th NVA Regt resulting in 161 NVA KIA (US BC). On 24 June, the 1st Bn, 35th Inf made contact with a battalion size enemy force and became heavily engaged. The 1st battalion was so close to the Cambodian border (approximately 500 meters) that it could not maneuver behind the enemy and was forced to disengage from the action. During 3-4 July a platoon from B Co, 1st Bn, 35th Regt on patrol in dense jungle approximately 3000 meters from the border, gained contact with an unknown size force. The platoon had been divided into two patrols, one with the platoon leader and the other with the platoon sergeant. Early in the afternoon of 3 July the platoon leader's patrol was heavily engaged and surrounded. The platoon sergeant attempted to link up with the patrol and was also surrounded. B Co (-) mounted in APC's attempted to link up with the two units but also became heavily engaged. Link up was made with the platoon sergeant's patrol and a company perimeter was formed. Artillery and air was called to support the unit in contact. The company later linked up with the remnants of the platoon leader's patrol and moved to the north. Next day a search of the area revealed the following results: US 17 KIA, 28 WIA; enemy 23 KIA (BC). Phase I of this operation terminated 2400 hours, 31 July with sporadic contact.

(b) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>3</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC) 478 & 68 (KBA)		KIA	66
VCC	68	WIA	320
Ballists	0	MIA	2
Crew Serve			
Wpns	17		
Indiv Wpns	224		

<sup>2</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 3583, DTG 170005 May 66, Subj: SITREP 160001H to 162400H.  
<sup>3</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 0523, DTG 070200 Aug 66, Subj: SITREP 060001H to 062400H.

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## (4) OPOED 6617 (CRAZY HORSE) IN 1st Cav Div (AM).

(a) Having completed Operation Davy Crockett, the 1st Cav Div (AM) began moving with the 1st Bde (-) into the area north of the Cap ROK Div's FAOR lying between Vinh Thanh and Soui Ca Valley and conducted Operation Crazy Horse 16 May - 5 June (Incl 15).

(b) On 15 May a CIDG patrol operating out of Vinh Thanh Special Forces (SF) Camp ambushed an estimated VC platoon. A search of the site yielded documents containing plans for an attack on the Vinh Thanh SF Camp on or about 18 May. In addition a 120mm mortar manual, sight and quadrant were discovered. At 1045 on 16 May a company of the 2d Bn, 8th Cav conducted a heliborne assault into the eastern side of the Vinh Thanh valley. By late afternoon the company was in heavy contact with an estimated enemy battalion. Two additional companies of the 1st Bn, 12th Cav were committed into the area of operation. The following day the 2d Bn, 12th Cav was introduced into the area. On the third day the 2d Bn, 5th Cav air assaulted into the area of operations. The presence of the 2d VC Main Force Regiment was confirmed, which was taking heavy casualties, approximately 60 per day. On the fifth day of the operation the 1st Bn, 8th Cav replaced the 2d Bn, 12th Cav and US forces continued to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. The seventh day of the operation was characterized by only sporadic contact.

(c) On 24 May (9th day of operation) the 1st Cav Div (AM) changed tactics and surrounded the main battle area with assistance from the 2d Bn, Cav Regt, Cap ROK Inf Div and two ARVN Abn Battalions. Blocking and ambush positions were established along all escape routes while a B-52 strike was delivered on the enemy position. After the strike the units tightened the encirclement and violent sporadic contact erupted as contact was made with dispersed enemy units. The operation terminated upon the units closing the center of the battle area.

## (d) Combat losses for the operation were:<sup>4</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC)	478	KIA	78
VCC	27	WIA	213
Refusers	0	IA	1
Crew Serve Wpns	15	Crew Serve Wpns	0
Indiv Wpns	88	Indiv Wpns	18

## (5) Frag Order 4125 (LAWNSHORE).

(a) From Nhon Co, in Quang Duc Province, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-2/327th) deployed with C-130 aircraft to Cheo Reo, in Phu Ben Province, in preparation for Operation Cooper. Due to increasing enemy pressure on the Toumorong outpost and at the request of the 24th Special Tactical Zone Commander, I FFORCEV committed the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) to Operation Hawthorne, (Incl 14) 2 - 20 June, and cancelled Operation Cooper. The mission of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was to evacuate Toumorong garrison and to conduct S & D operations for elements of the 24th NVA Regt and the 200th NVA Weapons Battalion, threatening the area.

<sup>4</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 4245, DTG 060230Z Jun 66, Subj: SITREP 050001H to 0524CON.

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(b) Initial moves by helicopter placed forces in the vicinity of Toumorong and only light contact occurred with aircraft receiving automatic weapons fire. 1st Bn, 327th Inf landed north of Toumorong and searched to the south while the 2d Bn, 502d Inf (-) remained in Dak To as a reserve reaction force. The 21st Ranger Bn and one battalion from the 42d Inf Regt (ARVN) in conjunction with 1st Bn, 327th Inf made a three pronged attack to relieve the pressure on Toumorong. Only light contact was made and the garrison was relieved and withdrew to Dak To on 6 June.

(c) On the evening of 6 June the 1st Bn, 327th Inf made light contact north of Toumorong and that night the artillery battery and the defending rifle company came under heavy attack. The 1st Bn, 327th Inf counter-attacked the enemy's southern flank and a bitter battle ensued throughout the day and night. The 2d Bn, 502d Inf was employed on 7 June to develop the enemy's northern flank. Contact was made immediately and hand to hand combat ensued between C Co, 2d Bn, 502d Inf and the enemy.

(d) Encirclement of the enemy was completed by the insertion of 1st Bn, 5th Cav, the I FFORCEV Reserve, and an ARVN Bn. As the encirclement tightened, fierce fighting continued with the 24th NVA Regt. After four days, the friendly lines were adjusted to accommodate a massive B-52 strike (Incl 15). As the battalion exploited the strike, resistance crumbled. Sporadic contact continued until the operation was terminated on 20 June. This B-52 strike is considered the most successful of the strikes received during this report period.

(e) For the 1st brigade's conduct of this operation, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky awarded them a citation declaring that "the skill, stamina and courage displayed by the troops of the 1st brigade are a tribute to them and to their leaders". The Premier also presented awards for valor to 41 men of the brigade. Capt William Carpenter, commander of Company C, 2d Bn, 502d Inf was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor for his participation in this action.

(f) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>5</sup>

## ENEMY LOSSES

KIA (BC)	479 & 52 (KBA)
VCC	22
Ralliers	0
Crew Serve Wpns	21
Indiv Wpns	86

## FRIENDLY LOSSES

KIA	45
WIA	241
MIA	1

(6) OPLAN 34-66 (HOOKER).

(a) On 10 June while the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) was engaged in the northwest portion of the II CTZ, the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) initiated operation Hooker I (Incl 14) on 10 June. This was a search and destroy operation in the area west of Pleiku-Kontum and in the vicinity of the Cambodian border sharing the north/south area of operation boundary with the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. This operation terminated 21 June when little or no contact was made.

<sup>5</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 4760, DTG 210120 Jun 66, Subj: SITREP 020001H to 022400H.

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(b) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>6</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC)	1	KIA	0
VCC	0	WIA	0
Ralliers	0	MIA	0
Crew Serve Wpns	0		
Indiv Wpns	10		
60MM Mortar	2		

(7) OPLAN 28-66 (BEAUREGARD).

(a) Having completed operation Hawthorne on 20 June, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) remained generally in place in the western highlands in the vicinity of Dak To, Kontum Province to conduct Operation Beauregard (Incl 16), 24 June - 15 July. This operation, a surveillance of the Laotian/Cambodian/RVN border was initiated with long range reconnaissance teams deploying to the northwest sector of the area of operation where ambush and blocking positions were established along all suspected VC infiltration routes. Then reacting to intelligence obtained from these teams, from Red Maze and three ralliers, several airmobile assaults were made to block the enemy's likely avenues of escape, but only light contact was made. It is believed, however, that the brigade's presence in the area reduced the number of infiltrators into the II CTZ.

(b) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>7</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC)	18 & 3 KBA	KIA	5
VCC	0	WIA	30
Ralliers	6	MIA	0
Crew Serve Wpns	2		
Indiv Wpns	7		

(8) OPLAN 36-66 (NATHAN HALE).

(a) During the period 19 June to 1 July the 1st and 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) with the 2d Bn, 327th Inf, conducted Operation Nathan Hale (Incl 17). The operation began with the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the 3d Bn, 5th USMC Force, (Deckhouse I) (Incl 17) conducting a shake down of its units with an amphibious landing north of Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province on 18 June.

(b) On 19 June based on intelligence, the 2d Bn, 327th Inf (-B Co) was inserted to the south of the SLF, west of Tuy An at 1740 hrs. Heavy contact was made immediately and continued until 2208 hrs that night. Based on this, B Co, 2d Bn, 327th Inf, located in Dak To, and I FFORCEV Reserve/Reaction force, 1st Bn, 8th Cav, were committed to relieve the pressure on A and C Co's, 2d Bn, 327th Inf, and closed in the area of operation by 2200. All contact broke in the area by 2400 hrs. On 20 June at 0200 hrs A Troop, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cav was committed into the area of operation. On the same

<sup>6</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 4798, DTG 220134 Jun 66, Subj: SITREP 210001H to 212400H.

<sup>7</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 0052, DTG 160100 Jul 66, Subj: SITREP 150001H to 152400H.

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day the SLF had sporadic contact in the beachhead area and at 0800 hrs the two Co's of 2d Bn, 327th Inf were again in heavy contact with an unknown size force. At 0815 hrs 20 June the 1st Cav Div (AM) was alerted to "be prepared" to commit the I FFORCEV Reserve/Reaction force to reinforce 2d Bn, 327th Inf. Heavy contact continued until 1100 hrs at which time the enemy broke contact. At 1400 hrs, the 1st Cav Div (AM) assumed OPCON of the 2d Bn, 327th Abn Inf. Plans were immediately implemented to commit additional forces in the area of operation to attack and destroy the enemy forces.

(c) On 21 June at 0230 hrs elements of 2d Bn, 327th Inf again came under heavy attack which lasted until 1400 hours. During this action the 1st Bn, 8th Cav was also engaged by an estimated enemy battalion which lasted until 1930 hrs.

(d) At 0630 hrs on 22 June the enemy attempted to overrun C Co, 2d Bn, 327th Inf without success. Meanwhile the SLF continued to push inland toward the area of engagement. Late in the afternoon the 2d Bn, 7th Cav closed in the area of operation and captured a POW who identified the enemy unit as the 18B NVA Regiment.

(e) On 24 June the 1st Bn, 7th Cav was introduced into the area of operation as the 2d Bn, 7th Cav was in heavy contact with a large NVA force. Contact was broken by the enemy at 1600 hrs.

(f) Between 25 June and the termination of the operation on 1 July still another battalion, the 2d Bn, 8th Cav was introduced into the operation but enemy contact dwindled and could not be regained.

(g) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>8</sup>

<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>		<u>FRIENDLY LOSSES</u>	
KIA (BC)	423 & 36 KBA	KIA	62
VCC	36	WIA	333
Ralliers	0	MIA	4
Crew Serve Wpns	29		
Indiv Wpns	131		

(9) FRAG ORDER msg 5093, DTG 301235 June (HENRY CLAY).

(a) The day following the termination of Nathan Hale, two brigades of the 1st Cav Div (AM) began Operation Henry Clay (Incl 18), 2-30 July. This operation moved from the eastern edge of the Phu Yen Province through Phu Ben and Darlac Provinces across to the Cambodian border. It was essentially a search and destroy operation throughout the Chu Dle Ya base area and west to the border. There were three B-52 strikes used during the operation with no significant results.

(b) On 5 July the recon elements of the 1st Bn, 7th Cav found 300 packs in one of the strike areas. Six packs were removed on 6 July and on the 7th elements of 1st Bn, 9th Cav returned to the area and all packs were gone.

<sup>8</sup>I FFORCEV Msg 5142, DTG 020100 Jul 66, Subj: SITREP 010001H to 012400H.

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(c) During Henry Clay two A.VN Bns (1/45, 3/45) conducted Operation Thang Long 243 in the area of operation south of East-West Grid line AQ 30. On 9 July at 0750 contact was made with an estimated VC Bn; 103 enemy were killed before the contact was broken at 1025.

(d) The 1st Cav Div (AM) continued to search to the west and on 16 July a large weapons cache was discovered in the area of the B-52 strike. There were no other significant contacts or actions in Operation Henry Clay which terminated on 30 July 1966 upon the closing of all Cav units into An Khe.

(e) Combat losses for this operation were:<sup>9</sup>

## ENEMY LOSSES

KIA (BC)	33 & 2 (KBA)
VCC	7
Ralliers	0
Crew Serve Wpns	2
Indiv Wpns	82

## FRIENDLY LOSSES

KIA	1
WIA	20
MIA	0

(10) FRAG ORDER msg 5581, DGC 130410 July 1966 (HAYES).

Upon the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (-) from Operation Beauregard, the 1st Bn, 7th Cav, 3d Bde moved into the vacated area on 19 July to conduct Operation Hayes (Incl 16). This was essentially a screening mission along the Cambodian border west of Dak To and Dak Pek. No significant contact has been reported to date in this operation.

(11) OPLAN 39-66 (JOHN PAUL JONES).

On 21 July the 1st Brigade 101st Abn Div returned to the Tuy Hoa, Vung Ro Bay area to conduct Operation John Paul Jones (Incl 19) in conjunction with the 2d Korean Marine Bde. On D-Day all units secured assigned objectives and Hwy 1 from Tuy Hoa to within 1 KM of Vung Ro Bay was opened. The following morning the 39th Engr Bn landed by LST on the Vung Ro Bay Beach to begin preparation of LST landing sites, access roads and hardstands.

## c. G3 Air Operations

(1) Tactical Air Support: Tactical Air sorties varies daily from 4 to 77 with a mean of 34 per day. The most frequent missions were:

(a) Direct support of friendly forces in contact.

(b) Preparation fires on landing zones and objective areas.

(c) Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas, assembly areas and infiltration routes.

<sup>9</sup>1 FFORCEV msg D0386, DTG 310211 Jul 66, Subj: SITREP 300001H to 302400H.

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(2) Use of air cover was drastically reduced from the previous quarter. This was primarily due to a new policy initiated by the 7th Air Force that immediate air strikes, using ground alert aircraft, would be flown on any lucrative target. Previously, ground alert aircraft were "scrambled" only in support of units receiving enemy fire. Air cover was therefore needed to provide strikes for targets of opportunity.

(3) Although damage assessment of strikes was difficult because of the dense jungle cover, some reports were available from forward air controllers, ground forces and agents. Numerous secondary explosions were observed. There were 590 confirmed enemy killed by Air Force (KBAF) within II CTZ during the period; 155 in May, 176 in June and 259 in July.

(4) Prior to June, 99% of the air strikes were conducted during daylight hours. In June, 69% were daylight missions and 31% were night missions. This was made possible by the newly installed MSQ/77 Ground Directed Bombing System (SKYSPOT). All night missions and 12% of the daylight missions were controlled by SKYSPOT.

(a) SKYSPOT permits bombing at night and during all-weather conditions by directing the bomb run and release from a ground based radar/computer system. The II CTZ is supported by systems based at two locations.

(b) The Bien Hoa system (POLAR BEAR) supports the southern quarter of II CTZ. The first SKYSPOT mission used by I FFORCEV was controlled by this system in support of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, in Operation Austin VI.

(c) The Pleiku system (PEN LIGHT) became operational in May and supports the northern two-thirds of II CTZ. It provided control for the majority of I FFORCEV SKYSPOT missions. The coverage capability of this system at various altitudes to maximum altitude (22,700 ft) and range (98.8 nautical miles) is shown in Incl 20.

(d) SKYSPOT was used extensively by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, during Operation Hawthorne. From the night of 11 June through the morning of 13 June, 41 missions were conducted. At night, missions were flown every 30 minutes. During the day, strikes were conducted every 45 minutes until weather permitted forward air controllers to assume control.

(e) Field commanders have commented favorably on the system citing the following advantages:

1. All-weather capability.
2. Surprise (no aircraft are observed prior to the strike).
3. Good accuracy (actual strike data indicates an average miss distance of less than 170 meters).

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4. Good reaction time (immediates filled in less than one hour; time over targets (TOT) consistently met within 10 minutes).

(f) The major limitations of the system are:

1. Minimum time between strikes on different targets is about 20 minutes.

2. Each system can control only one strike at a time.

3. Only a limited number of aircraft equipped to operate with the system at all ranges are available for in-country preplanned strikes. Initially, the available sortie rate was 10 strikes per day. In June this was changed to 15. Additional aircraft were on alert for immediate strike requests.

4. The system is adequate for area coverage, but it does not replace the forward air controllers for close air support who can visually acquire the target. The troop safety distance for SHYSPOT is currently 1000 meters.

(5) Tactical air sorties flown in support of major operations during the period were:

<u>OPERATIONS</u>	<u>TOTAL STRIKES</u>	<u>SORTIES/DAY</u>	
Austin VI	42	2.3	SHYSPOT first used by I FFORCEV
Davy Crockett	54	3.5	45 KBA (BC), 63 KBA (est)
Paul Revere	575	7.5	23 KBA (BC), 17 KBA (est), 13 secondary explosions, 5 mort dest.
Crazy Horse	200	10.0	32 KBA (BC), 62 KBA (est)
Hawthorne	421	21.1	8 AW sites dest, 52 KBA (BC), 209 KBA (est)
Hooker I	37	3.0	5 KBA (est)
Beauregard	29	1.4	Air strikes were held to min to encourage enemy to reveal self by action. 3 KBA (BC)
Nathan Hale	222	18.5	6 AW pans dest, 36 KBA (BC)
Henry Clay	183	7.6	1 secondary fire, 2 KBA (BC)

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(6) A comparison of sorties flown in I, II, III CTZ is shown in Incl 21. The graph of each Corps includes support of both ARVN and US/FWMAF forces. Sorties in support of I FFORCEV are also shown separately from II CTZ totals.

(7) A flareship was on airborne alert from 1900 to 0600 daily, stationed over Fleiku in general support of II CTZ. A restriction, to conserve flares, limiting flares support to units in contact, continued throughout the period.

(8) An experimental light ship, a C-123 fitted with a bank of 27 arc type lights cooled by a water type heat exchanger, was tested at An Khe and at Nha Trang. Troops on the ground reported favorably that the cone of light provides adequate lighting over a one-half mile area. Bonus effects of the cone of light are that troops outside the area remain in darkness and that lighting is continuous. Pilots indicated some aerodynamic difficulties with the ship and pointed out the limited station time, about two hours.

(9) Strategic Air Support.

(a) B-52 strikes conducted in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations are:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OPERATION OR TARGET</u>
131700Z May	Port Rail	15	Austin VI
251000Z May	Dead Sea 1	6	Crazy Horse
251000Z May	Dead Sea 2	9	Crazy Horse
300200Z May	Dead Sea 3	12	Crazy Horse
052000Z Jun	Large Mule	3	Suspected VC political cadre meeting NE of An Khe
102250Z Jun	Bull Thistle 1	15	Hawthorne
130001Z Jun	Bull Thistle 2	9	Hawthorne
130005Z Jun	Bull Thistle 3	15	Hawthorne
211610Z Jun	Shire Mare 3	9	NVA assembly area in Binh Dinh Province
231845Z Jun	Shire Mare 1	9	NVA assembly area in Binh Dinh Province
242100Z Jun	Blue Lake 1	6	NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
242100Z Jun	Blue Lake 2	6	NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province

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242100Z Jun	Blue Lake 6	6	NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
252345Z Jun	Shire Mare 2	12	NVA assembly area in Binh Dinh Province
272200Z Jun	Blue Lake 4	6	NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
27220 Jun	Blue Lake 3	6	NVA infil route fr Cambodia to Kontum Province
060310Z Jul	Pink Lady	6	Henry Clay
102200Z Jul	Slow Mare 1	9	Paul Revere
102200Z Jul	Slow Mare 2	6	Paul Revere
112000Z Jul	Wild Horse 1	9	Henry Clay
112000Z Jul	Wild Horse 2	6	Henry Clay
170125Z Jul	Slow Mare 3	9	Paul Revere

(b) Strikes Bull Thistle 2 and 3, on 13 June in Operation Hawthorne were reported by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, to be particularly effective. The 1st Bde had encountered and successfully contained the enemy north of Dak To for three days. Following the strike, the brigade exploited the area immediately, counting some 37 KBA and estimating many more that could not be recovered due to the dense jungle cover blown down by the strike. Several prisoners were taken without resistance in a state of shock. The commander of the first troops into the area stated, "many were just walking around like zombies still stunned by the enormity of the bombing attack."

(c) Pink Lady, on 6 July, in Operation Henry Clay, was the first strike of the Quick Run, a quick reaction B-52 force. From the time of request by the unit to the strike, only 11 hours elapsed. This is six hours less than the best previous reaction time. This was the first B-52 bomb run controlled by MSQ/77 system. The Strategic Air Command keeps aircraft on alert at Guam to provide a 10 hour reaction force (from time of receipt of MACV request to TOT). The Quick Run reaction force is normally used only for operations where troops are in contact.

## d. Army Aviation Operations:

(1) During the period, 1 May - 31 July 1966, this headquarters acquired operational control of the 183rd Aviation Company (01). The 183rd Avn Co (01) with 32 aircraft became operational at Dong Ba Thin on 16 July 1966 and was assigned to the 10th Avn Bn. Two airmobile companies (281st and 282d) were organized in II CTZ by the 17th Avn Gp from existing separate platoons and two HQ's packets for avn companies which arrived in RVN 7 June 1966. The 281st Avn Co (AM) was assigned to the 10th Avn Bn and placed under OPCON of the 5th US Special Forces Group (Abn) by MACV direction with home station Nha Trang. The 282d Avn Co (AM) (-), located at Da Nang, was assigned to the 14th Avn Bn

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and placed in support of I Corps. One platoon of the 282d Avn Co remains at Pleiku and provides support to DSA II Corps.

(2) An augmentation of seven additional UH-1B helicopters have been assigned to the 117th, the 129th and the 48th Aviation Companies (AM). The troop lift capability of each company has been increased by 30 percent as a result of the augmentations. All 10 airmobile companies of the 17th Avn Gp are scheduled to be augmented by November 1966.

(3) The first company of CH-47 helicopters, the 179th Avn Co (AM) (CH-47), assigned to the 17th Avn Gp, arrived in RVN on 26 July 1966. This unit is presently being offloaded at Cam Ranh Bay and is destined to be stationed at Pleiku in the highlands area. The company, with 16 assigned CH-47 helicopters is expected to become operational in August 1966.

(4) The area aviation support concept which existed during the quarter is shown in Incl 22. Primary areas of employment as listed in Ltr, AVF-AV, HQ, I FFORCEV, 18 Apr 66, Subject: Letter of Instruction (U) are:

10th Avn Bn GS II Corps Area Coastal South

14th Avn Bn GS II Corps Area Coastal North

52d Avn Bn GS II Corps Area Highlands

(5) Aviation units under OPCON I FFORCEV participated in the following significant US operations in II CTZ during the reported periods:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>UNITS SUPPORTED</u>
Austin VI	117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co 48th Avn Co	1 May - 18 May	1/101st Abn Div
Fillmore	129th Avn Co	25 Mar - 21 Jul	2d ROK Mar Bde 2/327th Abn Inf Bn
Paul Revere	155th Avn Co 170th Avn Co 161st Avn Co	10 May - 31 May	3/25th Inf Div
Paul Revere	119th Avn Co 155th Avn Co 170th Avn Co	1 Jun - Continuing	3/25th Inf Div
Hawthorne	48th Avn Co 117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	2 Jun - 20 Jun	1/101st Abn Div APACHE Teams
Beauregard	48th Avn Co 117th Avn Co 129th Avn Co	24 Jun - 15 Jul	1/101st Abn Div APACHE Teams

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John Paul Jones 48th Avn Co 21 Jul - Continuing 1/101st Abn Div  
117th Avn Co 2d ROK Mar Bde  
47th ARVN Regt

(6) While the above FMAF operations were in progress, numerous operations conducted by ARVN divisions and lasting from one to three days were supported with helilift. Assets allocated for these operations varied from a six aircraft platoon for Eagle Flights up to three aviation companies (AM) for initial lifts on multi-battalion size operations. Detailed coordination was required to release aviation assets previously committed to US operations in order to shift assets to meet ARVN requirements. Many ARVN requests for aviation support in May and June did not allow sufficient time to properly plan for shifting assets. ARVN airmobile operations during July indicated considerably more timely planning, resulting in increased aviation support for ARVN. For example, the following ARVN operations were supported in July:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>AREA</u>
Dan Thang 68	2 Jul	24th STZ	Kontum
Eagle Flight	4 Jul	23d ARVN Div	Ban Me Thout
Unnamed (2 each)	5 Jul	24th STZ	Kontum
Le Loi	7 Jul	24th STZ	Dak To
Thuan Long 243	8-10 Jul	23d ARVN Div	Ban Me Thout
Hac Ho 34	18 Jul	24th STZ	Plateau GI
Binh Phu 14	20 Jul	2d ARVN Div	Dong Son
Dan Thang 73	22 Jul	24th STZ	Kontum
Loi Hoa 63	27 Jul	22d ARVN Div	Thuy Hoa
Thang Long 246	18 Jul	23d ARVN Div	Ninh Hoa
Bach Dang 46	29 Jul	24th STZ	Dak To
Ninh Thuan 14	31 Jul	23d ARVN Div	Phan Rang

(7) On 6 July 1966, an emergency request for two airmobile companies was received from DSA II Corps to lift reinforcements for a 22d ARVN Div search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Phu Cat (BR910490). The 22d ARVN Div force was confronted with a VC force estimated to be battalion size in strength. One airmobile company was immediately available and a second company was diverted from a Cap ROK Inf Div resupply mission and was at the loading zone two hours after notification. The 22d ARVN Div reinforcements were helilifted into blocking positions around the enemy positions where artillery and air strikes inflicted heavy casualties on the VC force. The operation was completed and aircraft released at 1930 hours.

(8) I FFORCEV reinforced I Corps and III MAF with a total of 20 aircraft between 15 and 23 July. The aircraft consisted of four CV-2's, eight Ol's, six UH-1B gunships and two UH-1D slicks. All of the aircraft have been released back to control of the 17th Avn Gp except the eight Ol's and two UH-1D's which are continuing to support III MAF in Opn Hastings and I Corps.

(9) Major operations of the 1st Cav Div (AM) during the period included Mosby II, Davy Crockett, Crazy Horse, Hooker I, Nathan Hale, and Henry Clay. In addition to supporting organic units, the

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1st Cav Div (AM) supported the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div with two and three flyable CH-47's respectively on a daily basis. The CH-47's were used primarily for movement of supporting artillery ammunition into otherwise inaccessible areas. Numerous times the 1st Cav Div (AM) was tasked to provide CH-47 helicopters to extract downed aircraft for US Marine and US Air Force units. On 11 July, at the request of II FFORCEV, a 1st Cav CH-54 "Flying Crane" extracted an armed CH-47 helicopter that was downed by enemy action about 40 nautical miles south of Bien Hoa. The 1st Cav Div (AM) has a total of four CH-54's and they are the only helicopters in RVN capable of extracting a CH-47.

(10) Air traffic control of forward airfields in joint Army/Air Force operations continued to require detailed planning and coordination. The 125th Air Traffic Control (ATC) Company provided ground control approach and air traffic control equipment and personnel on request. Presently there are three forward airfields being operated by the 125th ATC Company. Catecka Airfield supporting Operation Paul Revere, Dak To Airfield supporting Operation Hayes and Tuy Hoa South Airfield supporting Operation John Paul Jones. It was necessary for this headquarters to prescribe procedures and firm responsibilities for the use of forward airfields in II CTZ. Specific responsibilities were assigned to the supported unit commander, the senior Army aviation commander supporting the operation as outlined in I FFORCEV regulation 95-1, Subject: Joint Airborne/Airmobile Airstrip Operation, 3 July 1966 (Incl 23).

(11) Administrative requirements for helicopters continued to detract from combat helilift capability.

## e. Psychological Warfare:

### (1) General:

(a) Psychological operations in the II CTZ continued to increase in both scope and coverage.

(b) The scope of the psychological operations, was divided into those efforts used to support the tactical operations and those efforts used in the various pacification programs.

(c) Every tactical unit in II CTZ, both FMAF and ARVN, had planned psychological operations before, during and following a tactical mission. This support was usually in the form of leaflet and loudspeaker missions. PSYOP personnel were either organic or attached to the tactical unit to exploit any POW's or returnees and the immediate combat situation. The target audiences of these tactical psychological operations were the NVA from the north, the VC, local and hard core, the population which supported them and the various Montagnard tribes.

(d) In addition psychological campaigns are being implemented preceeding the arrival of new American troops units. A series of leaflets are currently being printed explaining to the populace why the allies are in Vietnam and the role the American (that specific unit) are playing in the fight against the Viet Cong. An

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RCS PSYOP-65 (U)

educational program on psychological operations in the II CTZ is being prepared for the VC forces as a part of their in-country orientation. The role of the individual and the chain of command are stressed.

(1) The specific areas of PSYOP which was initiated during the reporting period was the support of the VM Junk and JS Swift fleets. Due to the nature of the work of the VM Junk and JS Swift fleets, face to face contact and direct aid to the people are possible. The procurement of food, medicine and instructional books to support these efforts has also been started. Exploitation of this phase of PSYOP should be quite productive.

(2) The main problem areas in II CTZ PSYOP are two-fold in nature. First, problems of maintenance, supply and delivery of leaflets to the requesting unit. Second, implementation of sound psychological operations practices. The first problem consists of readjustment and re-evaluation of required items of supply. These problems though numerous at first, are beginning to work themselves out as a better understanding of PSYOP is gained by using units. The second problem area could be alleviated by educating commanders in the employment of psychological operations as a warfare system and by immediately filling RTCE PSYOP positions with school trained personnel.

(2) Support:

(a) From 1 May - 31 July 1966, psychological operations support was provided to I Field Force Vietnam, other Free World Military Assistance Forces in the II CTZ and the GVN by the 215th Psychological Operations Company. The company had detachments in Cha Trang and Pleiku with an XO team (Current Intelligence) in Qui Thon.

(b) The Fifth Air Commando Squadron, with detachments in Cha Trang and Pleiku, provided support in psychological operations by dropping leaflets and conducting aerial loudspeaker missions. During the reporting period, a total of 112,546,00 leaflets were dropped and 463 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were provided in support of II CTZ combat and pacification operations.

(c) Programs are being developed with the US Navy to implement a loudspeaker capability for the swifts and junk boats. Plans are being developed to co-ordinate aerial loudspeaker missions and leaflet drops with the arrival of a swift boat at a fishing village.

(d) The main problem areas in providing PSYOP support in II CTZ is due to loss of time, equipment breakdown and/or maintenance. The small number of planes available (four U-10's) and the numerous missions required cause frequent maintenance problems. The constant use of the 1250W Multilith printing press has resulted in frequent breakdown due to increased production requirements. These problems have caused the cancellation of numerous PSYOP missions as well as the curtailment of leaflet supply.

(3) Operations:

(a) Operation Windy: This operation is directed

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against North Vietnamese Army personnel along the border and in an extension and reinforcement of the air and TVC operations conducted along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and North Vietnam. A large number of leaflets were dropped in nine aerial missions. The target area was covered in depth to 14 miles. Action left to next mission may also drop in connection with this operation.

(b) AVA Campaign: The program is directed against North Vietnamese Army personnel in South Vietnam. Standard VA leaflets and locally produced leaflets were dropped in conjunction with all tactical operations before, during, and after combat operations against known or suspected areas where North Vietnamese units were operating.

(c) The Green Noi Campaign (Open Area): The program was continuously emphasized in all phases of psychological operations in II CFZ. The program was directed toward civilian and military personnel, to persuade them to voluntarily return to GV control after having actively supported the Viet Cong militarily or politically. The theme used, stressed that the returnee will be treated with respect and a decision to return to the Republic of Vietnam would be wise. Emphasis was on education, as to just what the Xien Noi (Returnee) would receive in the way of aid; such as food and medical assistance as well as weapon rewards.

(d) The loudspeaker support for the tactical operations averaged one loudspeaker aircraft a day for each operation. From one to two EB teams (field loudspeaker) were provided to I FORCE tactical OPCH units on a direct support mission basis. In addition during the reporting period each US brigade received a public address system ABN-A3S-4 which can be vehicular or aircraft mounted on organic transportation augmenting the existing capability of ground and aerial loudspeakers.

(e) I FORCE tactical operations were supported as follows:

1. One audio visual jeepster, (EB team) to each of the following operations: Austin VI, Navy Crockett, Paul Raven, Crazy Horse, Hocker I, Nathan Hale, and John Paul Jones.

2. Two loudspeakers teams (EB team) to Operations Beauregard and Zanthorne.

(f) The following themes were exploited in tactical operations:

1. Before operations:

a. Allied superiority.

b. VC hardships enroute to combat in Republic of Vietnam.

c. Reduction of civilian casualties.

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- d. Chieu Hoi program.
- e. B-52 raids.
2. During operations.
  - a. Allied superiority.
  - b. Demoralization.
  - c. Chieu Hoi.
  - d. Specific instructions on how to return

(Chieu Hoi).

3. Following the operations, themes were: allied superiority, demoralization, Chieu Hoi, and in addition themes against specific targets such as, the sick and wounded, lack of food and medicines were stressed. Specific examples of leaflets used in tactical operations during the reporting period are attached as inclosures: Incl 24, demoralization leaflets; Incl 25, quick reaction leaflets and special leaflets; Incl 26, pacification leaflets. Specific themes creating dissension between the VC and VA have not been developed due to lack of intelligence and adequate personnel for such a program.

## (4) VC Propaganda:

(a) The VC rely extensively on propaganda. Propaganda against civilims is difficult to evaluate, but propaganda directed against US Military forces is considered to be ineffective. The propaganda themes directed at non-military targets are:

1. Allied artillery and aircraft are killing innocent people and are destroying homes, villages, farm animals and crops.
2. Requesting the mothers, wives, and daughters, who have sons, husbands and fathers in the armed forces to urge desertion and return to their homes.
3. The US are Imperialists, same as the French.
4. Crop destruction.
5. Use of noxious chemicals in South Vietnam.

(b) Propaganda directed at US military targets are:

1. Racial strife in America.
2. Being far away from home during the hardships.
3. Being puppets of Wall Street capitalists.
4. Disease, bugs, and heat in Vietnam.

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5. Not safe from VC terror acts.

6. Rally to the VC, repatriation, and VC Safe  
Conduct Passes.

## (5) Returnees:

(a) As of 30 July 1966, there were approximately 4,965 returnees in the II CTZ. From a psychological standpoint these people are important because they represent results of the PSYWAR effort. However they also represent one of the weak points; specifically have these Chieu Hoi been utilized to their fullest extent (i.e.) follow up interviews? The intelligence as to why they rallied is general in nature and not specific as to local condition, fulfillment of promised benefits and really becoming a citizen of Vietnam.

(b) One recent example of the above occurred on 4 Jul 66, when 6 returnees came into the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div with weapons. As of this date it is unknown whether or not they were paid, treated humanely or if they had any valuable intelligence.

(c) Although the rate of returnees is proportional to the number of tactical operations in the area, it still remains for the psychological operation to fully utilize this potential source of information.

## f. Chemical Operations:

### (1) General:

(a) On 7 May 1966 authority to employ RCA, CN and CS-1, was delegated by CG, I FFORCSV to all US/ARMAF divisions and separate brigade commanders. Prior to this time all US/ARMAF units in II CTZ requested specific approval for the use of these agents for each operation. There was no major effect on RCA employment since OPCON units had, in the past, been given authority to employ RCA prior to each operation. Employment response times seemed not to be affected.

(b) On 18 May 66, a message was received from USARV asking whether this headquarters had a valid requirement for riot control agent DM (Adamsite) and further if we recommended a change in present RCA policy to permit the use of DM. OPCON units were queried as to their thoughts on the matter. 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div stated they had no valid requirement for agent DM and did not recommend changing the RCA policy. The 1st Bde (AK) recognized a valid requirement for agent DM and further recommended changing RCA policy to include all available incapacitating agents. In reply to USAFV message, this headquarters indicated that no valid requirements exist at this time for agent DM and the current RCA policy was satisfactory. Factors considered in arriving at this decision were:

1. Use of agent DM would be an escalation of the use of chemical agents in Vietnam.

2. Its use would generate adverse public reaction.

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3. Agent CS (presently used) gives satisfactory results when employed properly.

4. Although agent DE has a longer duration of effect (15 to 30 minutes), this is of marginal value when weighed against the increased safety precaution required for friendly forces, non-combatants, and political considerations.

(c) On 2 June 1966, this headquarters received, from the 1st ACD, a request for consideration on possible use of incapacitating chemical agent EE which offers a more persistent effect (48-72 hours). The rationale and justifications set forth by the 1st Cav Div (AM) were militarily sound. This agent has a long lasting incapacitation giving commanders sufficient time to fully infiltrate and search a target area while the enemy is still under the full effect of the agent. Past experience indicated that it may take as much as 10 hours to get troops into an area and another 10-12 hours to search and clear the area. This request was insorsed to 3d USMACV for consideration emphasizing the possible military and political ramifications. Action is still pending at that headquarters.

(d) On 27 June 1966, 3d USMACV asked this headquarters for comments on proposed guidelines for crop destruction to include comments on desirability of commanders being authorized to destroy crops in conjunction with tactical operations. The proposed guidelines are: "Crops which cannot be controlled and whose harvest cannot be secured by military forces will be destroyed. Provision for the needs of refugees plus provision for the legitimate food requirements of the local populace must be made by local SVN provincial authorities with monitoring and assistance by US members of the provincial team. If such provisions cannot be made, crops will not be destroyed." In reply, this headquarters stated that the proposed guidelines are satisfactory and that authority for commanders to destroy crops while in tactical operations would be advantageous.

(2) Crop Destruction Operations: During the reporting period the following four crop destruction requests were initiated by DSA II Corps and forwarded through this headquarters to MACV for approval and execution:

(a) Project 2/2R/02/66 - Project consists of three target areas containing approximately 6,250 acres of various foodstuffs in Binh Thuan Province. Crops in area are recommended for destruction during August-September 1966 (Incl 27).

(b) Project 2-31 - Project consists of five target areas containing approximately 2,000 acres of assorted foodstuffs in Tuyen Duc Province. Recommended destruction during July-August 1966 (Incl 27).

(c) Project 2-22 - Project consists of 6 target areas in Phu Yen Province. The Province Chief requested re-survey of crops in these target areas in early August. This will be the 3d consecutive growing season that crops in these six target areas have been destroyed (Incl 27).

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(d) Project 2/2/01/66 - Project consists of four target areas encompassing approximately 65% of Kontum Province. Spray operations were initiated on 21 July and are expected to run through 31 December 1966 (Incl 27).

## (3) Defoliation Operations.

(a) During the reporting period the following defoliation requests were submitted by DSA II Corps and forwarded to MACV for approval and execution:

1. Project 2/20/05/66 - Project consists of defoliating three areas in the Don Ba Thin - Cam Ranh Bay area of Khanh Hoa Province. Target 1--defoliation of perimeter of Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base. Target 2--defoliation of approximately eight miles of the National Railroad. Target 3--defoliation of 10th Aviation Battalion complex. Spray operations are to be conducted 15 Aug - 31 Dec 66 (Incl 27).

2. Project 2/20/04/66 - Project consists of eleven target areas along LOC's in Phu Bon Province. Recommended for completion prior to October 1966 (Incl 27).

(b) During the reporting period the following defoliation projects were sprayed:

1. Project 2/20/01/66 - Defoliation of perimeters in the vicinity of Plei Me and Plei Djereng Special Forces Camps (Pleiku Province) was completed during July 1966 (Incl 27).

2. Project 20-61 - Defoliation of 18 targets along LOC's in Binh Dinh Province was completed during June 1966. The target areas are too numerous and spread out to depict on attached map.

3. Project 20-81 - Defoliation of a proximately nine miles of the National Railroad in Binh Thuan Province was completed during July 1966 (Incl 27).

4. Project 20-50 - Defoliation of eight target areas along the National Railroad in Binh Thuan Province was initiated in June. Project was to last through December 1966. Because of excessive crop damage and at the Province Chief's request the project has been delayed until Jan 67 (Incl 27).

## (4) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations.

(a) Use of E159/158, RCA Munitions--A detailed summary of E159/158 usage by the 1st Cav Div (AM) is at Incl 28. The summary covers usage during the last reporting period, but was not submitted in sufficient time to include in the last report. Photograph (Incl 29) shows E159 munition modification as described in para 2a of summary (Incl 28). The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div have also received a limited number of E159/158 munitions. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div has employed several E158's (1 cluster of a 2 cluster E159) in reconnaissance operations and selected targets of resistance. During Operation Hawthorne, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div employed RCA in an Arc Light target area 30 minutes prior to TOT in an effort to bring enemy forces out of bunkers and caves, making them more vulnerable to

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the bomb strike. Its effectiveness could not be evaluated. The only other employment of RCA by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was also conducted during Operation Hawthorne. Co C 2d Bn (Abn) 502d Inf used CS to suppress weapon's fire and extract its dead and wounded during the course of a hot fire fight with NVA forces. This RCA strike caused a virtual total suppression of enemy fire for approximately 15 minutes. The 1st Cav Div (AK) used RCA, E159 CS cluster and M7A3 grenades, in the following operations: Lewis & Clark, Davy Crockett, Paul Sever, Crazy Horse, Hawthorne, and Hooker I. During operation Nathan Hale and Henry Clay, RCA was not used. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, the Cap BOK Inf Div and 2d BOK Mar Bde have not used any E159/158 munitions during the quarter.

## (b) Other RCA uses.

1. Expedient disperser for M7 type CS grenades-- Photographs (Incl 29) show a locally fabricated system developed by the 1st Cav Div (AK) for aerial dispersing of M7 type CS grenades. This system was described in the OREL for quarterly period ending 30 April 1966, however, photographs were not available at that time. While the above mentioned system is non-standard, it does offer a satisfactory means of delivering a large amount of RCA on area type targets.

2. Mity Mite Air Blowers--Tunnel clearing and denial operations, using Mity Mite Air Blowers (E106 riot control dispersers) to force RCA clouds through the tunnel and cave systems, continue mainly along the coastal lowlands of the II CTZ.

3. During Operation Su Bok the Cap BOK Inf Div discovered a tunnel of approximately 50 meters in depth vic BR995466. The cave was estimated to have a capacity of 200 men. The cave was flushed with one Mity Mite blower and 48 M7A3 CS grenades resulting in the following:

21 VC KIA	18 rifles captured
1 VC Captured	92 bags of rice captured
1 MG and 2 carbines captured	3 bags of peanuts captured

## (5) Summary/Observations.

(a) Herbicide Operations - Defoliation along LOC's and in vicinity of base camp areas has considerably improved observation. In areas of dense foliage, repeated application is necessary for complete effectiveness. Crop destruction operations, while difficult to evaluate, are believed to have a definite impact on the availability of large area food sources in predominately VC controlled areas. Upcoming operations in Binh Thuan, Phu Yen, Kontum and Binh Dinh Provinces should be highly effective.

(b) Riot Control Operations - Giant strides have been made in RCA employment within the past year. Continual RCA usage, along with requirements for more and better delivery systems and munitions indicate that riot control agents are effective in offensive and psychological operations in Vietnam. Observations noted in after-action reports of operations with respect to chemical employment are as follows:

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1. Units must have sufficient protective masks on hand to exploit RCA attack.
2. Communications with ground forces during aerial delivery of RCA is essential.
3. Definite requirements exist for RCA delivery by mortar and artillery.
4. Riot control agents with more persistency and a longer duration of effectiveness are needed.
5. Aircraft crews require special training in aerial employment of RCA munitions.
6. White phosphorous and smoke preparations on objectives just prior to aerial delivery of RCA munitions effectively reduce the vulnerability of the aircraft to ground fire and increases the effectiveness of the RCA employment.

## g. Trainings:

(1) HQ USAFV published Training Circular Number 2, 7 May 1966, prescribing replacement training programs for all combat organizations. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and the 1st Cav Div (AM) had published training directives prior to the publication of the USAFV directive. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div published a training directive prescribing the brigade training program to implement the USAFV directive.

(2) As a follow on to the study of training conducted by ARVN units in the II CTZ and based on reports by the deputy senior advisor, II Corps, the Commanding General, I FFORCEV, dispatched a letter to the Commanding General, II ARVN Corps recommending remedial actions to improve the training posture of ARVN units in the II CTZ.

(3) HQ, I FFORCEV Staff Memorandum Number 350-1, 24 May 1966, subject: Mandatory Training was published providing guidance pertaining to training in mandatory subjects for the personnel of Headquarters, I FFORCEV and Headquarters Company, I FFORCEV.

(4) During 16 - 25 May, 25 officers and enlisted men from 155mm and 8 inch howitzer battalions under operational control of I FFORCEV received refresher training much in projectile assembly with artillery units of the 8th Army in Korea.

(5) The Fifth Special Forces Group's Project Delta, conducted long range patrol training for 22 officers and men of the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div from 11 to 30 July 1966.

(6) Training on the personnel detector, chemical, manpacked (People Sniffer) was conducted for selected personnel of I FFORCEV OPCCN units by a team from the Land War Laboratory during June 1966.

## h. Organization:

- (1) Evaluation of US Army Combat Operations in Vietnam.

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The report of the evaluation team headed by BG George L Mabry, Jr, was received during the month of May. The report, Evaluation of US Combat Operations in Vietnam (ARCOV), recommended a major change in each of the type infantry battalions operating in Vietnam, i.e., adding a fourth rifle company. Recommendations for changes in the organization of the battalion reconnaissance platoon, weapons platoon, and the support platoon in the headquarters company were also included. Recommendations for elimination of some recoilless type weapons and the EMTAC anti-tank missile were included in the report.

(2) Recommendations for modification of TOE 52-1D for HQ, I FFORCEV and MTOE 52-2D for Headquarters Company, I FFORCEV were received from the staff sections of I FFORCEV Headquarters and the commanding officer of headquarters company during the period. MTOE's were prepared and submitted to USAFV. MTOE's for the 1st Cav Div (AM), 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div were submitted to HQ, USAFV during the period.

## i. Doctrine:

(1) In response to requests from the US Army Armor School, reports of significant operations in which armor, armored cavalry, and reconnaissance elements of the air cavalry division and the infantry battalions participated were provided.

(2) After action reports and critique reports of significant operations were provided to the Combat Arms Schools and the Command and General Staff College.

(3) A compilation of lessons learned submitted by the major OPCON units was published and distribution was made to in-country units, units scheduled for deployment to the II CTZ, and to the Combat Arms Schools and the Command and General Staff College.

(4) In response to queries from the Command and General Staff College on functional operations of the Field Force Staff, and differences in functions in comparison with a type Army Corps, information was prepared and forwarded for use by the college in its instructional program.

## j. Research and Development:

(1) OPCON and assigned units submitted requirements for many new and improved items of equipment during the reporting period. These included new types of radio equipment to enable a squad leader to communicate with his fire team and weapons team leaders, new delay type fuses for artillery ammunition, a sound ranging system for counter-mortar operations, improved mine detection equipment and battery operated night observation binoculars.

(2) The AN/PRC-74 radio, crew served weapon starlight scope, medium range starlight scope, commercial type sniper's rifles, and the M79 "buckshot" round were received by the OPCON units during the period.

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## k. Disruption of VC Activities.

(1) VC extortion has been and continues to be the prime source of revenue, medicine, drugs, foodstuffs and contraband with which they support their warfare within RVN. To counteract this, MACV inaugurated a program in msg 20307 DTG 140910Z June to disrupt the extortion.

(2) I FFORCEV implemented COMUSMACV's plan by msg 5239, Subj: Disruption of VC Extortion (U) DTG 050558Z July, and called for a comprehensive and coordinated program, in coordination with CG II Corps, (ARVN). The plan includes:

(a) An intensified intelligence effort to obtain facts which reveal patterns of VC activity and permits decisive action to disrupt the system.

(b) Employment of quick reaction forces, appropriate helicopter forces, to seize VC extortionists, disrupt collection sites and destroy security forces protecting them.

(c) Increased stress on psychological warfare measures in support of the program. Primary emphasis is to be placed at village and hamlet level and directed toward strengthening local resistance against extortion and encouraging the local populace to report and identify the collectors, patterns of collections and collection sites.

(3) The location of VC tax collection points within II CTZ (Incl 30) were distributed to all OPCON units in msg A-0048 DTG 171235Z July. In order to accelerate the elimination of these points, general areas of operations were also assigned to OPCON units.

## 4. (C) Logistical activities:

### a. General:

(1) During the reporting period the G4 Section placed major emphasis on the planning, coordination and monitoring logistical support of the following I FFORCEV tactical operations:

Mosby	21 Apr - 3 May	Hawthorne	2 - 20 Jun
Austin	1 - 18 May	Hooker	10 - 21 Jun
Davy Crockett	4 - 16 May	Beauregard	24 Jun - 15 Jul
Paul Revere	10 May - In Progress	Nathan Hale	19 Jun - 1 Jul
Crazy Horse	16 May - 5 Jun	Henry Clay	2 Jun - 30 Jul

(2) I FFORCEV conducted logistical support planning conferences for all of the above stated operations. These conferences were conducted as far in advance of D-day as possible to facilitate the development of the plan of support by the unit and all supporting agencies. The conferences were normally attended by representatives of I FFORCEV G3, the unit to be supported, the 1st Logistical Command, Transportation Movement Agency, and US Air Force when airlift of troops was envisioned. In addition, technical representatives from the Provost Marshall, Signal and Engineers attended as required. During the conference all agencies had a chance to determine and discuss the support requirements, establish

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personal contacts with key personnel and refine the concepts proposed by I FFORCEV and/or 1st Log Comd. The supported unit knew who their contact personnel would be, their location, the manner of support to be expected, and the extent of backup available. The supporting agencies likewise knew what requirement would be placed on them by the supported unit. Changes to the operation subsequent to the meeting were announced by message with additional meetings arranged as required.

(3) The logistical planning conferences are an excellent means of insuring that all supporting activities are informed and that all necessary coordination is achieved between key personnel. The conferences have been a significant factor in the overall improvement of tactical logistical support experienced during the reporting period.

(4) In addition, during the initial conduct of the operations and as required thereafter, a G4 I FFORCEV liaison representative was sent to the field to insure that the tactical unit was receiving all necessary support and assisted when possible in resolving logistical problems.

## b. Supply:

(1) Supply conditions affecting operational capability continues to improve. Existing supply shortages did not affect the success of any tactical operation; however several items are still in short supply. These items are: jungle fatigues, medium and regular; underwear, medium and small; lightweight airmobile construction equipment; materials handling equipment (MHE), all kinds, especially rough terrain and also repair parts for generators. Class I, III, IIIA and V supplies have been adequate to support all operations. High consumption of illumination ammunition and signalling devices was experienced due to extensive night operations, the need to mark helicopter LZ's, signalling of supporting aircraft and extensive deployment of small units.

(2) During the reporting period, expenditures of the following Class V items was controlled by the available supply rate (ASR) as shown below.

2.75HE	.20 rds/tubes per day (a decrease of .10 rds/tube per day fr ASR on 31 April).
2.75 W/P	.10 rds/tubes per day
4.2 III	.50 rds/tubes per day (a decrease of .25 rds/tube per day fr ASR on 31 April).
4.2 HE	4.00 rds/tubes per day
105 III	.64 rds/tubes per day
LAW	10.00 per/Bde/day
81mm Mortar HE	5.00 rds/tubes per day

c. Service and support: The following combat service support

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activities were provided when requested by the tactical units: laundry, shower, graves registration, 3d echelon maintenance and medical hospitalization and evacuation. 1st Logistical Command personnel displayed an increased awareness of the critical importance of providing shower and laundry facilities to the troops in the field at the soonest possible time. Shower and laundry facilities are especially important in the jungles of Vietnam and contribute to the maintenance of high morale and the health and welfare of the field troops.

d. Transportation: Airlift requirements for unit moves and combat service support continued at a high rate to meet tactical situations. Several constructed and recently repaired airfields required extensive and continuous maintenance to keep them operational during large airlifts. Careful programming of assets enable line haul and land LOC requirements to be met. Port and beach clearance of supplies continues to be a problem due to lack of adequate beaching and harbor facilities. The completion of the Vung Ro Bay facility in the southeastern Phu Yen Province will improve the cargo clearing situation in the vicinity of the Tuy Hoa and significantly reduce the need for airlifting Class I, III & IV supplies. Railway movements are improving within the II CTZ. Sections are currently open from Phan Rang to Dalat, from Qui Nhon to Phu Cat and from Cam Lam to Nha Trang.

e. Medical: There were no major medical problems encountered during this period. However, two tests were conducted to determine if the drug DDS (diamino-diphenylsulfane) taken in addition to the weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet would reduce the malaria incidence rate.

(1) The first test was conducted with the 1st Cav Div (AM) from 25 March - 26 April 1966. The brigade conducted Operation Lincoln 25 March - 8 April and Operation Mosby I 11 - 17 April during the test. The results of the test showed that a 50% reduction in malaria incidence could be expected by using the two drugs. Also that there was no evidence of toxicity from the drug.

(2) The second test was conducted with the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div from 29 May - 10 June 1966 while the brigade was conducting Operation Paul Revere. Two battalions of the 1st Cav Div (AM) placed under operational control of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and participated in Operation Paul Revere but did not use the DDS drug. Results of the tests revealed that of approximately 2,500 men of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf only 16 cases (0.6%) of malaria were contracted where as out of approximately 1,600, 1st Cav Div personnel, 160 cases (10%) contracted the disease.

(3) As a result of the findings of the test all USARV combat units OPCON to I 7FORCEV were included in the combined DDS and chloroquine-primaquine prophylactic program effective 20 Jul 66.

## 5. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. Increasing emphasis on Civil Affairs and Civic Action in II CTZ is evident in the statistics provided by the major tactical units under operational control of this headquarters. For example, the number of patients treated by US/FMMAF medical personnel during the period was more than 90,000 as compared to 55,000 for the previous quarters.

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In addition, 107,000 kilos of rice were distributed along with clothes, school supplies, foodstuffs, soap, cooking oil, corn, vulgar wheat, blankets, and building supplies. Also continuing at a high level was the repair and construction of schools, dispensaries, houses, wells, roads, bridges, etc. Other areas of civic action activity are in education and training, transportation, technical assistance, entertainment and sporting events.

b. As of this quarter, the Community Relations Report became the staff responsibility of the G5 Section. Previously it was a G1 function. During the period, there was no significant change in the activities of the community relations committee. There was a continuing interest in extending counter-inflationary measures particularly with respect to billeting rentals, price ceilings and wage scales. In addition, attention was given regularly to countering black market activities, the placing of areas off-limits and other recurring problems generated by the increased US/PUSAF presence.

c. An attitude survey was conducted among the Vietnamese in Tay Hoa, An Khe and Phan Rang cities to determine the feelings of the general populace towards the civic action projects going on. Generally, it was found that the civic action programs were known primarily by the people affected or in the immediate vicinity of civic action projects. Little was known of any of the social welfare projects. It was also discovered that the Vietnamese did not know the proper procedures for submitting legitimate grievances with reference to losses incurred by American Military Action. Ways are being investigated in coordination with JUSPAC personnel to make Vietnamese civilians in urban areas aware of the civic action activities taking place in the rural areas.

d. During the quarter, the G5 section began a daily scrutiny of various Vietnamese and French Language newspapers and magazines representing the major religious and political views. This is being done in an attempt to pinpoint possible problem areas and sources of friction as a result of the increasing US presence in Vietnam, before they become major issues. Articles dealing with such topics as the personal behavior of troops, inflation, housing and other matters pertaining to civil-military relationships are translated and circulated on a weekly basis throughout the headquarters.

e. Two Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletins were published this quarter. Their purpose was to assist units by exchanging ideas and information, highlighting deficiencies and offering possible solutions (Incl 31 and 32).

f. During the period a White House Fact Sheet was prepared by this headquarters for the Secretary of Defense. The subject of this Fact Sheet was: The Army Supports a Rice Farmer (Incl 33).

g. During this quarter, the 41st Civil Affairs Company (-) and its nine teams in the II CTZ were attached to I Field Force Vietnam. Although designated as Refugee Control Teams, the fact that refugee control remained a GVN responsibility, kept utilization of the teams for this purpose to a minimum. Instead, much of the teams' efforts continued to be primarily directed toward other civil affairs actions.

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and various civic action projects in support of military operations. Additionally, the teams engaged in civic action projects in their respective home areas. These projects included holding sick-calls; distributing food and clothing; advising and coordinating in the construction of public facilities, such as latrines, schools, dispensaries, spillways, bridges, and roads; teaching English; making area surveys and assisting in censuses. The underlying problem area in the field of US sponsored civic action has been to conduct it in such manner as to improve the image of the GVN in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Continuous action to channel the benefits of civic action through local GVN officials has helped to meet this problem in part. Commanders and civil affairs staff sections are becoming more of the team and individual capabilities of the civil affairs personnel attached to their units. Teams have been more carefully selected. As a particular skill is needed, the team specialist holding that skill is called upon to perform a specific mission. This has led to more efficient utilization of the team personnel.

h. The Revolutionary Development Program in the II GVN at the beginning of the quarter was generally behind the programmed schedule, with only 5 of 12 provinces; Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Quang Nam, Phu Yen and Lam Dong, showing satisfactory progress within the quarter. Civil unrest during the period diverted considerable attention from the Revolutionary Development Program. The charts at Enclosure 34 show the status of hamlets as of 1 May and 31 July.

i. This section was called upon to publish guidance for US forces in II GVN on their role in the coming GVN elections (11 Sep 1964). In coordination with JEMSEC and USMIS information was gathered to provide the facts concerning the election. Specific instructions on the delicate nature of the situation were given to troop units for their conduct during the forthcoming campaign, and subsequent elections.

## 6. (c) Personnel and Administrative Actions

### a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths

(1) HQ, I RVNCF has personnel and PWNP senior command are shown in Incl 35.

(2) Authorized and assigned strengths of I RVNCF units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. Some fluctuation occurred during peak rotation periods in the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the 1st Bn, 1st Bn Div causing short periods of unacceptable PW strength in some battalions. These situations have been corrected. Particular shortages have been noted in the following hard skill MOS's: linguists, aircraft maintenance, signal maintenance and medical personnel. Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and operational control units are shown in Incl 36.

(3) Outstanding requisitions for replacements are not considered a critical problem at this time. Some slippage of one for one replacements, to include a short overlap, has been noted during peak rotation periods, especially in the case of aviators. However, current replacement plans appear to distinguish and US, United States Army, Vietnam is continuing to monitor closely.

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(4) Problem areas have been noted, in that the assigned strengths of units greatly exceed the 22d strength due to the large number of personnel carried as assigned, but are actually in an in/act transit status or hospitalized for extended periods of time in/out of country.

## b. Personnel Management

(1) Assignment instructions for personnel bearing rotation continue to be very specific. Receipt of assignment instructions has varied from six months in advance, to the day of departure, to non-receipt of instructions in some cases. This has created some difficulties especially where married personnel are concerned. The new policy of allowing enlisted personnel to be assigned to Oakland, California has at least assisted those personnel in departing country on their scheduled RMOs.

(2) Qualification and motivation of the vast majority of personnel serving within the units assigned, attached, or under operational control of this headquarters are considered excellent. The training base in COMUS are providing personnel that are in excellent physical condition and well informed on general guerrilla tactics that may be encountered within the command.

(3) The procedures (KIA/DC Reg 614-5 as: All 614-30) to eliminate the limited few personnel who lack or have lost the motivation and/or the personal integrity desired in a combat zone, continue to be extended, cumbersome and time consuming. Because of these procedures, marginal personnel must be carried on unit reports for extended periods of time, creating a strength picture that does not reflect the true combat strength of a unit.

(4) Hospitalization procedures within Vietnam provide elimination and disposition (MIB) reports to units from in-country hospitals and assignment of personnel to "Detachment of Patients" outside of country when hospitalized for more than 30 days. The act of country hospital is responsible for issuing reassignment orders for the individual concerned. This procedure causes many problems in strength accounting and requisitioning for personnel, due to the fact that there may be a delay of up to 60 days before the losing unit receives the transfer order. Thus both the hospital and the parent unit are carrying the man as a part of the assigned strength. It has been recommended to HQ, USMVF, that all departure orders for patients evacuated out of country be issued by that headquarters. This would enable the parent unit to drop the man from its strength and requisition replacement.

c. Civilian Personnel: Civilian personnel management procedures continued to improve. Pay procedures were significantly improved by the transfer of a paying office from Saigon to the 22d Finance Administration Section, Nha Trang. Civilian personnel status of the headquarters is as shown below:

Aid in Kind (AIK) employees authorized	86
AIK employees on hand 1 May 66	53
Released during reporting period	17

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Released for cause (5)  
Released per individual request (6)  
Transferred (6)  
Number of employees on hand 31 Jul 66 64

d. Detailed promotion allocations are shown in Incl 37. In super grades alone, 416 allocations were received: 18 to E9, 8 to E8 and 395 to E7.

## e. Development and maintenance of morale:

(1) The morale of all assigned, attached, and operational control units remained excellent throughout the reporting period. Morale services within the command continued to improve.

(2) R & R quotas for assigned, attached, and operational control units were received, distributed, and used as shown in Enclosures 38 and 39. It is to be noted that the units were able to obtain and use 445 standby allocations.

## (3) Awards and Decorations.

(a) The authority to award certain decorations to US personnel was delegated by USARV msg AFM-8 10035, HQ 000300 July, Subject: Further Delegation of Award Authority as follows:

1. To commanding generals of separate brigades; the Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Army Commendation Medal and the Purple Heart.

2. To commanders in the grade of major general and above and to brigadier generals commanding tactical units authorized a major general, the awards stated in para (5)(a) and also the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross and the Soldier's Medal.

(b) This delegation of authority has materially improved the timeliness of awards.

(c) Awards and decorations for the period are shown at Enclosure 40. The highest award for the period was the Silver Star of which 64 were authorized.

(d) Delivery of personnel mail has improved. Rates on which personnel mail was not received are shown at Enclosure 41. This remains a continuing matter of concern.

## (5) Chaplain activities.

(a) Religious services: During the period all the religious services in the Trung area were coordinated by this headquarters. Protestant and Catholic Sunday Services and Jewish Sabbath Services (Friday evening and Saturday morning) were held each week. Protestant and Catholic Services were provided at regular hours - from 0730 to 1300 hours at: HQ, I MAF; 3rd SF Gp; Camp McDowell (50th Sig Bn); HQ, 3d AF; 8th Field Hospital; and at the Airfield (17th Avn Gp and 10th AF). Jewish Services took place at the Chapel of the 8th

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Field Hospital on Friday at 1930 hours and Saturday at 0900 hours. In addition, during the week, daily Catholic services were provided at HQ, I FFORCEV at 0700, 8th Field Hospital at 1100 and 17th Avn Gp at 1730. Chaplains of this headquarters assisted units at Phan Rang, Tuy Hoa, Duc My, Dong Ba Thin, and Hon Mot Island. The I FFORCEV Jewish Chaplain, being the only one in II CTF visited and held services about every three weeks for every major unit and in every location: 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div; 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div; 1st Cav Div (AM); at Qui Nhon, Pleiku, An Khe, Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa.

(b) Chaplain coverage in II CTF. 100 chaplains assigned: 88 US (78 Army; 10 USAF); 12 ROK.

## 1. Coverage for OPCON units:

1st Cavalry Division (AM)	24 Chaplains	18 Prot,	6 Cath
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	5 Chaplains	3 Prot,	2 Cath
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	4 Chaplains	3 Prot,	1 Cath
ROK Capital Division	9 Chaplains	7 Prot,	2 Cath
2d ROK Marine Brigade	2 Chaplains	2 Prot,	
ROK Navy Trans Unit	1 Chaplain	1 Prot,	

2. Summary of chaplain coverage by area and denomination in addition to the chaplains in OPCON units follows:

LOCATION	UNITS V/ASCG CHAPLAINS	PROTESTANT	CATHOLIC	TOTAL
An Khe (Total Chaplains 3)	3 USAFV	3	-	3
Pleiku (Total Chaplains 5)	2 USAFV 1 Adv Team 1 USAF GS Group	2 - 1	- 1 1	2 1 2
Qui Nhon (Total Chaplains 16)	16 USAFV 1 Adv Team	14 -	1 1	15 1
Cam Ranh Bay (Total Chaplains 14)	9 USAFV 1 USAF GS Group	9 2	2 1	11 3
Dong Ba Thin (Total Chaplains 2)	2 USAFV	1	1	2
Phan Rang (Total Chaplains 3)	1 USAFV 1 USAF GS Group	1 1	- 1	1 2
Da Nang (Total Chaplains 12)	6 USAFV 1 USAF GS Group	6 1	3(1-Jewish) 1	10 2

## (c) Particular facets of chaplain activities in II

CTF:

1. The I FFORCEV Jewish Chaplain coordinates time and places of Jewish services and conducts the services in every troop location in II CTF.

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2. The I FFORCEV chaplain section coordinates all religious services in the Nha Trang area. Protestant and Catholic services for the 5th SF Group are usually provided by this headquarters.

3. US Air Force Chaplains assist in providing area denominational coverage in Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, Pleiku, and Nha Trang.

4. Advisory team chaplains, at Kontum and Ban Me Thuot, assist in covering scattered teams.

5. Three 5th Special Forces Group Chaplains cover all SF camps in-country including all those in II CTZ.

(d) Actions taken to influence chaplain activities in II CTZ.

1. Chaplains of this headquarters supervise the area and denominational coverage of all units in II CTZ.

2. Informed all OPCON units to request assistance of this office whenever the unit is unable to provide chaplain coverage from its own resources.

3. Informally, brought to the attention of the Chaplain, HQ USAFV, the concentration of chaplains in the Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay area, and the imbalance of denomination coverage.

(e) I FFORCEV Chaplains assist civilian organizations in the Nha Trang area by the following contributions: Protestant Bible School offering from services on 1st and 2d Sundays 3,000 to 5,000 Plasters; Evangelical Medical Clinic offering from services on 3d Sunday 3,000 to 5,000 Plasters; and Catholic offering from services on 1st and 3d Sunday to Holy Family Church, Nha Trang, 2d Sunday; St Joseph's School, Nha Trang. The usual Sunday offering is 10,000 to 15,000 VND.

(f) Civic Actions in which this office has been involved:

1. Distribution of food to: The Leprosarium, Old People's Home, Orphanages, and Convents.

2. Assistance by the Jewish Chaplain to the Catholic sisters in Qui Nhon in arranging for the transport of 50 tons of cement which was stranded in Saigon for lack of transportation.

f. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Discipline, law, and order: No unusual law and order problems developed during the period of this report. Command rates by units (assigned, attached, and OPCON) generally compared favorably with the USAFV rates for offenses and incidents are shown at Incl 42).

(2) Traffic safety program.

(a) The high rate of traffic accidents continued to



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be a problem throughout II CTZ. Speeding on streets crowded with bicycles, motor scooters, pedestrians and animal drawn vehicles; unique driving conditions present in Vietnam; and the erratic behavior of Vietnamese drivers and pedestrians were contributing factors. In a letter on 24 May 66, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, directed that a positive program of driver selection, supervision and training with emphasis on defensive driving, local hazards and Vietnamese traffic laws be established in order to reduce the traffic accident rate.

(b) ANVN convoys on Highway 19 presented a serious safety hazard due to lack of discipline and control. Some discrepancies noted were excessive speed, passing at dangerous places and driving two or three abreast, dangerous hornplay and failure to obey instructions of military police. This lack of control and discipline was brought to the attention of the ANVN II Corps Commander by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, in a letter on 23 June 1966. In his reply the Commanding General, ANVN II Corps, stated that intensive and accelerated programs to improve driver training would be conducted and improved traffic regulations would be implemented in order to alleviate the situation.

(3) Quantity and quality of military police personnel. Replacements for military police units have been received in adequate numbers and personnel have been well qualified. Authorized strengths are adequate with the exception of the separate brigades when fragmented as battalion task forces in widely dispersed operations. MTOs for separate brigades have been submitted for approval.

## (4) Prisoner of war procedures.

(a) Under existing arrangements all personnel captured by US, regardless of specific category, are transferred to the nearest ANVN civil or military authorities for final disposition. This method of operation as it applies to prisoners of war has evidently been questioned in view of the United States responsibilities to conform to the requirements of the Geneva Convention. Technically the United States remains responsible for the humane treatment and welfare of prisoners of war falling into their hands. To meet these responsibilities a major change in policy has been placed into effect whereby the United States will retain custody of prisoners until such time as they are delivered to ANVN Combat Captive (PV) Camps which are being established in each Corps Tactical Zone. A II Corps Combat Captive (PV) Camp is now under construction at Pleiku. The camp is nearing completion and will have the capacity for 1000 PWs.

(b) Effective with the opening of the ANVN II Corps Combat Captive (PV) Camp, captives will be processed as follows:

1. Capturing troops will disarm, search, segregate and tag (MAY Para 340) all captured personnel. After interrogation at the division or separate brigade collecting point, the individuals are categorized and disposed of according to their status, e.g., suspects who are determined to be innocent civilians are released to the US civil affairs personnel for return to the civil community; returnees (an enemy who voluntarily surrenders) are released to GVN civil authorities for transfer to an "open area" (Chien Nai) center; civil defendants, i.e.,

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criminals and other wanted persons are released to GVN authorities; those designated as prisoners of war are prepared for evacuation.

2. To ensure accountability for captured personnel, two copies of Detainee Report (MACV Form 543) are prepared on all suspects, returnees, civil defendants, and PWs delivered to the division or separate brigade collecting point. Problematic cases are treated as PWs until final determination of their status is made by military tribunal. At the time an individual is released from United States custody the receiving official signs the Detainee Report to attest for receipt of the person. One copy of the Detainee Report is forwarded to MACV Provost Marshal for accounting purposes.

3. Prisoners of war will be evacuated through United States military channels to the II Corps Combat Captive (PW) Camp. A MACV Military Police (PW) advisory team is located at the camp to render advice and assistance in fulfilling responsibilities as prescribed by the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. I EFORCEW units have been instructed to notify this headquarters regarding problems encountered relative to processing of prisoners, transportation or guard personnel.

4. An increase in the number of prisoners of war may require additional military police for escort guards; however, currently no sizable increase is expected. The Provost Marshal and GJA will monitor the program to resolve any problems which may develop.

## 6. Miscellaneous:

(1) The remainder of the staff sections completed on 20 May 1966 the two and one-half mile move from the 5th Special Forces Compound into the Headquarters Compound, Grand Hotel. The staff organization in the main building is shown in Inclosure 43.

(2) Protocols: There were 118 distinguished visitors to the command during the reporting period (Incl 44).

## 7. (C) Artillery:

a. HQ & Btry, 52d Arty Gp, 3d Bn, 6th Arty (105mm) and Btry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty (155 T) arrived Qui Nhon Port on 17 June 1966, aboard the USS Walker. Immediately following the well-coordinated debarkation, personnel of the 52d Arty Gp and 3d Bn, 6th Arty were flown to their base camp area in the vicinity of Pleiku City where they were sponsored by the 6th Bn, 14th Arty. Btry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty moved by road to its base camp area in the vicinity of An Khe where they were sponsored by the 1st Cav Div (AR) Arty.

b. All three units, HQ & Btry, 52d Arty Gp with 108 personnel; 3d Bn, 6th Arty with 518 personnel; and Btry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty with 116 personnel were attached to I EFORCEW by CO Number 4181, HQ USARV, dated 27 June 1966. Missions assigned to these new units by letter, HQ, I EFORCEW, 20 July 1966, Subject: Letter of Instructions (LOI) (U) (Incl 45) are:

52d Arty Gp - general support, US, ARVN and PAVN in the

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II CTZ, OPCON to I FFORCEV Arty.

3d Bn, 6th Arty - attached to the 52d Arty Gp.

Btry C, 6th Bn, 16th Arty - attached to the 1st Cav Div (AM).

c. TOE equipment of the 52d Arty Gp and the 3d Bn, 6th Arty (minus howitzers) arrived in-country aboard the SS Cornel Victory and SS Capen on schedule. The authorized 18 105mm self propelled howitzers for 3d Bn, 6th Arty arrived in-country 24 July.

d. The WABTOC and TOE equipment of HQ, 52d Arty Gp and the 3d Bn, 6th Arty loaded on the SS East Hill is in a "Hold Status" in Manila port with no known estimated time of arrival in-country.

e. The time lapse between receipt of TOE and WABTOC equipment will cause undue hardship to the incoming and sponsoring units in the establishment of base camps and in becoming completely operational.

## 8. (C) Engineers:

a. The 45th Engineer Group arrived in II CTZ during the quarter and was placed under the OPCON of the 18th Engr Bde. The group consists currently of the 20th and 39th Engr Bns. With the arrival of this group, tactical operations within the II CTZ are now supported by the 35th, 45th and 937th Engr Gps generally in the areas as shown in Incl 46.

b. The major engineer activities of I FFORCEV during the reported period consisted of:

(1) Updating land and air LOC studies within the II CTZ from information received from field units and from reconnaissance by Engineer Section personnel. This information was submitted to G2, G3 and G4 upon their request.

(2) Disseminating additional minefield information to friendly units within the II CTZ as received from DSA II Corps.

(3) Determining engineer support requirements to maintain air and land LOC's for concepts developed for Exercise Flashback.

(4) Developing a study of the tentative engineer work required to support tactical operations in the plateau area.

(5) Coordinating engineer support for Operations Longfellow, Fillmore, Bezuregard, Hooker, Nathan Hale, Henry Clay, Hayes and John Paul Jones.

(6) Determining locations for incoming units to include required engineer surveys, requests for real estate, and proposed base camp layouts.

(7) Developing plans in coordination with G3 and G4 on the construction of new airfields and the upgrading of existing airfield in the II CTZ.

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(a) Construction of three airfields 3,200 feet long and surfaced with T-17 membrane was completed in June:

Ban Blech Airfield vic AQ 938610 (Incl 18)  
Phu Nhon Airfield vic AQ 870990 (Incl 18)  
Camp Radcliff vic BR 450465 (Incl 13)

(b) The three airfields upgraded are:

Ban Don, dry weather airfield, vic ZY 031865, to C-130 capable in May (Incl 18).

Dong Tre, dry weather airfield, vic BQ 909706, to C-123 capable in June (Incl 17).

An Khe, all weather airfield, vic BR 480447, to C-130 capable in June (Incl 13).

(8) Finalizing the Tuy Hoa tactical road net plan with interested agencies.

(9) Establishing required highway standards on MSR's as class 35 two-way, class 50 one-way with class 62 risk traffic permissible.

(10) After receipt of authority, assisted G4 and OPCON units in requisitioning the airmobile engineer equipment for 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

(11) Initiating action to obtain 21 additional sets of Bailey bridge for use in II CTZ.

(12) Requesting eleven additional sets of M4T6 Float Bridging from HQ MACV. This quantity is the minimum reserve felt necessary to support operations and maintain LOC's during the monsoon season within II CTZ.

(13) Maintaining close liaison with the Engr Adv of II CTZ and monitoring progress of ARVN and ROK engineers.

## 9. (C) Signal Operations.

a. Maintenance and upgrading of all I FFORCEV communications, and development of mid and long range communications plans have comprised the majority of signal section activities.

b. Considerable effort was expended to improve the maintenance posture of the 54th Signal Battalion. Electronic equipment of the battalion has been in continuous operation for almost a year and has begun to deteriorate at an above normal rate, primarily due to environmental conditions in Vietnam. With the cooperation of USARV and 1st Logistical Command, significant improvements have been made in the maintenance program during the reported quarter.

c. On 1 July 1966, the 21st Signal Group became operational in Nha Trang as a major subordinate element of the 1st Signal Brigade. The

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group has operational control of all signal units in I and II CTZ except those assigned to I FFORCEV and OPCON units of I FFORCEV. The group has responsibility for managing long haul communications within II CTZ. It is anticipated that this centralized control will materially contribute to improvement of communications available to support I FFORCEV.

d. A semi-fixed communications facility was installed during May at the new headquarters compound of I FFORCEV. A communications building was constructed and currently houses the telephone central, communications center, and technical control facilities. Fixed plant communications equipment to replace the tactical equipment now in use at this facility is being programmed.

e. A secure voice communications system was installed in May in the I FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center. This system provides secure voice telephone communications with HQ MACV and USARV. The system will be extended to US divisional units in the near future.

## 10. (U) Informational Activities:

a. Increased press interest and coverage of the combat operations of I Field Force Vietnam during the period resulted mainly from four widely separated and successful spoiling attacks and press speculation as to the outcome of the much talked about Communist Monsoon Offensive.

b. The four operations which gathered the most press interest and coverage from in-country and stateside media were Operation Davy Crockett, a raid into the Bong Son area by the 3d Bde of the 1st Cav Div (AM); Operation Crazy Horse by the 1st Cav Div (AM) (-) which started as a one company air assault and quickly built up to five battalion strength in the Vinh Thanh Valley; Operation Hawthorne by the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (-) with the resulting publicity from the plight of Captain Bill Carpenter's surrounded rifle company near Dak To; and Nathan Hale by the 1st Cav Div (AM) (-) in the vicinity of the Dong Tre Special Forces Camp in Phu Yen Province.

c. In each of these combat operations the press quickly grasped the magnitude of the story potential and nearly all major news media were represented. The operations were not without cost to the press corps. In Operation Crazy Horse, Stan Castan from Look magazine was killed by Communist mortar fire and Ward Just of the Washington Post was wounded by Red grenade fragments during Operation Hawthorne.

d. During the period, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div received major play in two Newsweek articles. The first, titled, "Bloody Checkboard," done on Operation Austin VI in the Quang Duc and Thuoc Long Province areas, was done by Merton Perry of Newsweek with assistance from the I FFORCEV information officer. The second was the inclusion of two stories of men from the 101st in Newsweek's July 20th cover story on "Men At War."

e. Paul Hemphill, columnist from the Atlanta Journal arrived in Nha Trang in May and spent eight weeks with I FFORCEV covering operations of OPCON units and doing six columns a week almost exclusively on

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these units and their men. His columns received wide acclaim from readers of one of the South's largest newspapers.

f. Also during May, this headquarters was visited by Mike Demarest, a senior editor of the National Section of Time Magazine and Frank McCulloch, Time's Far East Bureau Chief.

g. Operation Hawthorne, which kicked off on the 2d of June, brought about the largest press attendance that the 101st Airborne has had since their arrival in-country. As many as 30 members of the press corps were on hand for the operation, which hit its peak with the dramatic rescue and bitter fighting revolving around the company commanded by Captain Carpenter. The story was front page and in the top news spot in papers and television stations across the United States.

h. Also during June, two companies of the 2d Bn of the 327th Inf opened up Nathan Hale and were reinforced by the 1st Cav Div (AM). A special CV2 Caribou was requested and laid on from MACV to transport newsmedia representatives to the action.

i. Also in the realm of public information, Bob Poose, II Corps correspondent for the Associated Press interviewed the Commanding General, I FFORCEV and wrote an interpretive feature on the war in II CTZ based on the interview and his own observations after 10 months of covering the war in the Central Highlands. The article was selected by AP New York as the story of the week and received wide play in the US and AP's foreign wire.

j. On the 9th of June, the information officer I FFORCEV attended an important information planning conference in Saigon with the USARV IO and the MACV IO to consider this headquarters' recommendation that the incoming Public Information Detachment be stationed in the Trang and operate a press camp here for correspondents covering the war in II CTZ. Although USARV and MACV originally leaned toward establishment of this facility in Pleiku, a decision was made to follow I FFORCEV's recommendation.

k. The I FFORCEV IO covered the raising of the flags of the Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Korea and the United States over the Grand Hotel on the 25th of June. (Incl 47 and 48). The news account of the event was sent to Stars and Stripes by teletype and was published on the 28th (Incl 49). In addition, a radio tape was made of the ceremony and dispatched to USARV for editing and distributed to the Army Hour, AFPS Saigon, and the Department of the Army Command Information Unit by USARV IO.

l. To coincide with the flag raising, heralding I FFORCEV's accomplishments since their arrival, an in-depth feature "I FFORCEV War Roundup" was written and cleared for release (Incl 50). The feature was intended for background use by in-country correspondents and was personally addressed to more than 65 correspondents representing all news media. At present, the Associated Press is using the feature to brief all incoming AP staffers. From the response of a number of the press corps, the feature was well received.

m. An investigation into the problems confronting the distribution

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of Stars and Stripes to OPCON units was undertaken in June in coordination with Major M. S. Lindner, OIC of Stars and Stripes in Vietnam. The outcome was to change the distribution pattern for the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div from their organic aircraft to the APO system and to cut delays which occurred while unloading the papers in Saigon.

n. July was highlighted by the arrival of the 14th Public Information Detachment to establish a press center. Efforts by the Can Ranh Bay Support Command to lease a suitable facility to house the press camp were held up shortly by the recently issued MACV directive prohibiting leasing of additional Vietnamese facilities. A request for exception to the MACV directive was originated and subsequently approved. The real estate officer, office of the area engineer, was still in the process of attempting to lease a building for the press camp at the end of the reporting period.

o. Information Officer, I FFORCEV interested the Associated Press and Ron Ross in doing stories on the anniversary of the arrival of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Also in the month, Bob Prose of the AP wrote a similar story on the 1st Cav Div (AM).

p. Through the period, 324 Hometown News Releases were dispatched to the Hometown News Release Center, Kansas City, Mo. In addition, 71 stories were distributed to in-country media along with 23 photos.

q. Communications between the I FFORCEV Information Office and HQ MACV were improved by the installation of a point-to-point teletype.

r. The four Command Information Topics produced and distributed during the period, Nine Rules, Star Spangled Security, Inflation, and Truth --- An American Weapon, are attached as Incl 51, 52, 53, and 54.

11. (U) Inspector General Activities:

a. There were 15 complaints and 15 requests for assistance, advice, or information received during this period. The eight justified complaints pertained primarily to living and working conditions, guard duty, excessive duty, mess, and actions of superior. There was no evidence of any trends, widespread irregularities, or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

b. The annual general inspections of the units assigned to this headquarters were conducted as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>EQUIVALENT RATING</u>
272d Military Police Company	2 May 66	Excellent
55th Military Intelligence Detachment	16 May 66	Excellent
54th Signal Battalion	13-16 May 66	Superior
209th Signal Detachment	15 Jun 66	Superior
Headquarters Company, I FFORCEV	27 Jun 66	Superior
64th Engineer Detachment	27 Jun 66	Unsatisfactory

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STANDARD: Operational Report for Antarctic Base, October 1, 1961.  
100 Miles.

1. Operational reports were not received as required by the  
instructions, except for the data on the number of personnel, as  
equipment status, based on the number of personnel, and the  
number of performance of missions and the number of personnel, efficiency,  
and energy, were as follows:

2. The report incorporated the data received, except for the  
instructions, personnel to the staff, and the assignment, the total  
assignment, the personnel, the assignment, the assignment, the assignment,  
the assignment, the assignment, the assignment, the assignment, the assignment,  
the physical fitness program, the food service and the food service,  
the supply records and procedures, and the maintenance of  
supplies and equipment.



SECRET

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## Section 2 - Summary Observations and Recommendations

### Part II: Observations (Lessons Learned)

#### 1. Observations:

##### a. Item: Calls for Flareless support

Discussion: A Flareless request by the 1st Bde, 101st Air Div, had difficulty locating the requesting unit north of the 1st. Normally, Air Force F-4s navigate the Flareless to the coordinates furnished by the ground units, but this particular combination of terrain and weather prevented use of F-4s. Instructions from several radio sites on the ground further confused the aircraft. Through lack of use, the crew had lost proficiency in use of an on-board bombing system.

Observation: Flareless aircraft have re-trained on the bombing system and units have been informed to limit the number of radio stations providing instructions to the aircraft.

##### b. Item: Simultaneous engagement of targets by tactical air and artillery.

Discussion: The 1st Bde, 101st Air Div, reported that the most time was expended between ceasing of artillery fire on a target and commencing of air strikes. The doctrine of simultaneous engagement was examined. Due to the possibility of loss of friendly aircraft from exploding artillery shells, simultaneous engagement can only be used in extreme emergency. Near simultaneous engagement can be achieved by close coordination between the forward air controller and the ground force commander.

Observation: The forward air controller has the requisite radio equipment to communicate with the ground commander. An aid for timing was determined to be the firing of white phosphorous on the last volley of artillery as a signal to the forward air controller. These rounds can also be used to mark the target for the strike aircraft.

##### c. Item: Timing of T-28 strikes.

Discussion: Both the 1st Air Cav Div and the 1st Bde, 101st Air Div, report that the optimum time for a T-28 strike, which is to be exploited by ground forces, is early in the morning. This allows the ground forces a maximum of daylight hours to get into the area. The ground force requests the desired T-28 and specifies a WLT time in their strike request.

Observation: Normally, at least 24 hours must be allowed for processing, evaluating, coordinating, planning, and executing a T-28 strike. Recently, a quick reaction force of six aircraft was established. This force will meet a maximum allowable reaction time of 20 hours from receipt of the T-28 strike request to T-28. To cut down message handling time, requests for immediate strikes from I FORNIV T-28 units are sent info to MACV and II Corps. In this manner a 11-12 hours overall reaction time can be met.

##### d. Item: Air support for road convoy security missions.

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AFM 30-75 (7)

Discussion: The use of fighter aircraft to provide continuous air cover over road convoys requires a great number of aircraft and flying hours. This mission is not considered practical except where ambush is highly likely. Continuous airborne coverage by a forward air controller (FAC) in an F4U observer aircraft is used. Intelligence reports indicate that the VC recognize these FAC's and appreciate their ability to call in air strikes so that a degree of security is thus achieved. Fighter aircraft are on 15 minute alert at FLEET, 1st TFW 347, and 348 TFW Airfields in RV Corps Area.

Observations: Additional security is obtained by requesting fighter aircraft going to and returning from strikes to pass the runway route. Also, as the VC will use the same ambush position over again, harassment and interdiction strikes can be planned on these sites as a "show of force".

## e. Item: Late preplanned air strike requests.

Discussion: The deadline for preplanned requests to reach HQ is 1300 hours the day before the strike. Units have difficulty meeting this time because much can happen in the afternoon to modify their plans. Late programs are processed but difficulties are encountered if all available aircraft have already received their strike orders for the next day. Late requests may either not be filled or may divert aircraft from other strikes already planned.

Observation: If a unit anticipates that some late requests will be required, they should notify 33 AF, 1st TFW, and estimate the number of missions so that the required aircraft can be held back at the daily planning conference at HQ. If this cannot be done, the unit should request the strike as immediate. The disadvantage here is that they must accept the alert load ordinance.

## f. Item: Rotation of 3-10 pilots.

Discussion: When assigned during the tactical operations the pilots were rotated every four days and there was a loss of continuous support. This loss sometimes lasted four hours or more. The new pilots often had to orient themselves to the terrain. If the tactical unit was in contact and had sound WSTOP missions to fly, this loss of aircraft was harmful to the WSTOP program.

Observations: Pilot rotation must be in phase with aircraft maintenance schedules and/or the new pilot must have sufficient overlap in order to orient himself to the terrain and the combat situation.

## g. Item: Lack of supporting aircraft for psychological warfare.

Discussion: Seven F-10 aircraft and four C-47 aircraft support all psychological operations in RV. As of the 31 July three F-10's were in 33 II CTZ and one C-47 in 33 II CTZ. It is obvious that even with the minimum time being utilized for maintenance, there are insufficient planes for psychological operations.

Observation: Additional planes are necessary for proper psychological activities. In II CTZ alone, twelve F-10's and two C-47's are needed to provide support for anticipated psychological operations.

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523-337: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
 MS 2503-65 (7)

1. Item: Slow reaction time in quick reaction PSYOP leaflets.

Discussion: Quick reaction PSYOP leaflets must be based upon sound intelligence and speed of delivery to and from the printing plant. There have been examples when a leaflet has been printed within 10-14 hours and took three days to deliver it to the using unit.

Observation: If the field team with the unit doesn't bring the captive in, the intelligence (IN) team must contact the PSYOP team as soon as possible, so that a leaflet design and tapes may be made on the spot. The request for quick reaction leaflets should be kept down to 25,000 to 50,000 initially so as to speed printing time. Most important of all, the requesting unit should try to help the delivery and pick-up of the quick reaction leaflet with its own organic aircraft. Since the 243rd PSYOP Company has no aircraft, it can only coordinate transportation through regular air scheduling channels. As the priority of leaflets is low, there is often a delay in delivery.

1. Item: Current mine sweeping facilities and procedures are unsatisfactory for extensive mine clearing required on roads in II CTZ.

Discussion: Mine clearing operations on roads and highways must be conducted on a daily basis on roads prior to convoy movement. This requires engineer troops to sweep lengths of road which cannot be covered in fact in sufficient time to open the road in time for convoy traffic. As a result we have, at necessity, used the concept of driving along the road and looking for suspicious areas and then checking these out. Additionally the expedient plastic explosive mines used in many cases by the VC are impossible to locate with our current mine detector.

Observation:

(1) A requirement exists for a workable non-metallic mine detector.

(2) The foot mounted mine detector will be a valuable addition and should aid in reducing the sweep time of the roads when they arrive in 2d quarter FY 67.

2. (C) Training and Organizations:

a. Item: Shortage of PSYOP - trained personnel assigned to tactical units.

Discussion: There is a critical shortage of PSYOP trained personnel in both the PSYOP companies and in the tactical units. As a result of this shortage, effective planning and supervision at the implementation level is often unavailable.

Observation: On an immediate basis, the assignment of PSYOP trained personnel to PSYOP positions is necessary. A long term solution would be to include PSYOP training as a basic course in all branch schools. Untrained personnel slated as PSYOP replacements should be programmed to have at least a one month overlap for OJT training.

3. (U) Intelligence:

a. Item: Interrogation of captives and other personnel.

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Discussion:

(1) The shortage of US personnel proficient in the Vietnamese language necessitates the use of native Vietnamese military or civilian interpreters to assist US interrogators.

(2) Reliance on interpreters in exploiting captives and other individuals for intelligence information frequently causes interrogations to degenerate into an interview or "question and answer" period. The actual interrogator loses control of the process, has no "feel" for whether or not the source is telling the truth or all that he knows, or whether the interpreter is interpreting correctly. This results in interrogation reports of dubious reliability.

(3) The foregoing shortcomings in the use of interpreters during interrogations can be alleviated to some degree by training the interpreters themselves as interrogators.

Observation: Vietnamese interpreters assigned to interrogation duties should be trained in interrogation techniques.

b. Item: Lack of psychological operational intelligence.

Discussion: The basis of any Psychological Warfare Campaign is timely, local intelligence. While this problem has been recognized for some time, it still exists. The loudspeaker (NS) Team Leader with the combat unit is often not aware of the latest POW or detainee or their information. It is important that the PSYOP personnel interview all prisoners as soon as possible, preferably before they enter the ARVN channels. The 245th PSYOP Company has submitted a list of questions designed to provide psychological intelligence. This list is currently being staffed at HQ, I SFORCEV.

Observation: Command interest should be directed toward COMUSMACV message dated 28 June 1966, subject: Intelligence Support of Psywar.

a. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Requirement to react rapidly to the tactical situation dictates extensive use of available airfields.

Discussion: Airfields capable of handling C-130 aircraft within II CTZ totaled 32 on 31 July 1966. During airlifts for large operations many of the airfields deteriorated to a point where constant and extensive repairs were required to keep the fields open. This was particularly true at those airfields where F-17 membrane was utilized. In several instances fields were closed for almost a full day necessitating adoption of emergency measures to complete the movement on time.

Observation: Continued emphasis should be given to construction of additional C-130 airfields. Adequate emergency repair capability must be available at C-130 airfields. The availability of airborne engineer construction equipment is essential when unpaved or F-17 membrane covered airfields are utilized.

b. Item: Sufficient vehicles have not been available for support of brigade size operations.

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SIS INVO-65 (U)

Discussion: This problem was noted during the previous reporting period. The units have insufficient vehicles to provide for movement completely by highway. The only source for additional transport to lift tactical elements is through 1st Logistical Command, which in turn reduces their capability of keeping adequate supplies at the Forward Support Areas.

Observation: The advantage of utilizing truck transport for tactical moves must be weighed against the effect it will have on logistical support. When trucks are used, adequate planning and supervision must be exercised to ensure maximum utilization. A recommendation has been made to have a light truck company attached to the 1st Cav Div (AM).

c. Item: Insufficient quantities of adhesive are supplied with the accessory kits for F-17 Membrane repair.

Discussion: Heavy usage of F-17 Membrane fields at Oasis (241229) and Camp Badeliff (up to 30 sorties per day of C-130 aircraft) has resulted in considerably more rips and tears than was anticipated when the accessory kits were designed. In the case of Oasis, the failure of the base required taking up the membrane and relaying it after repair of the base. This used up large quantities of adhesive during resurfacing. At Camp Badeliff, heavy C-130 traffic, utilizing maximum performance takeoffs and landings, caused a critical shortage of the adhesive.

Observation: Additional quantities of adhesive must be made available. This could be accomplished by making the adhesive a class IV item of supply and by including additional adhesive in the accessory kit. At the present time only 2-5 gallon cans of adhesive are supplied per accessory kit. This is just enough to lay the strip initially. The amount of non-skid compound included in this accessory kit is excessive. Two of the eight cans of non-skid compound could be eliminated and replaced by adhesive. Non-skid compound can be used as adhesive, but it requires considerable drying period making it use of limited value in the midst of high density traffic.

#### 5. (U) Other:

a. Item: Reporting and feedback on psychological operations.

Discussion: The very nature of psychological operations makes a detailed and up-to-date feedback difficult to obtain. Trying to evaluate the program on the information currently available is at best, weak. The intelligence summaries received are good but often they are weeks, sometimes months old and contain order of battle, not psychological operations intelligence.

To further improve the program a PSYOP interrogation questionnaire is being developed. This questionnaire will be a great aid in determining the susceptibilities of the enemy and also the effectiveness of the PSYOP program. Also to enhance research and analysis of the program, a PSYOP SITREP is being developed.

Observation: Introduction of the above mentioned reports should contribute to the effectiveness of the PSYOP program.

b. Item: Identification of stations or signals which interfere with radio operations in the II CTZ is becoming an increasing problem.

Discussion: Extensive use is made of HF, FM and VHF radio

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AFSA-30-735

AFSA-30-735 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
AFSA 30-735-05

in the 11 MHz. Interference from deliberate and unintentional sources has been repeatedly encountered. When a jamming signal is recognized, or suspected as such, a report has been submitted by the detecting unit. However, in many cases lack of knowledge as to a precise description of the signal or failure of the operators to recognize language heard, results in a report not being submitted.

(1) Among the cases of FM interference (30-75.95 mc), there have been deliberate attempts by the enemy to enter tactical nets. But, most interference problems encountered are from use of the higher powered new family radios by US forces which create primary channel or adjacent channel interference. It can be concluded that a large number of FM radios in a small tactical area of responsibility, with close proximity (approximately 10 miles) to another tactical or base camp area (with airfields), is the primary cause of interference problems in the FM spectrum. Highly mobile units often use a large number of aircraft radios, which add greatly to the interference problem, due to their capability of a greater range from higher altitudes. In addition to this frequency congestion, the problem is compounded by frequent interference during the warmer periods of the day from Japanese stations operating in the 50-70 megacycles range. It is believed that these cases of interference by Japanese voices (the words "Koshi, Koshi" heard frequently) are instances of Sporadic E, or temperature inversion, which cause variations in radio wave propagation. This is indicated by the short term (2-4 hour) periods of interference occurring in the hot afternoon and the characteristic of frequent fading. This has been experienced in the Pleiku-Noctum area.

(2) In the VHF range, an increasing number of cases of interference in the 50-100 megacycles range have occurred when new family radios (30-75.95mc), older AN/TRC-1 equipment (70-100 mc) and AN/TRC-24 (50-100 mc) radio equipment are used simultaneously in the same area (1 mile radius)\*. While the apparent fundamental frequency overlap is not too great, harmonic interference is widespread. Onsite coordination is often difficult or impossible, due to language barriers at joint site areas (ROK, VN, & US).

(3) Also, in the 200-400 megacycle range, an increased amount of interference has been experienced between multi-channel VHF radios, invariably located near airfields, and the aircraft AM UHF radios. Since the aircraft radios are AM and the VHF is FM, often the signals are unintelligible and operators cannot obtain call signs which are needed to solve the interference problem. Frequency police in this frequency range is needed.

## Observations:

(1) Excellent cooperation has been experienced in solving frequency interference problems even where language incompatibility exists with allied nations.

(2) The concentrated use of FM radios in tactical and base camp areas promises to be a severe problem unless some means of FM direction-finding for station location and frequency police is effectively employed. This should be employed in base or tactical areas (60 miles radius or less), with immediate reaction by cooperation of the local commander.

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\* Site radius is often small for security reasons.

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AVC663-7274

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AVPA-JC-TNC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
RCS CSFR-65 (U)

c. Item: Radio voice call signs, as derived from ACP 110, continue to be a burden in tactical communications. Failure of many units to utilize these call signs and substitution of similar words complicates the frequency police problem.

Discussion: Units continue to employ short call words locally derived. In some cases these have been approved at higher level. Basically there is no objection to shorter two-syllable call words except that ACP 110 does not provide them. Shorter call words effectively assist communications from aircraft and are easier for user to hear and understand. The tongue-twister-two word call signs have been more of a problem in radio than a practical tool. As a means of security the call signs are probably successful, but unfortunately the US units have difficulty in pronouncing the words as the enemy perhaps would. The primary advantage of the ACP 110 is hidden in the difficulty of the word it uses.

Observation: Study should be given to a more practical selection of words for radio calls to be used by the tactical units especially for air and ground mobile stations or air support communications. A more acceptable selection of call words would also assist in the police of the frequency problem.

d. Item: Stable power input for transistorized electronic equipment.

Discussion: The latest communications equipment which employs solid state components have been experiencing frequently "blown" transistors, due to fluctuating power sources. Even with supposedly stable generators, the power often surges or drops sufficiently to cause malfunction of solid state equipment.

Observation: A type of AC auto transformer should be developed as an integral component for future manufactured equipment and a modification made to those already in operation.

e. Item: Authority is needed in II CTZ to adjudicate claims under Foreign Claims Act.

Discussion: Authority to adjudicate and pay claims to Vietnamese nationals and other foreign personnel for injuries received should be delegated to an SDA in this geographical area. Prompt payment for damages and injuries is vital to our pacification program. Current case of Ho Thi Thoa illustrates the problem of centralizing payment out of Saigon. A Vietnamese soldier was killed in Nha Trang by US Army truck on 3 November 1965. An accident report was submitted by this HQ to MACV on 8 November 1965. Widow of this soldier submitted a petition through General Directorate of Finance and Audit that reached MACV on 25 April 1966. Because of their inability to locate the claimant, MACV had to request I FFORCEV JA's help. After locating claimant, who was living in a hovel with three children, a proper claim was submitted to MACV on 5 May 1966. Not until 28 July 1966 was a check for 145,000 VND received by this office as compensation to this widow.

Observation: A Foreign Claims Commission, consisting of one Judge Advocate General officer, should be established in II CTZ to insure prompt payment for damage caused by US forces operating in this geographical area.

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AVF1-GC-FHQ

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966, SCS  
CSFGR-65 (U)

f. Item: Units must have sufficient masks available at all times to exploit an RCA strike.

Discussion: On several occasions lucrative targets for an RCA strike have been passed up because ground units in contact did not have masks available.

Observation: Commanders should insure that sufficient protective masks are carried to exploit RCA strikes if lucrative targets develop.

g. Item: Delivery device for dispersing M7A3 (CS) grenades from UH1 aircraft.

Discussion: Presently there is no standard device for delivering a large volume of M7A3 type grenades from helicopters. Units have developed expedient devices but a standard disperser needs to be developed.

Observation: Requirements have been forwarded to USAFV for development of a standard disperser for M7A3 type grenades.

h. Item: Development of RCA rounds for M79, 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars, and 105mm and 155mm artillery.

Discussion: Inclement weather can restrict RCA employment by aircraft and artillery; would be an ideal method of dissemination in these instances. Point targets or small areas could be fired upon with greater accuracy than aerial delivery. This would also give a more rapid response to RCA requests.

Observation: Requirements for development of above rounds have been submitted to USAFV.

i. Item: Aerial delivery of E159/E158 RCA munitions.

Discussion: E159/E158 munitions cannot be employed at altitudes below 500 feet due to the time element necessary to insure that all eight modules are activated and area coverage is achieved. Because of this limitation, the use of these munitions is highly restricted when operating in inclement weather or highland areas during monsoon seasons when ceilings are continually below 500 feet.

Observation: A standard disperser for M7 type CS grenades would be of value in situations mentioned above. This system could be employed with satisfactory results at altitudes less than 500 feet. Requirements have been forwarded to USAFV for development of a standard disperser for M7 type grenades.

j. Item: The tendency of commanders to use the "numbers" or "overkill" theory of leaflet use.

Discussion: It was a tendency in World War II and Korea to overemphasize the number of leaflets dropped. The higher the number of leaflets dropped the more successful the psychological operation. It appears as though the commanders in the II CTZ are developing the same unsound tendency. Investigation of leaflet dissemination practices used by FMAF units shows fundamental violations of psychological conditions which no amount of leaflets can rectify.



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AVPA-GC-TNG

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
RCS CSPOB-65 (U)

Specific examples of these violations are:

- (1) A number of leaflets were dropped on the ridge lines rather than the usual VC/NVA routes, i.e., valley floors, along streams to halfway up ridge lines.
- (2) Often the themes were not applicable to the situation. Example: Stressing hunger when a VC unit had just taken all the rice from the nearby villagers.
- (3) Appeals were made to Montagnards in Vietnamese or with standard Chieu Hoi leaflets.
- (4) Not understanding leaflet dissemination led to a request for a million leaflets to be dropped in a 35 knot wind. The result would have been that an area of over 200 sq miles of the South China Sea would have been covered with leaflets. The results of this type activity are now being felt. The backlog on the American presses in II CTZ, Saigon, Japan and Okinawa has reached millions.

Observation: Base drops on accurate timely intelligence and guidance from a trained PSTOP staff officer.

k. Item: Utilization of medical officers (doctors) on civil affairs teams.

Discussion: Based on experiences gained during the past months, it was determined that the assigned medical specialist could adequately perform the field sick-call and treatment of Vietnamese that previously was performed by the teams' assigned doctor.

Observation: Medical officers have been reassigned from the CA teams to tactical units.

## Part II: Recommendations

Reference paragraph 7d and e: Recommend that maximum effort be made to transport M&BTOC and TOE equipment of each unit deploying to Vietnam on the same ship.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

54 Incl  
28

*Donnelly P. Bolton*  
DONNELLY P. BOLTON  
Colonel, GS  
Acting Chief of Staff

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AVFA-GC-TMG

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966,  
MCS CSFOR-65 (U)

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AVHGC-DH (25 August 1966)

1st Ind

25 NOV 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOT-OT  
APO 96558

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. (U) Concur with the comments contained in the basic report and with the preceding indorsements as amplified below.

3. (U) Reference Paragraph 6b(3), Page 36, Elimination of Personnel Unfit for RVN Service: Cited regulations provide for the removal of personnel to other locations within USARPAC, whose presence is embarrassing to the command. Frequently, such action is accompanied by disciplinary and/or elimination actions. Proceedings are generally protracted and are impeded by communications difficulties, and frequently, by return to CONUS of eyewitnesses prior to satisfactory disposition of the case. Additionally, the removal of the offender frequently lessens the aggressive pursuit of follow-up proceedings. This headquarters will take action to alleviate the problem within the framework of existing regulations.

4. (U) Reference Paragraph 6b(4), Page 36, Late Receipt of Orders Transferring Personnel to Hospitals: Since the end of the reporting period, this headquarters has taken steps to prepare orders transferring patients expeditiously. The establishment of a Transient, Trainee, Patient and Student (TTPS) Account within USARV is expected to further improve this situation.

5. (U) Reference Paragraph 7d and e, Page 42 and Recommendations, Part II, Page 56, WABTOC and TOE Equipment: Maximum effort is being made by CONUS loading terminals to load all unit equipment on the same ship or ships. Operational circumstances, however, frequently preclude loading all of one unit's equipment on a single ship. Generally, ships loaded with unit equipment, including WABTOC items, are given priority of discharge over other ships in RVN ports. Pitfalls in the complete effectiveness of present policies are caused by uncontrolled factors such as a

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1st Ind

25 NOV 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
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shortage of ships at CONUS loading ports and congestion at some RVN ports. No further action is considered necessary by this headquarters as present policies will suffice once port facilities become more developed and port congestion and ship backlog is eliminated.

6. (C) Reference Paragraph 1g, Page 49, Lack of Supporting Aircraft for Psychological Warfare: COMUSMACV initiated action in August, 1966 (See MACV Message MACP D 293636) to increase the number of aircraft supporting PSYOP. To date six C-47's and 15 U-10's are operational in RVN with six more C-47's and 16 additional U-10's programmed for June, 1967.

7. (U) Reference Paragraph 2a, Page 50, Shortage of PSYOP-trained Personnel Assigned to Tactical Units: There is a critical shortage of PSYOP-trained personnel in USARV. Distribution of incoming PSYOP-trained personnel is controlled by this headquarters.

8. (C) Reference Paragraph 3a, Page 51, Interrogation of Captives and Other Personnel: COMUSMACV is cognizant of the lack of Vietnamese qualified interpreters. Action initiated to mitigate this shortage is the assignment of ARVN MI Detachments to US units at division and separate brigade levels.

9. (C) Reference Paragraph 3b, Page 51, Lack of Psychological Operational Intelligence: In Letter, Headquarters MACV, Subject: USMACV Psychological Operations Posture, 29 July 1966, COMUSMACV reiterated to senior commanders their responsibilities in the conduct of PSYOP.

10. (C) Reference Paragraph 4a, Page 51, Requirement to React Rapidly to the Tactical Situation Dictates Extensive Use of Available Airfields: Programmed airfield mat and membrane shipments due in-country over the next year will permit expanded C-130 airfield repair, maintenance, and new construction. Both items remain in critical supply at present and are allocated by MACV. This headquarters has also taken action to obtain MX-19 aluminum airfield matting for a total of 37 airfields and has requested deployment of two airborne engineer light equipment companies. Although this requirement was verified by JCS, deployment of these units is not expected before late 1967. On 10 September 1966, this headquarters also requested DA to provide airmobile engineer construction equipment for certain USARV engineer units. CINCSARPAC on 16 September 1966 concurred with the USARV request although no reply from DA has been received.

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11. (S) Reference Paragraph 4b, Pages 51-52, Sufficient Vehicles Have Not Been Available for Support of Brigade Size Operations: Within the II ARVN Corps tactical area, there are 15 truck companies presently in-country. 22 truck companies have been requested for location within II Corps area including the 669th Transportation Company which is scheduled to support the 1st Cavalry Division. Based on the programmed deployment, the capability for motor movement is expected to equal the requirement by the end of CY 67. As for depot replacement stocks, no 2½ ton trucks are due in RVN until the 3d Qtr. FY 67. The only other sources of 2½ ton trucks is the return of repairables from Okinawa which is sporadic.

12. (C) Reference Paragraph 4c, Page 52, Insufficient Quantities of Adhesive are Supplied with the Accessory Kits for T-17 Membrane Repair:

a. The selection of C-130 airfield sites with too low a bearing ratio, a volume of traffic exceeding design specifications, and the shortage of landing mat (See 10 above) over which the T-17 membrane should be laid for extended operations, have resulted in a large consumption of adhesive cement for repair purposes. Moreover, operational necessity has required the use of T-17 taxiway sets as runway sets, thus requiring additional adhesive for the increased number of joint panels. Another factor, contributing to the shortage, is the issue of adhesive to III MAF units which was not programmed.

b. This headquarters has taken action to increase the adhesive contained in each T-17 runway set from 10 gallons to 15 gallons. In addition, 246 T-17 rehabilitation kits, each containing 20 gallons of adhesive, have been ordered. Adhesive is also available in depot stocks (approximately 1000 gallons as of this date and another 1500 gallons on requisition) and is issued to units throughout RVN upon request.

13. (U) Reference Paragraph 5b, Pages 52-53, Identification of Stations on Signals Which Interfere With Radio Operations .....

a. Language barrier difficulties will continue to hamper efforts to resolve frequency interference problems. Progress has been made in the definition of frequency usage for both tactical FM and AN/TRC-24 frequencies, however. On 1 July 1966 a system of block frequency allocation for tactical FM frequencies was initiated which gave the Free World Forces frequencies distinct from those used by RVN Forces. A similar system for AN/TRC-24

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31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(12-channel radio relay) frequencies was effected during October and early November 1966. As the management of these systems becomes more proficient, resolution of accidental interference incidents will be possible through assignment records in most cases.

b. This headquarters agrees with the report that FM broadcasts from out of country stations are being received in Vietnam. The onset of the heavy monsoon rains has resulted in an atmospheric condition which results in an effect upon radio signals known as "ducting". Investigation has also revealed that using units have been reporting interference from friendly forces due to their ability to monitor transmissions of distant stations. This has indicated a lack of awareness on the part of numerous operators that the capture effect characteristic of FM equipment will permit them to over ride these transmissions and maintain communications with local stations. Action is being taken to promote more awareness of this characteristic of FM equipment on the part of commanders, staff officers, and radio operators in the subordinate commands.

c. At a recent conference called by J6/JGS RVNAF and attended by representatives from MACV J6, USARV and II FFORCEV, the problem of close coordination at the Corps level, pertaining to the use of frequencies in the 50-100 megacycles range was discussed. It was agreed that CG I FFORCEV, CG II FFORCEV and CG III MAF would act as the coordinating activity for all US Forces desiring to employ "A" band frequencies (50-100 mcs) on AN/TRC-24 equipment in their respective Corps areas. Recognizing that the AN/TRC-1 equipment employed by ARVN operate in the 70-100 mcs range, coordination with the appropriate ARVN Corps Signal Officer will be accomplished prior to activation of "A" band systems by US Forces.

d. During the above mentioned conference it was also agreed that representatives of the J6/JGS RVNAF and MACV J6 would conduct a joint study to better allocate "B" and "C" band AN/TRC-24 frequencies. This should result in a reduction of interference between friendly radio relay systems and airborne UHF equipment.

e. An Air Force, Electromagnetic Compatibility Team has recently arrived in-country. It was placed under the operational control of the MACV Frequency Coordinator and provides an in-country frequency policing capability.

14. (U) Reference Paragraph 5c, Page 54, Radio Voice Call Signs  
.....

a. This headquarters has previously recognized the effect that

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31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

unauthorized call signs has had on efforts to effectively police FM frequencies in the 27.0 - 75.95 mcs range.

b. Current call sign employment procedures permit the dropping of one of the two words derived from ACP-110, once initial contact is established. The use of one word thereafter should not prove a significant burden to personnel operating tactical nets.

c. Voice call signs derived from the ACP 110 and 119 series frequently are groupings of unfamiliar words and probably do prove difficult to some radio operators. The advantage of having secure call signs already prepared in tabulated form is considered to be of such value as to outweigh this objection. Also, the use of these call signs makes rapid identification of a unit through call sign assignment records possible. This provides for more immediate response to radio frequency interference problems. Accordingly, USARV SSI Item 50-4 is being published which requires all subordinate commands to derive their voice call signs from the ACP sources.

15. (U) Reference Paragraph 5d, Page 24, Staple Power Input for Transistorized Electric Equipment: It has been recognized that a requirement exists for stable AC power sources for use with transistorized communications equipment. As an example, the AC power supply being procured for use with Radio Set AN/PRC-25 has as a component variac to compensate for voltage and frequency changes of the AC power source.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

54 Incl  
nc

R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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RD

GPOP-OT(25 Aug 66) 2d Ind (C)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 16 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.
2. (U) Reference paragraph 10, 1st Indorsement: DA message 789558, DTG 072155Z November 1966, from ACSFOR informed this headquarters and USARV that DA proposed to purchase 10 company sets of airmobile engineer equipment for issue to non-airmobile combat engineer units.
3. (C) Reference paragraph 11, 1st Indorsement: USARV LOGSUM dated 16 December 1966 (USARV AVHGD-PO 41000) cites dues out of 473 each 2 1/2 ton trucks and states that 312 each were shipped from Baltimore. USAMC indicates that total requirements will be met from February production with anticipated arrival in RVN about 60 days after release from production.
4. (C) Reference paragraph 5d, page 54, basic report: USARV has been requested to elaborate on specific stable AC power source requirements in order for this headquarters to assist in this problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

54 Incl  
nc

*J. L. McMullin*  
J. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED  
INCLOSURE(S) SECRET COMPONENTS.

63


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HQ USARPAC

8-00-7563



# I FFORCEV OPERATIONAL REPORT




ON LESSONS LEARNED



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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# SPECIAL MAP II CTZ, RVM

SCALE: 1:1,000,000 (APPROXIMATE)






1st/101st

1st

2



1st/101st

1st ACD

3/25th INF

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3

OPN - FILLMORE  
25 MAR 21 JUL

XUAN DAI

LANGA  
DAM

CHINA

2

FILLMORE  
5 MAR 21 JUL

SEA

XUAN DAI

CG2

MA NHA

LANGA


DARE

GLOSSARY

B.	Ban	baie	bay
	Cho, Chu	village	village
	De	montagne	mountain
	Ea	village	village
	Hon	riviere	stream
	Hon	montagne	mountain
	Hon	ile	island
	Kong	massif	range
Kg.	Krong	riviere	stream
L.	Larg	village	village
N.	Nui	montagne	mountain
	Phu	montagne	mountain
Pi.	Plai	village	village
S.	Song	riviere	stream
S.	Suoi	riviere	stream
	Vung	baie	bay
X.	Xa, Xom	village	village


CUA DA NONG





XUAN DAI

3





# CONFIDENTIAL

## COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 MAY - 31 JULY

<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>		<u>MIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US	354	14	2,392	229
ROK	60	2	588	36
ARVN	<u>220</u>	(Not Available)	<u>1,690</u>	<u>229</u>
TOTAL	634	16	4,670	494

### KILL RATIO:

FWMAF	7.2 to 1
US	6.8 to 1
ROK	9.8 to 1
ARVN	7.3 to 1

## COMPARISON OF COMBAT LOSSES 1 JAN - 30 APRIL


<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>		<u>MIA</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
US	446	50	2,437	348
ROK	<u>202</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1,893</u>	<u>500</u>
	648	69	4,330	848

### KILL RATIO:

FWMAF	6.6 to 1
US	5.5 to 1
ROK	9.0 to 1

*Incl #3*


CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

UNITS ATTACHED OR ASSIGNED TO  
OR UNDER OPCON OF I FFORCEV  
DURING QUARTER 1966


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
HQ Co, I FFORCEV	No change		Nha Trang	Assigned
64th Engr Det	"		"	"
10 I FFORCEV Arty	"		"	"
1st Bn 30th Arty		20 July	Qui Nhon	" *
6th Bn 14th Arty		20 July	Pleiku	" *
54th Sig Bn	No Change		Nha Trang	"
52d Arty Gp	27 June		Pleiku	Attached
3d Bn 6th Arty	20 July		Pleiku	" *
13th RRU	8 June		Nha Trang	OPCON **
209th Sig Det	No change		"	Assigned
7th Avn Gp	"		"	OPCON
13th Mil Hist Det	"		"	Attached
41st Civil Affairs Co	12 June		"	Attached
55th MI Det	No change		"	Assigned
77th FA Det (RADAR)		20 July	Pleiku	Assigned *
235th FA Det (RADAR)		20 July	Qui Nhon	Assigned *
237th FA Det (RADAR)		26 May	Nha Trang	Assigned ***
238th FA Det (RADAR)	No change		Cam Ranh Bay	Assigned
48th Inf Det (RADAR)	"		Pleiku	Assigned
245th PsyOps Co	"		Nha Trang	OPCON
I Corps Adv Gp	"		Pleiku	"
1st Air Cav Div	"		An Khe	"
1st Bde 101st Abn Div	"		Tuy Hoa	"
3d Bde 25th Inf Div	"		Pleiku	"
2d ROK Mar Bde	"		Tuy Hoa	"
ROK Tiger Div	"		Qui Nhon	Mutual Coord
272d MP Co	"		Nha Trang	Assigned

\* Attached to 52d Arty Gp effective 20 Jul 66.

\*\* Det 4, 3d RRU was incorporated in the organization of 13th RRU.

\*\*\* 237th FA Det (RADAR) was attached to 54th Sig Bn, OPCON to CG, USASC, CRB for employment in the defense of Nha Trang.

Jul #6



—— OPCON

----- MUTUAL COORDINATION

===== ATTACHED

Sheet #7

L

# SECRET

I FFORCEV OPLAN'S - 1 MAY 66 TO 31 JUL 66

OPLAN 22-66 (CHAMBERLAIN) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in PHU CAT Mountain area of BINH DINH Province.

OPLAN 24-66 (DEVENS) - I FFORCEV contingency plan to relieve or reinforce DAK PEK CIDG camp.

OPLAN 25-66 (DAVY CROCKETT) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in the BONG SON area north of QUI NHON.

OPLAN 26-66 (COOPER) - I FFORCEV operation to interdict suspected lateral VC infiltration corridors leading from the Cambodian border to PHU YEN Province. (Cancelled because forces were committed to operation HAWTHORNE).

OPLAN 27-66 (SAM HOUSTON) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in the CHU DIE YA. (Cancelled because forces were committed to operation HAWTHORNE).

OPLAN 28-66 (BEAUREGARD) - I FFORCEV operation to conduct surveillance of the LAOTIAN - CAMBODIAN - RVN border and to conduct blocking and ambush operations along known and suspected VC infiltration routes in KONIUM Province.

OPLAN 29-66 (MARK TWAIN) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in the area west of NHA TRANG and DONG BA THIN to enhance security of the NHA TRANG - CAM RANH complex. (Cancelled due to commitment in operation HAWTHORNE).

OPLAN 30-66 (WASHINGTON) - COMUSMACV directed operation in I CTZ conducted in coordination with III MAR (I FFORCEV participation cancelled due to commitments in II CTZ).

OPLAN 31-66 (BUSHMASTER) - COMUSMACV directed contingency plan to conduct night ambushes astride VC infiltration routes throughout II CTZ.

OPLAN 32-66 (LONGSTREET II) - Operation requested by 937th Engineer Group to provide security for reconnaissance of Highway 1 from TUY HOA to QUI NHON.

OPLAN 33-66 (ROXBOROUGH II) - USAFV directed operation to select and secure, in coordination with Capital ROK Infantry Division, a staging area and initial deployment area for the 26th ROK Regiment deployment from the Republic of Korea to the Republic of Vietnam.

OPLAN 34-66 (HOOKER) - I FFORCEV operation to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance along the Cambodian - RVN border in PLEIKU Province.

OPLAN 35-66 (FULTON) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in TO HAP suspected VC base area SW of NHA TRANG. (Cancelled due to commitment in operation HAWTHORNE.)

OPLAN 36-66 (NATHAN HALE) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation. Operation was conducted in conjunction with Special Landing Force operation, DECKHOUSE I.

OPLAN 39-66 (JOHN PAUL JONES) - 18th Engineer Brigade requested security of VUNG RO BAY and Engineer port construction parties and security of Highway 1 from VUNG RO BAY to TUY HOA.

OPLAN 40-66 (JIM STUART) - COMUSMACV directed contingency plan to deploy 17th Abn Bde (Sep) to II CTZ.

OPLAN 42-66 (OLYMPIA & MABEL HOLMES) - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in northern BINH DINH Province.

June #8

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7513

# SECRET

## I FFORCEV FRAG ORDERS - MAY 66 TO 31 JULY 66

FRAG ORDER HAWTHORNE - I FFORCEV operation to evacuate TOUNBORNG garrison and to destroy elements of the 24th NVA Regiment.

FRAG ORDER NATHAN HALE - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation against the 188 and 95th NVA regiments. Operation was conducted in conjunction with Special Landing Force Operation DECK HOUSE I.

FRAG ORDER HENRY CLAY - I FFORCEV search and destroy operation in the HAROI VC base area.

FRAG ORDER 1-66 (JOHN PAUL JONES) - 18th Engineer Brigade requested security of LOC from VUNG HO BAY to TUY HOA.

FRAG ORDER 2-66 (PINE TREE) - I FFORCEV operation to secure 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division staging area at QUI NHON, route of march from staging area to base area and security of base area vicinity PLSTIKU. (Frag Order 2-66 was rescinded by Frag Order 8-66.)

FRAG ORDER 3-66 (HAYES) - I FFORCEV operation to conduct surveillance of known and suspected VC infiltration and supply routes in KONTHU Province.

FRAG ORDER 4-66 (LIGHTWOOD) - I FFORCEV operation to secure 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) to include security of staging area at TUY HOA, security of route of march from staging area to base area and security of base area vicinity TUY HOA. (Operation cancelled because 196th Infantry Brigade (Sep) was diverted to I CTZ.)

FRAG ORDER 5-66 (ROUNDOUT III) - I FFORCEV and Capitol ROK Infantry Division coordinated operation to sponsor the Headquarters, ROK Force Vietnam Field Command, 9th ROK Infantry Division and the Operations Company, 5th Signal Battalion in Vietnam.

FRAG ORDER 8-66 (IVY LEAF) - I FFORCEV operation to secure 4th Infantry Division (-) to include the staging area at QUI NHON, the route of march from the staging area to the base area and security of the base area vicinity PL IKU. (FRAG ORDER 8-66 was rescinded by FRAG ORDER 11-66.)

FRAG ORDER 9-66 (SOUTH CAROLINA) - COMUSMACV directed contingency operation to deploy a three battalion brigade to I CTZ.

FRAG ORDER 10-66 (ROAD RUNNER) - I FFORCEV order to execute ROAD RUNNER operations.


FRAG ORDER 12-66 (EMERSON) - I FFORCEV operation to conduct search and destroy operations in the VAN CANH - DONG TRE area.


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


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




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
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


P H A N

1 OPN CRAZY HORSE  
18 MAY - 5 JUNE



#13



1

KONG NANG

THAI DUAT

5

NGON MAH

WANG YANG

OPN HA

2-20

Dak Su

VB7

Sono Uouang

ZB AS

AS

12

PN HAWTHORNE  
2-20 JUNE

17

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**Dak Sun**

10-21-01

3

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# 21 JUNE

4

10-12 JUL

5



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


June 15














OPN HAYES

18 JUL



OPN BEAUFEGARD

29 JUNE 15 JUL

1

○市井ノ風

BR4

BR9

KONG SUWET

KONG WAN HOKU

N G P H A N

KONG TIC KONG

CHU TAY

CHU TAY

OPEN NATHAN HALE  
19 JUNE - 1 JULY 66

CHU TAY

CHU TAY


CHU TAY



CHINA

OPN  
DECKHOUSE  
18-27 JUNE

SEA



SLF


SSS

GLOSSARY

Ban	baie
Cho, Chu	village
De	montagne
Ea	village
Hon	village
Hoi	montagne
Kong	baie
Kong	village
Lam	village
Phu	montagne
Phu	montagne
Phu	village
Song	village
Song	village
Song	village
Vung	baie
Xa, Xom	village

Sheet #17






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A black and white photograph of a map, likely a military or historical map, with the text "OPN HENRY CLAY" and "2-20 JULY" overlaid in large, bold, black letters. The map shows a region with various place names and geographical features. The text is centered over the map, with "OPN HENRY CLAY" on the top line and "2-20 JULY" on the bottom line. The map itself is a detailed topographical map with contour lines, rivers, and numerous place names. The text is superimposed on the map, partially obscuring some of the details. The overall image has a high-contrast, grainy appearance, typical of a photocopy or a scan of a physical document.








4







OPN HENRY CLAY  
2-30 JULY









**SECRET**

CHINA


SEA

OPINION  
PAUL JONES  
21 JUL

GLOSSARY

Ban	hamlet	ba	bay
Cho	village	ba	village
Chu	mountain	ba	mountain
De	village	ba	village
Ea	stream	ba	stream
Hon	mountain	ba	mountain
Hon	island	ba	island
Kong	massif	ba	massif
Kong	range	ba	range
Kong	river	ba	river
Kong	village	ba	village






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
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BY MONTAG  
S-00-7513

ANNEX A TO LOT

MAP OF SOUTH VIETNAM



LEGEND: I - RICHMOND AREA, 52d Ave. 101  
II - COASTAL AREA NORTH, 14th Ave. 101  
III - COASTAL AREA SOUTH, 10th Ave. 101

UNCLASSIFIED

Incl #22

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO 96240

REGULATION  
NUMBER 95-1

3 July 1966

AVIATION

Joint Airborne/Airmobile Airstrip Operation

1. PURPOSE: a. To prescribe procedures and fix responsibilities for the joint use of forward airstrips during airborne/airmobile operations.

b. To establish safe operations criteria for forward airstrips used in airborne/airmobile operations.

2. GENERAL: Airmobile operations in II CTZ require intensive use of forward airstrips by fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Joint Army and Air Force use of forward supply bases is often mandatory. Efficient operations and safety considerations require that minimum landing zone safety criteria, air traffic control, control of vehicular traffic and loading and unloading areas be established.

3. MISSION PLANNING: A joint planning conference, whenever tactical situation permits, will be held at this headquarters approximately seven days prior to a major operation to discuss logistical support. The senior Army aviation commander supporting the ground tactical unit or his representative will attend this planning conference to coordinate details of air traffic control with BASC, other appropriate Air Force personnel and representatives of 125th Air Traffic Control Company. The plan will include the air traffic control frequencies, traffic patterns to be used by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, approach and departure corridors, control of vehicles and pedestrian traffic in the vicinity of the airstrip, and other procedures or restrictions peculiar to the operations.

4. CONTROL: a. Airfield Control Officer. The senior Army aviation commander supporting the tactical unit will be the Airfield Control Officer. He or his designated representative, will have the following responsibilities:

(1) Insure compliance with the minimum landing zone safety criteria as specified in Annex A.

(2) Supervise overall operation of the airstrip including traffic control and associated ground support activities.

(3) Supervise Combat Control (USAF) or Air Traffic Control (USA) Teams activities, and movement of aircraft, aircraft parking, aircrew safety practices, all vehicular traffic on the airfield and aircraft unloading.

(4) Insure that all aircraft and helicopters operating within

Incl 28



Regulation Number 95-1, HQ, I FFORCEV, dated 3 Jul 66

a radius of 1 mile of the airfield maintain radio contact with the control tower.

b. The senior US commander of the supported unit in the area of operation will be responsible for:

- (1) Control of vehicle and pedestrian traffic in vicinity of airstrip.
- (2) Removal of cargo from cargo ramp.
- (3) Insuring sound safety practices are followed.
- (4) Security of the airfield.
- (5) Establish and monitor an artillery firing advisory service to the airfield control tower.

c. Limited airlift supply or resupply activities that do not warrant assigning an Airfield Control Officer to the airstrip will be supervised by the senior US commander or advisor at the location. Direct coordination between all aircraft commanders and the senior US commander or advisor is authorized to insure safe, efficient airlift operations.

5. To assist the Airfield Control Officer, a US Air Force Combat Control Team or ATC Team from the 125th ATC Company will be deployed to provide air traffic control at the primary airfield in the area of operation. Normally, a brigade size or larger operation will require ATC facilities.


6. REFERENCES:

- a. MACV Directive 95-5.
- b. MACV Directive 95-6.
- c. MACV Directive 95-9.

(AVF-IV)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:



NEIL M. MATZGER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

JOHN R. DEANE, JR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

A



MINIMUM LANDING ZONE CLEAR AREA AND LATERAL SAFETY ZONE CRITERIA FOR C-123  
AND C-130 AIRCRAFT

1. Runway Shoulder:
  - a. Width: 10 feet from runway edge.
  - b. Length: Equal to runway length.
  - c. Obstructions: None.
2. Runway Clear Area:
  - a. Width: 35 feet from edge of shoulder.
  - b. Length: Equal to runway length.
  - c. Obstructions: None.
3. Runway Lateral Safety Zone.
  - a. Width: 75 feet from edge of clear area.
  - b. Length: Equal to runway length.
  - c. Obstructions: No fixed or movable obstacles protruding above + 7:1.
4. Taxiway Shoulder: Same as runway.
5. Taxiway Clear Area.
  - a. Width: 65 feet from shoulder.
  - b. Length: Equal to taxiway length.
  - c. Obstructions: None.

Annex A to HQ I F FORCEV, Regulation Number 95-1, 3 July 1966

WARNING TO THE VIET CONG:

If you come to take rice from the people of Dai Dien  
area of Dien Khanh DEATH will be there to greet you!



GIRL

76-6-245N

- A. Do You remember: RALLY TO GVN
- B. It's been so long- RALLY TO GVN
- C. Please remember me RALLY TO GVN
- D. If you really care, RALLY TO GVN NOW

Nếu Bạn Muốn Đoi Xứ Thất Tử. Tế  
Hãy Quy Chánh 76-6-245N

Incl 24'

WARNING TO THE VIET CONG:

If you come to take rice from the people of Dai Dien  
area of Dien Khanh DEATH will be there to greet you!

## *Hãy Coi Chờ!*

Nếu các bạn đến cướp thóc lúa của đồng bào vùng  
Đại-Diên, Diên-Khánh Thần Chết sẽ tiếp đón các  
bạn ở đấy!

FRONT: Illustration

Is your Family Living in Peace?

BACK: Is your Family Living in Peace?

If your family is living in a VC controlled area, surely it isn't in peace.

As you have seen, everytime the GVN initiates operations to destroy VC secret bases. The VC have used your homes and villages as a battlefield, thus causing danger to the people who live in that area.

Surely you know that innocent villagers are warned so that they may avoid damage to their homes. However, danger cannot be avoided for everyone, especially old people and children.

There is only one way to guarantee safety for your loved ones: that is to bring them to the free areas that are controlled by the GVN.

You also have a guarantee for yourself: use the National Safe Conduct Pass and go to the Chieu Hoi center. You will be united with your family and reestablished in a new life of happiness and freedom.

SF 1114



In 1289

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SP 1114

**CHIAI CÓ PHƯƠNG CÁCH BẢO  
ĐẢM AN-NINH CHO CHÍNH BẠN**

**KHÔNG ?**

Nếu gia đình bạn sống trong vùng Việt Cộng kiểm soát, chắc KHÔNG THỂ NÀO ĐƯỢC BÌNH AN.

Như các bạn đã từng thấy, mỗi khi Chính Phủ V. N. C. H mở cuộc hành quân tiêu diệt các mật khu Việt Cộng thì bọn Việt Cộng dùng nhà cửa, làng mạc các bạn làm chướngướng khiến những gia đình ở trong vùng đó lâm vào tình trạng vô cùng nguy hiểm. Các bạn chắc cũng biết, đồng bào vô tội được loan báo trước để tránh sự thiệt hại về nhân mạng. Tuy nhiên dân bà, trẻ con và những người già cả sống trong những vùng đó có thể phải chịu sự nguy hiểm.

Chai có phương cách bảo đảm an-ninh cho thân quyền các bạn là dời họ ra ngay vùng tự do, do Chính - Phủ kiểm soát.

Cũng có một cách bảo đảm an-ninh cho chính bạn: bạn hãy dùng tờ Thông Hành Quốc Gia ra nhờ Chính Phủ bảo - vệ theo đường trình Chieu-Hoi. Bạn sẽ có thể sống chung với gia đình và xây dựng cuộc sống mới trong Hạnh-phúc và tự do.

SP-1114

## RALLY INSTRUCTION LEAFLET

1. Make a big "X" visible from the air. Logs, stones, bundles of straw.
2. If possible, build a smoking fire on two sides of the "X".
3. When an aircraft sees the marker, he will signal by turning on landing light. If area is big enough, the helicopter will land and meet you.
4. If allied forces are close, follow the direction the aircraft flies. Weapon muzzle down.
5. Allied forces or National Army soldiers will meet you. You will be treated kindly and given food and medicine.

### REVERSE:

Comrades in the ranks of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Troops, you have suffered much for your communist masters in a futile war. You have this chance to avoid a useless, inglorious, and lonely death.

Each rallier will receive a reward for his weapon and ammunition. Read carefully the instructions on the other side of this leaflet and follow the road to a new and happy life.



### Làm Cách Nào Để Quy Chánh.

1. Làm dấu chữ X lớn, bằng khúc cây, đá sỏi, bó rơm để tu trên không trông xuống có thể thấy được.
2. Nếu có thể được, nhúm khói hai bên chữ thập (X), sáng lên. Nếu nói ấy rõ ràng thì phi-co sẽ đáp xuống và chở các bạn đi.
3. Khi phi-co thấy dấu hiệu đó thì sẽ chiếu đèn sáng lên. Nếu nói ấy rõ ràng thì phi-co sẽ đáp xuống.
4. Nếu có quân đội đồng minh đóng gần đó, các bạn hãy đi theo hướng phi-co, chỉ súng xuống đất khi bạn đi chuyển.
5. Quân đội quốc gia và đồng minh sẽ tiếp đón các bạn. Các bạn sẽ được xử tử tế và sẽ được thực phẩm và thuốc men.

## RALLY INSTRUCTION LEAFLET

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2. If possible, build a smoking fire on two sides of the "X".
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
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Các Bạn Trong Hàng Ngũ Việt Cộng  
Các bạn đã chịu đau khổ dưới ách thống trị của  
quan thầy công sản trong một chiến tranh vô nghĩa.  
Các bạn được cơ hội này để tránh cái chết cô đơn,  
vô danh vọng và vô ích.  
Mỗi quy chánh viên sẽ được trọng thưởng về số vũ  
khí và đạn dược mà các bạn đã mang về.  
Hãy đọc kỹ những điều chỉ dẫn phía bên kia truyền  
đơn để đi vào một cuộc sống tự do và hạnh phúc.  
76-1-245N





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## **HÙNG CÁC BẠN NGƯỜI PHỤ.**

Chính phủ Việt Nam công hòa và quân đội đồng minh lấy làm tiếc phải chặn ghe thuyền của các bạn để kiểm soát. Nhưng số chúng tôi, chúng tôi ở đây giúp đỡ các bạn. Chúng tôi rất tiếc phải chặn đứng công việc của các bạn, trong lúc bạn làm việc. Chúng tôi cũng lưu ý các bạn là lúc nào cũng phải mang theo số ghe và thẻ căn cước. Chúng tôi cố gắng không cho Việt cộng xử dụng nổi danh các của các bạn để làm chỗ ẩn nấp. Chúng tôi xin các bạn đừng giúp đỡ Việt cộng. Hãy nói chúng tôi biết những gì bạn biết về Việt cộng. Chúng nào chúng tôi đánh đuổi được hết bọn người độc ác ấy khỏi đất đai và hai phần của bạn thì các bạn sẽ được sống trong thanh bình. Muốn đánh đuổi Việt cộng, chúng tôi cần sự giúp đỡ của các bạn. Các bạn có thể can đảm trả lời những câu hỏi sau đây của tôi không ?

Các bạn có thấy Việt cộng ở trong vùng này không?

Các bạn có biết trại Việt cộng ở ở đâu không?

Việt cộng dùng những loại ghe nào ?

Các bạn có thể nói hoặc chỉ cho chúng tôi tàu của Việt cộng không?

Các bạn có biết Việt cộng chờ đợi tiếp tế tại đâu không?

Có bao Việt cộng đến nhà bạn trong tuần này?

VIỆT CỘNG ĐÃ ĐI ĐÂU RỒI ?


Hiện nay có Việt cộng trong làng của bạn không ? Bao nhiêu?

Việt cộng có lấy cá của bạn không?

Các bạn có cần đánh Việt cộng không? Chúng tôi sẽ giúp đỡ các bạn nếu các bạn cần chúng tôi. Chúng tôi đang cố gắng giúp bạn tìm bọn người độc ác ấy!

Xin thăm Hà bá Long Vương ở với bạn và giúp các bạn đánh đuổi nhiều cá.

76-11-245N



TO THE FISHERMAN, OUR FRIENDS

The government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Free World Military Forces regret stopping and searching your boat. Do not be afraid of us, we are here to help you. We are sorry to stop you at your work. We must ask that you carry at all times your boat registration papers and your identification card. We are trying to keep the wild Viet Cong from using your fishing grounds as a hiding place. We must ask that you do not help the Viet Cong. Tell us anything you know about the Viet Cong. Soon the evil ones will be driven from your land and your waters and you will be at peace. To drive the Viet Cong we need your help. Can you be brave and answer any of my questions?

Have you seen any Viet Cong in this area?

Do you know of any Viet Cong camps?

What type of boats do the Viet Cong use?

Can you show me or tell me of any Viet Cong boats?

Do you know where the Viet Cong load supplies?

How many Viet Cong came by your house this week?

Where did the Viet Cong go?

Are there any Viet Cong in your village now?

How many?

Do the Viet Cong take fish from you?

Do you need help to fight the Viet Cong?

We will help you if you need our help. We are trying to protect you by seeking out the evil ones.

May the Queen of Water, Ha Ba Long Vuong be with you and fill your nets with many fine fish.

76-11-245N

## TO THE VC SOLDIERS

This is an important message which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam sends you.

Do you know that now the GVN has a policy which is to receive Vietnamese and Montagnard Communist Soldiers who were tricked into believing the VC propaganda. Now these men desire and volunteer to return to the GVN; and they are striving to bring back brotherhood between the Vietnamese and Montagnard people, peace for the country, and a solid, prosperous economy for our fatherland.

This policy is called the Chieu Hoi program, which was activated by the GVN.

At every province and district, there has been set up a Chieu Hoi office.

The responsibility of Chieu Hoi personnel is to help those who leave the VC ranks to return to the GVN.

SP 1221 (P)

### KO PHUNG JING JONG KHOAN VIET-KLIN

Anet jing kiei hui yuom bhai mong knuk kua  
Viet-Nam engie ko di ih.  
Di ih thao ko knuk kua Viet-Nam engie mao  
sa brua kai car jum wit phung kin KUON leh  
anin phung Klin EDE-GA po la leh hiem kiei  
kua Viet-Klin mit lae leh anin po buan hiem  
hrueti anap ko di go so rang jing suk suor hong  
knuk kua Viet-Nam engie, leh anin du kua  
brua kai car Viet-Nam engie bi mao kiei hui  
enang hiem car ala, jing ayong adei suk suor  
kplah wah YUAN hong EDE-GA leh anin sa kiei  
mkuom jak bak lei hiep mda ko gap co muuh  
buan sang.

Brua kai car knuk kua Viet-Nam engie kap  
jum wit go phung Viet-Klin hiep kiei anin  
jing brua kai car loo wit phung wor ilan.  
Hiem brua knuk kua mao sa boh aoi ma brua  
loo wit phung wor ilan hiem gap boh sang  
brua koi leh car leh anin car.  
Kiei buan rong ko gap co muuh wor ilan  
kiei du ko po phut leh Viet Klin lo wit ko  
knuk kua Viet-Nam engie.

Incl 21'

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SP 1221 (P)

### CÔNG CÁC CÁN BINH VIỆT CỘNG

Đây là một bức thư quan trọng do Chính Phủ Việt-Nam Cộng Hòa gửi đến các bạn.

Các bạn có biết rằng Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa hiện đang có một chính sách nhằm tiếp đón những cán binh Việt Thương Cộng, những người lỡ tin theo sự tuyên truyền nhảm nhí của Việt Cộng nay thành thật muốn trở về và tự nguyện trong tương lai sẽ trung thành và ủng hộ chính sách của Chính Phủ, cố gắng làm việc để mang lại tinh huynh để giữa đồng bào Kinh Thượng, hòa bình cho xứ sở và một nền kinh tế vững mạnh để mang lại sự thịnh vượng cho tất cả mọi người.

Chính sách này gọi là chính sách Chieu Hoi do Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa chủ trương.

Ở một cấp lý và quận lý đều có đặt văn phòng Chieu Hoi.

Nhiệm vụ của nhân viên Chieu Hoi là giúp đỡ những người đã rời bỏ hàng ngũ Việt Cộng để trở về với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa.

SP-1221(P)

Incl 21'



Letter to Y Ka, Y Soon, Y Hong, Y Kinh of A-37 1st Bn Darlac Province.

I am Y Bah, Nie, 2nd Lt., political commissar of A37, 1st Bn, Darlac Province, I would like to let you know that I have returned to the GVN on 2 June 66. Don't be unhappy and think that I am a traitor, because before returning to the GVN I had pondered over my decision carefully. I realized that we have followed communist VC over ten years, bearing hardship and sufferings, many friends of ours had died in the jungle, in result we have never received any rewards from VC. Those Montagnard villages which have not been liberated are prosperous while those liberated ones people live in fear and hardship. People are tired of us, they want to stay away from us. We have no objective for our struggle. Is it not right that we have been exploited by VC to realize their aggression?

I am welcomed and treated well, I am provided many things, this is contrary to the false propaganda of the VC.

This is a brief short letter, I hope you understand and make up your mind to return as I did.

76-6-245(P)



# TÂM THƯ

Gửi các bạn Y Ka, Y Soon, Y Hong, Y Kinh thuộc A37 Tiểu Đoàn 1 Tỉnh Đắk Lắk:

Tôi Y Bah Nie thiếu úy chính trị viên A37 Tiểu Đoàn 1 Tỉnh Đắk Lắk xin báo tin cùng các bạn là tôi đã ra trình diện quy chuẩn chính quyền quốc gia ngày 2-6-66.

Xin các bạn hãy bước mà cho rằng tôi là kẻ phản bội, vì trước khi quy chuẩn tôi đã suy nghĩ rất nhiều. Tôi thấy chúng ta đã theo cộng sản từ mười mấy năm, từng chịu đựng gian khổ, nhiều bạn hiền đã phải bỏ mình trong rừng rồi cuộc chiến ta cũng vẫn chưa được một ân huệ nào của cộng sản cả. Những làng Thượng chưa được chúng ta giải phóng đều sống lầm lũi sung túc, trái lại những buôn chúng ta đến giải phóng chỉ làm cho dân chúng thêm lo sợ và khổ cực. Đồng bào chán ghét, căm thù ra hành chúng ta. Chúng ta không còn lý do gì để chiến đấu nữa. Phải chăng chúng ta bị lợi dụng xương máu để cộng sản thực hiện mộng xâm lăng.

Ở đây tôi được đối đãi rất tử tế được cung cấp đầy đủ mọi thứ cần thiết để sinh sống, trái lại với lời tuyên truyền láo nháo của cộng sản. Mấy lời văn tắt mong các bạn thông cảm suy nghĩ lại và trở về như tôi.

Thân ái,  
Nie Bah

Incl 26

TO ALL VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGNARD PEOPLE

Do you recognize the two young men on this leaflet? Look closely, please. The two young men are Y-Tuc and Y-Tuk, formerly of the hamlet of Buon Dham in Darlac Province.

Recently they quit the Viet Cong to come back to the side of the Government of Vietnam. They did not join the Viet Cong from choice but by force. After many sad days with the Viet Cong, they are learning to smile and laugh again in the land of the red and yellow flag of Vietnamese and Montagnard brothers.

How did these two fellows escape from the Viet Cong? They only pretended to follow the Viet Cong. Then they requested their leader to give them one free day of leave -- and on this occasion they cleverly escaped to return to the GVN.

Did you know that thousands of young men like Y-Tuc and Y-Tuk have done the same thing? Yes, they were more clever than their Viet Cong leaders. No wonder that Viet Cong morale is zero. The Viet Cong leaders know that almost everyone is trying to return to the GVN, even some of themselves.

76-7-245(F)

KỎ JIH JANG MNUIH YUÂN LEH ANĂN ÊĐÊ-GA.

Di ih thảo kral mớ 2 cô hêh êdam hăm hia mớ anei? Pap mñai lèp ksilêm bẽ bi nìk tam. Phung 2 cô hêh êdam anei jing Y-Tuế leh anăn Y-Tuk mphun dô di gở dđk ti buôn Dham hăm cớ Dak-Lak dlei pò.

Mrão anei di gở phũ hẽ Việt-Klin đũe hriê dđk tĩng kớ knũk kna Việt-Nam Êngiê. Di gở amáo dđj cớng thớng dđk tĩng kớ Việt-Klin ôh biđadah hớng kiei Việt-Klin mtrũt mớ di gở. Lu hruê leh di gở dđk kớu hńĩng hớng Việt-Klin, di gở hriam tiao đũĩn arã anei leh anăn lỏ đah tiao hăm lãn mào hĩa chiám gru hrah leh anăn kñi phung ayũng adej Yuân-Êđê-Ga.

Si ngũ dua cô mah jĩng anei tiao hẽ mớng Việt-Klin lẽ? Di gở kớng hũuê ngũ si Việt-Klin mớh. L gở akho mdei hẽ sa hruê kớ Khua di gở leh anăn hớng kiei hũe hĩm mĩn kớ tiao hĩng đũe dđk hẽ tĩng kớ knũk kna Việt-Nam Êngiê.

Di ih thảo leh mớ kớ êđeo-êđeo cô hăm phung hêh êdam mớ si Y-Tuc leh anăn Y-Tuk mào ngũ leh kiei mớ?

Ờ, di gở thảo mĩn prai hĩn kớ phung Khua Việt-Klin. Amáo mào kiei yuôm bĩn ôh hăm kiei hriam mĩm bũũ Việt-Klin kớng ỹũ jĩng boh hỏĩ (zéro). Phung Khua Việt-Klin thảo leh mớ kớ pát chiám gũp cô mnuih lỏng lỏ đũe dđk hớng knũk kna Việt-Nam Êngiê, vũt hăm phung Khua di ỹũ pỏ mớ chiám wĩt.



Inset 243

**TO ALL VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGNARD PEOPLE**

Do you recognize the two young men on this leaflet? Look closely, please. The two young men are Y-Tuc and Y-Tuk, formerly of the hamlet of Buon Dham in Darlac Province.

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76-7-245(F)



**THÂN GỬI TOÀN THỂ ĐỒNG BÀO KINH THƯỢNG:**

Các bạn có biết hai thanh niên trong hình này là ai không? Họ là Y Túc và Y Túc người xã Buon Dham thuộc tỉnh Darlac Họ vừa rời bỏ hàng ngũ Việt Cộng để trở về với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa. Trước kia họ theo Việt Cộng không phải vì họ muốn mà vì bị bắt buộc. Sau những ngày sống cực khổ với Việt Cộng, ngày nay họ lại bắt đầu tìm lại được lẽ sống trên mảnh đất tự do dưới màu cờ vàng đỏ của đồng bào Kinh Thượng.

Làm thế nào mà hai thanh niên này thoát khỏi vùng Việt Cộng được? Thoạt đầu họ giả vờ theo Việt Cộng, rồi họ xin phép cấp chỉ huy được nghỉ phép một ngày và nhân dịp này họ trốn trở về với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa.

Các bạn có biết rằng hằng ngàn thanh niên trẻ như Y Túc và Y Túc đã làm như vậy để trốn thoát không? Những người này đã chứng tỏ rằng họ khôn ngoan hơn cả cấp chỉ huy của họ. Chúng ta không nên ngạc nhiên mà thấy tình thân các cán binh Việt Cộng mỗi ngày một thấp. Các cấp chỉ huy Việt Cộng biết rằng hầu hết các cán binh đều muốn trở về với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa.

76-7-245(P)

*Incl 263*

PVT Truong Danh Tho  
5th Bn  
52nd Regt.

This man has made the right choice. He has returned to the GVN,  
and will begin a new life. When will you return. The GVN is waiting  
to welcome you.

76-9-245(P)



BINH NHI TRUONG-DANH THO, THUỘC  
TIỂU ĐOÀN 6, TRUNG ĐOÀN 52.

BINH NHI NÀY ĐÃ CHỌN ĐÓN SỰ SỐNG  
CHÍNH ĐÁNG. ANH ĐÃ TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHẤM  
CHUYỀN VIỆT NAM VÀ SẼ LẬP LẠI CUỘC  
ĐỜI MỚI. KINH NGHIỆM ĐÀN TỬ VIỆT CHẤM  
CHUYỀN VIỆT NAM CHƯA CẦN CẢM ỨNG.

76-9-245(P)

Incl. 22

PVT Truong Danh Tho  
5th Bn  
52nd Regt.

This man has made the right choice. He has returned to the GVN,  
and will begin a new life. When will you return. The GVN is waiting  
to welcome you.

76-9-245(P)



CHỌI CHỌN PHẢI LỰA CHỌN TẾ VỚI CHỌN CHỌN SẴN TẾ  
ANH CHỌN CHỌN CHỌN TIỀN ĐÓNG ?


Incl 244


# SPECIAL MAP


SECRET

II CTZ, RVN

SCALE: 1:1,000,000 (APPROXIMATE)







SECRET



HEADQUARTERS 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION  
APO US Forces 96490

AVCCM

2 May 1966

SUBJECT: Summary of E159 Canister, Riot Control CS Munition Activities

TO: Commanding General  
I Field Force Vietnam  
ATTN: Chemical Officer  
APO US Forces 96240

1. The division received 21 E159's and to date has expended 4 for Training and 10 on combat support missions. All munitions were delivered as E159 double clusters from the bomb rack of a UH-1B helicopter equipped with an XM16 arament sub-system. All clusters were released at an altitude above the target of 1500 feet using a manual release system, where the crew chief initiated the drop upon the pilot's command. All munitions functioned except one. All munitions were activated by using 2 E63 timers. Modification as described below was made to all of the munitions since the munitions as delivered were designed for release at a height of 500 feet, an unacceptable altitude for helicopter operations in the area of operations. Preferred operational altitudes for helicopters are either "on the deck" or above 1500 feet.

2. The employment of each cluster follows.

a. On 19 and 21 March 1966, three munitions were test fired to adjust the timer settings for proper height of functioning and to develop a method of mounting the clusters. On the initial drop the instruction manual setting of 7.9 seconds was used. The munition impacted upon the ground and then activated. A second munition was dropped using settings of 5 and 6 seconds. One of the E158's functioned before the munition hit the ground and the second E158 functioned after impact. Because of the height of the E63 timers above the strongback the bomb rack suspension lugs were modified by welding a rod extension loop to them so that sufficient clearance was available between the bomb rack and the cluster tip for the E63 timers. On the third test firing the E158's were detached from the strongback, rotated 60° and reattached to the strongback using

CM1-97-66-C

CC

Incl 28

AVCCM

SUBJECT: Summary of E159 Canister, Ric' Control CS Munition Activities

four 5/8 inch metal bands, two on each E158. This modification permitted the strongback to be hooked directly to the bomb rack since the timers did not interfere. This modification was used on all subsequent E159's fired. After the cluster was locked in the bomb rack, two static lines were attached from the arming wire, of the two M63 timer initiators, to the aircraft. When the E159 was released from the bomb rack the arming wires were extracted. The mechanical time initiators were set for a 3 second delay. On 30 April a 4th test was conducted using a higher drop height, 2000 feet, with a 4 second setting on the timers.

b. The results of these trial firings were as follows:

<u>Test No.</u>	<u>Timer Setting</u>	<u>HOB</u>	<u>Coverage</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	7.9 sec	Ground impact	150x150m	Munitions functioned after impact-noticeable billowing. Excellent coverage
2	5.0/6.0 sec	Partial Ground impact	150x150m	Excellent coverage
3	3.0 sec	300 feet	200x300m	All modules exploded prior to impact cloud rose thru trees - 4 grass fires were started. Excellent coverage Average duration 5 minutes.
4	4.0 sec	350	300x300m	

c. On 071400 April, the 1/9 Cav employed two E159's in a fire support mission. The target was suspected VC in foxholes along a wooded creek line at YV 815690. The CS was employed to drive the VC into the open, to reduce ground fire at helicopters and friendly positions. The cluster was dropped at an altitude of 1500 feet with a timer setting of 4 seconds. The CS mission was followed by a 2.75" rocket fire mission and an Air Force air strike. The first cluster was off target due to a mistaken signal to release the cluster. The second cluster was on target. Both clusters detonated about 100 feet above the ground with an initial area coverage of about 150 x 100 meters before the cloud moved along the creek. No friendly

AVCCM

SUBJECT: Summary of E159 Canister, Riot Control CS Munition Activities

troops moved into the area but the small arms firing did subside.

d. Again on 11 April the 1/9 Cav dropped two bombs on enemy targets. This time the targets were bunkers and foxholes along a creek at YB 846311 and YB 843312. Once again the bombs were mechanically released from the bomb racks of a UH-1B at 1500 feet and with a 4 second timer setting. Both targets received direct hits and coverage was reported as excellent. No enemy activity was observed, leading to the suspicion that no enemy were present. This was confirmed on the following day when a ground patrol inspected the area and discovered no signs of enemy presence.

e. Another two E159's were dropped in support of the 1/12 Cav north of LZ to suppress small arms fire along a creek bed at coordinates YV 855897. The target was marked by smoke and the drop was preceded and followed by intense ARA and TAC Air. The E159 was dropped 150 meters north along a wood line. Even though the bomb was dropped a little too far north the coverage was excellent and the small arms fire was suppressed but the enemy did not leave their holes. The lesson learned from this attack was that when employing CS, some plausible chance must exist for the enemy to survive if you desire to get him from his foxholes. This was the first time the enemy did not attempt to leave a CS mission area. Presumably because of the intense ARA and TAC Air both before and after, he elected to stay in his holes regardless of the CS, although his firing was suppressed.

f. On 27 April at coordinates AS 815385 two more E159's were used in support of a joint mission on an LZ for the 2/5 Cav. The objective was to drive the enemy into ambush sites. On this occasion one E159 malfunctioned due to the powder train being wet (the munition had been exposed to heavy rain). The second munition gave excellent coverage (100 x 150 meters) although no movement was noted.

### 3. Recommendations:

a. When CS is used on dug in troops it should be employed in the initial strikes on the target.

b. Two E159's be employed on each target.

c. E158 clusters could be attached to a more inexpensive hard back for use on helicopters.

d. For delivery from the XM16 system timers should not be mounted in such a fashion that they interfere with the suspension lug system.

AVCOM

SUBJECT: Summary of M59 Canister Riot Control CS Munition Activities

e. A more accurate timer is also desirable.

4. Generally, the system proved effective and it is the only quick responding combat munition available for CS. Expedient action should be taken to procure more devices as soon as possible. This headquarters will, by separate action, request operational quantities of this munition.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/MALCOLM R. BAER  
t/MALCOLM R. BAER  
Lt Col, AGC  
Adjutant General


A TRUE COPY

*John P. Crispell*  
JOHN P. CRISPPELL  
LTC, CMIC  
Chemical Officer


CONFIDENTIAL



June 29'



June 29<sup>2</sup>




June 29<sup>3</sup>



Jul 29<sup>th</sup>







Incl 295


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# SPECIAL MAP II CTZ, RVM

SCALE: 1:1,000,000 (APPROXIMATE)







VC TAX COLLECTION  
POINTS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HEADQUARTERS  
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO US Forces 96240

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
BULLETIN NUMBER 3

28 May 1966

1. PURPOSE: This bulletin is published in an attempt to assist units by exchanging ideas and information, highlighting deficiencies and offering possible solutions.

2. CIVIC ACTION PUBLIC RELATIONS: It has been found that the Vietnamese in urban areas know little or nothing about the major civic action and social efforts being made in the rural areas. Each unit commander who is involved in such activities should attempt to make this information available to inhabitants of urban in his vicinity. Civic action activities need to be fully publicized in the public information media to insure that as many people as possible are aware of the support being given to the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The publicity should emphasize combined ARVN/US/PWMAF efforts. US/PWMAF units will not, attempt to publicize these efforts directly with the Vietnamese public. Make the information available to the local JUSPAO representative who may be able to provide word-of-mouth dissemination through the Vietnamese Information Service, the Vietnamese-American Association or the Vietnamese Friendship Committee.

3. US MILITARY PERSONNEL AND VIETNAMESE CUSTOMS:

a. The Vietnamese people look upon a public display of affection between male and female as undesirable. This includes the simple act of holding hands. US military personnel should be made aware of this and the ill effect it has on US-Vietnamese relations.

b. The Vietnamese also find distasteful the free handouts of money on the street to Vietnamese children. The adults feel that it is corrupting the children's morals (money-grows-on-trees attitude) and creates the impression that US troops do not need or care about their possessions, thus encouraging thievery. Pay for value received and make charitable contributions through official channels.

4. MACV CIVIC ACTION FUND:

a. Reference: Letter, MACPD, Hq, MACV, 25 April 1966, subject: MACV Civic Action Fund, with 1st Ind AVF-GE, this Hq, 16 May 1966 and letter AVCA, Hq, USARV, 17 May 1966, subject: MACV Civic Action Fund.

b. A special civic action account has been established in the MACV Chaplain's Fund. Projects to be financed from this account should be high impact projects for which funds are not otherwise available.

c. Request for funds from this special account must include:

(1) Location (Province, district, village, and coordinates).

Incl I

Incl #31

(2) Sector or sub-sector advisor with whom project was coordinated.

(3) Name and position of US or GVN official who approved the project.

(4) Description of proposed construction, e.g., size of building or extent of repairs, materials to be used, and source of materials. A sketch or drawing is desirable.

(5) A firm estimate of cost.

(6) Identification of military units (RVNAF and FVNAF) and civilian groups participating.

(7) Impact on community, e.g., number of civilians to benefit, impact if project is not approved, and indications of civilian interest and need for the project.

(8) Other concrete, specific statements in support of the project.

d. Submit requests to G-5, this headquarters.

5. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION: Attention is invited to MACV Directive 515-2, Subject: Psychological Operations - Military Civic Action, dated 30 April 1966.

6. ITEMS OF INTEREST FROM WEEKLY CIVIC ACTION REPORTS:

a. Garden seeds were issued and villagers were assisted in planting gardens of corn, tobacco, blackeye peas and radishes.

b. A resettlement area was sprayed for insect control.

c. A volleyball field was constructed at a school.

d. Captured VC weapons and equipment were presented to a Province Chief to be distributed to RF/PF units.

e. Fertilizer was donated to a hamlet to be used in an experiment with vegetable gardens.

f. Arrangements were made with the International Voluntary Service representative to stock a fish pond in a village area.

g. A merry-go-round was installed in a refugee camp.

h. 120 yo-yos were distributed at a resettlement area.

Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletin Number 3 dated 28 May 1946  
quarters I Field Force Vietnam, APO SF Poros 94240

1. The Boy Scouts from An Hoa had a weekend campout with the Qui  
Hou Boy Scouts at the school grounds. Bus transportation was provided.

j. Villagers were assisted in repairing their village epilepsy.

k. Four refugees are being taught the barbering trade.

2. Action was initiated to equip a village with water and road  
barrels for fire fighting.

m. Medical personnel are assisting the village chief in conduct-  
ing a personnel census of the village and preparing medical records for  
each resident.

n. A dental care class was held for the children in a hamlet.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

*Philip M. Matlock*  
PHIL M. MATLOCK  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

JOHN R. DEANE, JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

A

HEADQUARTERS  
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO 96240

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
BULLETIN NUMBER 4

13 July 1966

1. PURPOSE: This bulletin is published to assist units by exchanging ideas and information, highlighting deficiencies and offering possible solutions.

2. COORDINATING CIVIC ACTION: Units should insure that medical civic action does not interfere with the Vietnamese local health worker's program or cause Vietnamese health workers to lose face. It has been reported that some Vietnamese health workers resent efforts which they believe undermine their work and their system.

3. PAYING OF WAGES TO VIETNAMESE WORKERS: Some instances have been reported of individual US soldiers, temporarily in an area, hiring Vietnamese laborers for 200\$VN per day. This has made it difficult to hire laborers at a fair wage.

4. US/PMAF CIVIC ACTION FUND: USMACV Directive 37-13 provides civic action funds to divisions, separate brigades and similar-sized units upon the request of the unit commander. Divisions are authorized a monthly revolving fund of 200,000 \$VN while separate brigades and similar-sized units are furnished 100,000 \$VN monthly. For further details see the MACV Directive.

5. MACV CIVIC ACTION FUND:

a. Reference: Letter MACPD, 25 Apr 66; Subject: MACV Civic Action Fund, and paragraph 4, Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletin No. 3, Headquarters I Field Force Vietnam, 28 May 66.

b. Fund requests are being received for projects which involve only Vietnamese participation or for the purpose of purchasing scarce items such as refrigerators. Requests for MACV Civic Action Funds for projects must reflect US participation in the projects beyond that of donating the money.

c. Fund requests are also being received to purchase equipment and materials which are normally supplied by other agencies such as USAID. These requests will not be honored unless the items will not be available through normal channels within a reasonable period of time.

6. AMERICAN CHRISTMAS TRUCKS AND TOWNS:

a. The final shipment of ACTT has arrived. The following units in II Corps were allocated a portion of the shipment:

Incl 32



- (1) 1st Air Cav Div
- (2) 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
- (3) 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

b. The above units have been notified. Other US units desiring an allocation should call Sgt Thompson at the Catholic Relief Services office: USAID 467 or Tiger 472.

c. Transportation to move these supplies is an individual unit responsibility.

d. Photographic coverage and related news stories must emphasize the source of supplies, American Christmas Trucks and Trains. The organizations which sponsored this program are the Young Republicans, Young Democrats, and the JAYCEES.

7. CARE (COOPERATION FOR AMERICAN RELIEF EVERYWHERE):

a. CARE has an increased capability to undertake support of special civic action activities, such as furnishing a pump and rotor for irrigation projects. CARE will consider support of special civic action projects when presented a reasonably detailed plan or description of what is desired. Direct contact with CARE is authorized for representatives from brigade or higher headquarters. Telephone of CARE is Post Telephone Telegraphic 25156. Requests from smaller units should be made to the local USAID representative.

b. Coordination with local GVN officials and MACV advisors prior to initiation of these projects is required.

8. ITEMS OF INTEREST FROM WEEKLY CIVIC ACTION REPORTS:

a. Ten thousand vitamin tablets were distributed to three orphanages.

b. A few Montagnards were picked up as VC suspects and were later released after an interrogation. They were transported back to their village and given food, clothing and blankets to sooth any hard feelings.

c. Rabbits were purchased and will be given to the villagers for breeding purposes.

d. An ice machine is being transported from Saigon for the purpose of reducing the current high price of ice.

e. Baby chickens are being raised for further distribution to local farmers. Distribution will also be made to refugee camps for the establishment of a poultry cooperative.

Civil Affairs/Public Affairs Bulletin Number 4 13 July 1966, Headquarters  
I Field Force Vietnam

f. The tops of 55-gallon drums were cut off and the remainder of the drum painted and placed around the city as trash barrels. These barrels were chained to concrete blocks.

g. Windmills were installed resulting in better irrigation for rice paddies.

h. Two thousand fish were stocked in a village pond. The fish were procured from a government fish hatchery.


i. Food and clothing, captured during an operation, were distributed to the residents of a hamlet.

j. Clothing and food packages were dropped into fifteen remote villages. A PSY WAR aircraft explained the meaning of the activity.

k. Experiencing difficulty in controlling the populace during sick calls? Place two vehicles parallel to each other with a space between them large enough for a single column to be formed. This will have the effect of funneling the people to the medical personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:



NEIL M. MATZGER  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

JOHN R. DEANE, JR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

A

## THE ARMY SUPPORTS A RICE HARVEST

1. The Army has committed its manpower and equipment to assist the Vietnamese farmer harvest rice.

2. In the rice-rich Tuy Hoa Valley of South Vietnam's Phu Yen Province there is enough rice to feed more than 220,000 people for a year. Through the end of 1965 the Viet Cong controlled the area and seized large amounts of rice to sustain local VC units as well as VC units in other parts of South Vietnam. Because of this VC activity, the province government had had to import rice in large quantities to feed the local populace.

3. Beginning in February 1966, United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces were committed to securing the rice in the Tuy Hoa Valley. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade began providing physical security and transportation to enable the local Vietnamese farmers to harvest their rice and bring it into government-controlled areas. During these operations in February and March more than 30,000 metric tons of rice were harvested and secured.

4. While this is only the first phase of what must, of necessity, be a long term operation, some advantages can already be discerned. Deprived of rice, the Viet Cong is forced to either curtail operations by large units in this area or to transport rice from greater distances. It has also eliminated the Tuy Hoa rice bowl as a source of supply for more distant VC units. The people of the Tuy Hoa area have been relieved for the first time in many years of the fear of rice shortages and hunger and have been made aware of VC vulnerabilities. The VC have lost their former omnipotent image.

5. The potential advantages to be gained from the uninterrupted continuation of this operation justify further determined effort. A second rice harvest is due in August. This harvest should produce another 30,000 tons of rice. Minor harvests conducted throughout the year should add approximately 7,000 tons more thus bringing the total

UNCLASSIFIED

*Incl 33*

harvest for the year to between 60,000 and 70,000 tons. This is the total amount required to provide for the needs of the population now under government control in Phu Yen Province, the second most populated province in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

6. There is every reason to believe that the above goals will be met and that with the accomplishment of these goals the people of the area will develop a sense of psychological security possibly never before attained in their life-time. This sense of security should result in even greater gains in production, stabilization of the economy and increased support for the government. The effort thus far, however, while worthy of note as an outstanding example of the Army's role in counterinsurgency, must be viewed in its proper context: the very first step in a very long term operation.

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

## HAMLET STATUS

PROVINCE	TOTAL PLANNED	GOAL FOR THIS CY	BEING SECURED	SECURED THIS CY	% SECURED THIS CY	TOTAL NOW SECURED	CLEARED
BINH DINH	675	107	30	0	0%	69	220
BINH THUAN	181	58	9	13	22%	98	74
DARLAC	317	56	23	0	0%	0	39
KONTUM	273	31	5	0	0%	49	136
KHANG HOA	263	28	6	0	0%	170	71
LAM DONG	82	27	6	3	11%	25	41
NINH THUAN	119	23	4	2	9%	88	28
PHU BON	139	31	9	7	22%	39	31
PHU YEN	257	33	1	0	0%	33	116
PLEIKU	253	46	1	4	9%	40	54
QUANG BUC	81	32	6	0	0%	42	24
TUYEN BUC	203	71	8	1	1%	132	62
CAM RANH	30	5	0	0	0%	0	0
TOTAL	2673	548	106	30	5%	787	896

as of 1 May 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 34

## HAMLET STATUS\*

PROVINCE	TOTAL PLANNED	GOAL FOR BEING THIS CY SECURED		SECURED THIS CY	% SECURED THIS CY	TOTAL NOW SECURED	CLEARED
BINH DINH	675	119	16	35	29%	99	194
BINH THUAN	181	58	22	21	36%	106	41
DARLAC	317	47	20	25	53%	25	121
KHANH HOA	261	28	12	6	16%	140	101
KONTUM	273	31	3	5	21%	53	135
LAN DONG	82	27	1	12	44%	34	37
NINH THUAN	119	23	2	7	30%	93	23
PHU BON	139	33	10	16	48%	48	57
PHU YEN	257	33	14	23	70%	35	106
PLAKIM	253	46	0	7	15%	43	52
QUANG DUC	81	32	5	9	28%	35	22
TUYEN DUC	203	79	6	25	32%	148	48
CAM RANG	32	5	28	0	0%	0	0
TOTAL	2873	561	139	191	34%	899	937

\*as of 31 July 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES KEY PERSONNEL  
and  
FVMAF SENIOR COMMANDERS ON DUTY INDICATED

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>1 May 66</u>	<u>31 Jul 66</u>
Commanding General	MG S. R. Larsen	NO CHANGE
Deputy Commanding General	BG M. Zais	NO CHANGE
Chief of Staff	BG J. R. Deane, Jr.	COL D. J. Deane (No)
Deputy Chief of Staff	CCL H. J. Turner	COL J. D. Thompson
Artillery Officer	BG C. A. Symroski	NO CHANGE
Secretary General Staff	LTC E. Ingram	NO CHANGE
Information Officer	CPT L. R. Lubenow	LTC D. A. Williams
Inspector General	LTC W. B. Reed	LTC J. H. Glandorf
Judge Advocate	MAJ V. Gomez, Jr.	LTC R. W. Kennedy
AC of S, G1	COL J. R. Thompson	COL G. A. Bone
AC of S, G2	COL W. W. Cover	NO CHANGE
AC of S, G3	COL L. S. Boatwright	NO CHANGE
AC of S, G4	CCL C. P. Hannum	NO CHANGE
AC of S, G5	LTC J. R. Messuri	LTC T. Llana
Adjutant General	CCL N. M. Matzger	NO CHANGE
Provost Marshal	COL R. H. Lehman	COL J. J. O'Donnell
Signal Officer	COL R. C. Horne	COL J. P. Doe, Jr.
Engineer Officer	COL E. L. Waddell, Jr.	NO CHANGE
Chaplain	COL W. K. Anderson	LTC T. J. Galdie
HQ Commandant	LTC A. P. Kass	NO CHANGE
Aviation Officer	COL G. H. Shea	CCL J. W. Marr
Chemical Officer	LTC J. P. Crispell	NO CHANGE
Director, DASC	LTC P. P. Hoza (USAF)	NO CHANGE
CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)	MG H. W. O. Kinnard	MG J. Horton
CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	BG W. Pearson	NO CHANGE
CG, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	BG G. D. Walker	NO CHANGE
CG, Capital ROK Inf Div	MG M. S. Chae	LTC M. S. Chae
CG, 2d ROK Marine Bde	BG B. C. Lee	NO CHANGE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

		KIA	BATTLE PTA	PCA	DEAD	NON-BATTLE INJ	SICK	OTHER	RETURN TO DUTY	REMARKS
2HC, I FRODOV	371	117.8					1	507	190	3
54th S...	721	91.7				3	30	360	113	247
272d ME	182	96.7					17	71	39	3
55th MI Det	72	97.2				1	7	36	35	3
HQB, I FRODOV ARCT	48	118.7					1	11	6	14
52d Artillery Co (2)	1814	100.0	8		1	3	204	253	444	271
41st Civil Affairs Co	98	70.4						59	31	25
1st Cav Div	15955	99.7	99.1	3	23	61	2439	11705	8338	5389
1st Cav Div Atch	2106	96.9	1			1	56	940	845	531
1/1st Abn Div	4490	101.4	50	2	21	22	717	3530	2273	2454
1st Abn Div Atch	603	96.4			1		19	88	43	47
3/2nd Inf Div	4553	100.7	42	2	14	46	597	1677	1632	983
II Corps Adv Co	1129	105.4	1					324		423
17th Avn Co	5126	95.6	10	2	3	13	102	2038	903	2031
Cap CX Inf D	12551	99.0	39	1	12	67	645	968	452	135
2d Cav Mar Det	5259	96.9	21	1	1	1	121	110	173	71

(1) Includes HQ I FRODOV, HQ Co I FRODOV, 13th Bn, 13th Military History Det, and 64th Bngr TA.  
 (2) Includes 30th Arty, 6/14th Arty, and 3/6th Arty.  
 (3) Includes 10th Avn Bn, 14th Avn Bn, and 52d Avn Bn.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Inc 38



Jul 27

# ATTACHMENT ALLOCATIONS

	MAY							JUN							JUL						
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
1st AFHQ	2	3	2	3	5																
2nd AFHQ																					
3rd AFHQ																					
4th AFHQ																					
5th AFHQ																					
6th AFHQ																					
7th AFHQ																					
8th AFHQ																					
9th AFHQ																					
10th AFHQ																					
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25th AFHQ																					
26th AFHQ																					
27th AFHQ																					
28th AFHQ																					
29th AFHQ																					
30th AFHQ																					
31st AFHQ																					
TOTAL	7	33	131	10	88(2)	1031															

) Indicates turnbacks

Jul 38

UNIT	HONG KONG	TAMUO	SHANGHAI	TAIPEI	KUOLA LA TAI	PEKING	CHINA
HQ 1 PFCORV	13	3	19	4			1
HQ CO 1 PFCORV	4	6	3	4			1
1ST BN 30TH ARTY	14	24	19	13	2	4	
6TH BN 14TH ARTY	8	14	33	15	2	3	
54TH SIG BN	17	32	21	16	4	3	
55TH ARTY BATT	3	5	3	1	1		
1720 P CO	3	6	3	5			
1ST CAV DIV (M)	653	342	983	510	33	30	
3D BDE 25TH INF DIV	79	156	163	84	12	23	238
101ST ABR DIV	136	257	250	156	14	15	
17TH AID GP	187	277	181	12	10	12	
TOTAL	1044	1633	1669	900	113	96	

June 99

RECEIVEDS RECEIVED/UTILIZED

UNIT	OFF	NO	21	OFF	NO	21	OFF	NO	21	OFF	NO	21
HQ I FORCE/CEV	9		7	2		12	2		15			
HQ CC I FORCE/CEV			3	1		7			7			
1ST BN 30TH ARTY	3		16	4	2	29						
6TH BN 14TH ARTY	4		16			27						
54TH SIG BN	3	1	22	2		36						
55TH IN DET	1		3	3	1	3						
272D INF CO			6	1								
1ST CAV DIV (HQ)	133	21	1156	139	36	1115	63	21	903			
3D INF 25TH INF DIV	10		137	15		207						
1ST BL 101ST AIR DIV	30		536	20	1	242						
17TH AVN GP	33	10	100	48	29	139						
TOTAL	241	38	1830	246	69	1846	143	59	1755			

MAY

UNIT SS LN DFC SM RS RS(V) AM AM(V) ACM ACM(V) PH CIB CUB

HQ I PFORCEV

OFF		2		10								
WO												
EM					1		2					

HQ CO I PFORCEV

OFF				3								
WO				1								
EM									1			

HNB I FFV ARTY

OFF		1		3								
WO				1								
EM												

6TH BN 14TH ARTY

OFF												
WO												
EM			1									

54TH SIG BN

OFF				4		1						
WO				2								
EM			1	4					1			

55TH MI DET

OFF				1								
WO												
EM												

1ST CAV DIV (AM)

OFF	2	33	46	31	499	35	169	14	41	34	37
WO		18	2	11	3	638	32	62	3	18	14
EM	5		4	44	116	973	13	219	44	630	87

June 40'

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>LH</u>	<u>DPC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>BS</u>	<u>BS(V)</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>AM(V)</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>ACM(V)</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>CIB</u>	<u>C</u>
-------------	-----------	-----------	------------	-----------	-----------	--------------	-----------	--------------	------------	---------------	-----------	------------	----------

3D BDE 25TH INF DIV

OFF					1	1	2				7	15	
WO							1						
EM					1	5			1		98	542	

101ST ABN DIV

OFF	8				8	14	4			8			
WO													
EM	14				29	53	2		22	57			

17TH AVN GP

OFF		5		6		445	12	3		3			
WO		5		3		391	6	7		1			
EM				3		225		15		1			

Inclosure 2

JUNE

SS LM DFC SM BS BS(V) AM AM(V) ACM ACM(V) EH CIB

FFORCEV

OFF 16 11  
EM 5

HQ CO I FFORCEV

OFF 1 1 2

LHB I FFORCEV ARTY

OFF 1  
EM 1

1ST BN 30TH ARTY

OFF 1

6TH BN 14TH ARTY

OFF 3

54TH SIG BN

OFF 1 2  
WO 1

55TH MI DET

OFF 1 2  
EM 1 1

2D MP CO

EM 1

1ST CAV DIV (AM)

OFF	1	10	182	11	213	13	79	5	10	19
WO		3	52		141	13	22	2	2	
EM	9	1	3	242	52	331	13	394	10	200 22 5

3d INF 25TH INF DIV

OFF				1	9		1		4	4
WO					6					
EM			1		3		3		43	520 31

1ST INF 101ST AIR DIV

OFF	2	1		1	71	17		2	3	
WO					8		1			
EM	2			3	215	60	1	370	42	

June 40<sup>2</sup>

JUNE

13

RE LN DE EN BE BE(V) AN AN(V) ACH ACH(V) EE CIR C

1. RE AVN GP

OFF	2	7	7	342	18	7	1
WD	1	4	4	256	13	11	1
EN			2	380		7	2

**JULY**

UNIT	SS	LM	DEC	SM	BS	BS(V)	AM	AM(V)	AGM	AGM(V)	PH	CIB	GMB
HQ I FFORCEV													
OFF					15		11		4				
WO							3						
EM					5				15				
CO I FFORCEV													
OFF					1		3						
WO							1						
EM					1				1				
HNB I FFORCEV ARTY													
OFF					2		5		1				
1ST BN 30TH ARTY													
OFF							2						
6TH BN 14TH ARTY													
OFF							2						
14TH SIG BN													
OFF					2		2		2				
WO					1		2		1				
EM					9		3		11				
55TH MI DET													
OFF									1				
WO					1								
EM					1				1				
272D MP CO													
OFF									1				
EM									3				
1ST CAV DIV (AM)													
OFF	7		10		269	16	572	20	184	2	15	25	1
WO			6		52		355	8	101	1	3	1	
EM	10		1		377	49	981	10	589	4	122	536	8
3D BDE 25TH INF DIV													
OFF						3	16		2		6	5	1
WO							3						
EM	1			1	1	12			2		55	362	11
101ST ABN DIV													
OFF						6							
EM					9		4	4					
17TH AVN GP													
OFF			3		8		502	23	4		1		
WO			7		3		396	17	8		1		
EM					4		246		13		1		

*Incl 40'*



# MANUSCRIPT OF PERSONAL LETTER MAIL

Following is a list of assigned, attached and OPOON units of HQ I Field Force Vietnam and the dates, by months, that personal letter mail was not received during the period 1 May to 27 July.

## UNIT

## DATES AND COMMENTS

1st Air Cav Div (incl 54th Inf Bn)	No personal mail received on 22 May, 8, 28 Jun and 6, 16 Jul 66.
1st Bde 101st Abn Div	No personal mail received on 1, 9, 12, 23, 29 May, 2, 11, 20 Jun and 9, 11, 26 Jul.
3d Bde 25th Inf	No personal mail received on 21 Jul 66.
2nd II CTZ GP	No personal mail received on 18, 21, and 22 Jul 66. No mail also on 4 days out of first 11 days of May 66. M. later available.
2nd 23d Inf Div	No personal mail received on 2, 15, 18, 29 May, 4, 5, 14, 15, 17, 22, 23, 26 Jun and 22, 24 Jul. Figures based on APO files.
10th Avn Bn (incl 68th Inf Bn) (incl 238th MA Radar Bn)	No personal mail received by some units assigned to 10th Avn Bn on 17, 20, 26, 29 May, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 24, 26, 30 Jun, and 4, 8, 11, 15, 17, Jul 66.
52d Arty Gp (includes Arty units located at Pleiku)	APO records reflect no personal mail on 18, 21, 22 and 23 Jul 66.
14th Avn Bn	No personal mail received on 1, 3, 8, 10, 12, 20, 29 May, 2, 5, 11, 21, 23, 27 Jun and 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25 Jul.
52d Avn Bn	No personal mail received May 3, 14, 23; July 18 and 21.

RATE OF OFFENSES PER 1000 TROOPS  
(Known Offenders)

<u>MAJOR COMMAND</u>	<u>CLASS I</u>		<u>CLASS II</u>		<u>TRAFFIC</u>	
	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
1st Air Cav Div	0.62	0.32	8.31	5.39	0.29	1.60
3/25th Inf	1.61 <sup>1</sup>	0.61	1.84	6.33	0.92	0.41
1/101st Abn	0.43	0.44	5.31	7.00	3.16	2.99
I FORCEN (Assg & Atch) Units	1.07 <sup>2</sup>	0.00	15.65 <sup>3</sup>	7.55	3.56	7.89 <sup>4</sup>
USARV	0.67	0.47	10.06	10.52	5.08	5.68

1. Excess rate attributed entirely to larcenies and auto thefts.
2. Excess rate attributed mainly to aggravated assaults.
3. Excess rate attributed mainly to disorderly conduct, curfew and off limits violations.
4. Excess rate attributed mainly to speeding violations.

Information for month of July has not been tabulated at this time.

*Inc 42*

1st Flr: G-5, G-4, IO, IG, JA, FM, SIG, HQ COMDT  
2nd Flr: CG, CofS, G-1, ENGR, G-3 D & T, 13th MHD  
3rd Flr: G-2, G-3, Army Avn, Chem, DASC



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DISTINGUISHED VISITORS TO I FFV

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>PERIOD OF VISIT</u>
G-3 USARPAC	MG George I. Forsythe Party of 4	3 May
CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)	MG John Norton Party of 2	4 - 5 May
② U, USA STRATEGIC Communications Center	MG Richard J. Meyer Party of 3	9 May
Asst Sec of Defense for Manpower	Mr. Thomas D. Morris Party of 7	13 May
Dir of Management and Support of Intel, Ministry of Def. United Kingdom	MG Miles F. Fitzalanhoward Party of 3	24 May
Special Asst for Counter- insurgency and Spec Activities, JCS	MG William R. Peers Party of 4	25 May
American Embassy, Sgn ②	Mr. Robert Rodgers Party of 3	26 May
COMUSKOREA	Gen Dwight E. Beach Party of 7	26 - 27 May
Dir of Research & Engr, DOD	Dr. John S. Foster Jr. Party of 6	29 May
PM General	MG Carl C. Turner Party of 4	30 - 31 May
② CG, USARYTS	MG Bruce E. Kendall Party of 6	31 May
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 3	3 June
COMUSMACV Commanders Conference		5 June
CG, USARV	LTC Jean E. Engler Party of 5	7 June
ACofS Force Development, DA	LTC James Polk Party of 3	10 - 11 June
CG, USA Aviation Ctn ②	MG John J. Tolson III Party of 2	12 - 13 June
CG, Royal Australian Forces Vietnam	MG K. McKay Party of 2	17 June
CoS USMACV	MG William B. Rosson Party of 2	18 June
Minister in the Foreign Office in Great Britain	Lord Henry D. L. O. Walston Party of 4	19 June

*June 44*

CONFIDENTIAL

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CG, 4th Inf Div	MG Arthur S. Collins Jr. Party of 5	21 - 22 June
Dir, Far East Region, Office of Asst Sec of Def for Int Sec Affairs	Rear Admiral William E. Lemos Party of 2	30 June
CG, Command and General Staff College	MG Michael S. Davison Party of 2	2 July
Commander TF Seven-Six	Rear Admiral D. W. Wulsen Party of 5	4 July
Representative	Honorable James C. Corman (D-Calif) Party of 4	8 July
COMUSMACV	Gen William C. Westmoreland Party of 4	10 July
CG, 9th ROK Inf Div	MG Lee So Dong Party of 6	11 - 12 July
CG, USA Weapons Command	MG Roland D. Anderson Party of 2	17 - 18 July
J-3 MACV	MG John C. F. Tillson III Party of 5	18 July
Acting Belgian Ambassador to South Vietnam	Ambassador A. Sellies Party of 2	21 July
CINCUSARPAC	Gen John K. Waters Party of 12	25 - 26 July
Dir of Def Communications Agency	LTC Alfred D. Starbird Party of 6	30 - 31 July

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**



AVF-CS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO U.S. FORCES 96240

20 JUL 1966

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI-1) (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
52d Artillery Group  
APO 96295

1. (U) General: By General Orders 4181, HQ, USARV, dated 27 June 1966, your group is attached to this command. Operational control will be exercised by I PFONCEV ARMY.

2. (C) Organization and Mission:

a. Attached:

- (1) 3d Bn, 6th Arty, Pleiku, RVN.
- (2) 6th Bn, 14th Arty, Pleiku, RVN.
- (3) 1st Bn, 30th Arty, Qui Nhon, RVN.
- (4) 77th Radar Detachment, Pleiku, RVN.
- (5) 235th Radar Detachment, Qui Nhon, RVN.

b. Mission: General Support of US, ARVN and FMAP Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone.

c. Base Area: Vicinity of Pleiku City, SA 226535.

3. (S) Executions:

a. Rules of Engagement for artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes.

(1) In other than built up areas, artillery fire, naval gunfire and air strikes may be directed against VC/NVA forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by OVN, VN liaison personnel, observers or forward air controllers (FAC).

FFA-750-66

COMBINED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DDO DIR 5202.10

60-4936-66

**SECRET**

043 of 9015

AVC663 7274

7513

Incl 45

**SECRET**

AVF-CS

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI-1) (U)

Further, unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only under exceptional circumstances and in cases where:

(a) The requested naval gunfire support missions cannot be observed due to geography, weather, or other factors; or

(b) No US ALOs, FACs or artillery airborne observers trained in naval gunfire spotting are available (conduct of naval gunfire support missions under this proviso must be undertaken as an acknowledged deviation from standard procedures).

(2) Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and air strikes in RVN against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants are governed by the following criteria:

(a) All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC, forward observer, or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after US-GVN-RVNAF approval, as appropriate.

(b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflets, speaker, or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

(c) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(3) Specific rules of engagement governing operations conducted in the vicinity of RVN/Cambodian Border are contained in TOP SECRET Inclosure 2, I PFORCEV LOI, distributed to selected units under separate cover.

b. Civil Disturbances: In the event of civil disturbances, the nearest Vietnamese National Police establishment will be notified. I PFORCEV units will take no action other than to defend themselves and property of the US.

4. (U) Administration: Administration channels for your organization will be to this headquarters. Operational matters will be referred to the CG, I PFORCEV Artillery.

5. (C) Communications:

a. Internal: Group SOP.

**SECRET**

SECRET

AVF-CS

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions (LOI-1) (U)

b. Internal:

(1) Radio: On order, enter I FFORCEV ARTY Command/Fire direction (CF) Net AM (RATT).

(2) Wire: Establish wire line from Group switchboard to the Pleiku tropospheric scatter site for access to sole-user circuit to this headquarters. Establish separate wire lines to the CP, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and Pleiku tropospheric scatter site for access to the common-user system.

(3) Teletype: Establish wire line to Pleiku tropospheric scatter site for termination of sole-user teletype circuit to this headquarters.

c. Current SOI/SSI in effect.

6. (U) Logistical Support:

a. All classes of supply and maintenance support will be provided by the PLEIKU Sub-Area Command.

b. Requisitions and work orders will be submitted directly to the appropriate representative of the PLEIKU Sub-Area Command.

c. For those ammunition items not having an ASR, class V supply rates are established by a monthly RSR report. This report is submitted by each battalion or larger unit and is due at HQ I FFORCEV by the 15th of each month, listing the RSR for the following month. RSR reports from battalions under your command will be addressed to CG, I FFORCEV, ATTN: G3 Plans, through CO, 52d Artillery Group with info copy to CG, I FFORCEV Artillery, and in the following format:

FSN—DODAC

NOMENCLATURE

WEAPONS DENSITY

RSR

d. Logistical problems that cannot be resolved by normal support agencies will be referred to ACofS, G4, this headquarters through the CG, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

e. Annex N, I FFORCEV Field SOP.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*John R. Deane, Jr.*

JOHN R. DEANE, JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff


Copies furnished:

G1, G3, G4, CG Art (I FFORCE V)  
CG, USASC, Qui Nhon  
CG, Pleiku Sub-Area Command  
CG, 77th Radar Detachment  
CG, 235th Radar Detachment


3  
SECRET

AVC663 7274





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# I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

## NEWS

4-9-66

25 June 1966

### I FIELD FORCE HOLDS FLAG RAISING

#### CEREMONY

WITH I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, Nha Trang, RVN—Amid the strains of the Vietnamese, Korean and American national anthems, the flags of these three allied nations, fighting Communist aggression in the Vietnamese central highlands, were raised over Force One's headquarters for the first time today.

Symbolically the day chosen for the ceremony marked the 16th anniversary of the Communist invasion of South Korea and the corresponding Free World response of military assistance.

Major General Stanley R. (Suede) Larsen, commanding general of Force One, Major General Vinh-Loc, Vietnamese commander of the II Corps Tactical Zone, and Major General Chae Myung Shin, commander of all Korean forces in Vietnam, presided over the ceremony.

Honor guards from all three nations, under the command of Captain Clinton G. High, of Durham, N. C., were assembled in front of the newly erected flag poles and the assembled crowd of dignitaries which included Mr. Philip G. Habib, political counselor of the U. S. Embassy representing Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Mr. Seok-Kwon Lee, charge d' affaires of the Korean Embassy to Vietnam and Lieutenant General John A. Heintges, deputy commander of the

*Chief 49*

(MORA)

2/2/2/2/2/2

United States Military Assistance Command (COMUSMACV) representing General William C. Westmoreland, commanding general, COMUSMACV.

General Larsen, General Vin-Loe, Mr. Lee and Mr. Habib all addressed the throng of military spectators and troops which gathered for the event held at Force Victor One's new headquarters in the scenic Nha Trang beachside hotel called Le Grande Hotel.

In his address to the multi-nation troops, General Larsen cited the "close, warm and mutually respected associations" the three nations experienced in their fight against the Viet Cong. He added, "May these flags symbolize that unified strength yet ahead of us which will see this war through to a just peace and freedom for our friends in Vietnam."

Mr. Lee recalled that the 25th of June 1950 lived vividly in the memory of all Koreans as the day the Communists tried to yield their will upon an unwilling people. He cited the example of Free World response to Communist aggression as a principle which his government continues to follow in assisting the people of Vietnam.

General Loch and Mr. Habib both praised the combat accomplishments and fighting spirit of the allied forces in II Corps and both leaders expressed confidence in their ability to carry the fight into the future.

Force One came to Vietnam from Fort Hood, Texas in the crucial days of August 1965 when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units were making an attempt to cut the war weary country in half by launching a massive monsoon offensive from Pleiku to Qui Nhon. First tabbed Task Force Alpha, the combat units of Force One blunted the offensive and have since seized the initiative away from the Communists.

(MORE)

3/3/3/3/3/3

( ) Initially the fighting forces consisted of the 173d Airborne Brigade, the Screaming Eagles of the 101st, a battalion from the 1st Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion of the 7th U. S. Marine Regiment.

The 173d and the Big Red One battalion has since moved to III Corps and are now under the control of II Field Force Vietnam and the Marines have moved to I Corps area.

Since the original organization, the combat capability of Force One has greatly enhanced the arrival of the 1st Air Cavalry in September, the 3d Brigade of the 25th in December and the 2d Korean Marine Brigade and ROK Tiger Division in October. The Tiger Division was strengthened by the arrival of the 26th ROK Regiment in May to fill out the Division.

( ) Honor guards from the Army of Vietnam, the Republic of Korea Tiger Division and representing the combat units of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the 3d Brigade of the 25th Division participated in the ceremony. Music for the occasion was provided by the 1st Air Cavalry Division Band.

# FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

## NEWS

RELEASE NUMBER 4-8-66

25 June 1966

### I FIELD FORCE WAR ROUNDUP

By Captain Larry E. Lubenow

WITH I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, NHA TRANG, RVN---The combat capability and achievements of I Field Force Vietnam have come a long way since they arrived in Vietnam in August 1965 as Task Force Alpha with the herculean task of brunt-ing the Communist attempt to cut the worn torn country in half and bring ultimate victory out of North Vietnamese aggression.

Twenty-two American and Korean operations or campaigns undertaken since Force One's arrival have not only brunted and destroyed the Viet Cong strategy but have seized the initiative from the once near victorious enemy.

Today, as the battles of Operations Nathan Hale and Paul Revere wage, and the smoke has hardly cleared from the very successful Operation Hawthorne in rugged Kontum province, the combat forces of Force One stand poised and ready for the much talked about North Vietnamese Army Monsoon Offensive of 1966. Although it has failed to materialize, the American and Korean strikes at Communist main line battalions and regiments could well have been the spoiler.

(MORE)

Incl 304

2/2/2/2/2/2

Force One's area of responsibility, the Vietnamese II Corps Tactical Zone which stretches from just south of Quang Ngai province on the eastern seacoast to Bien Thuan and Quang Duc on the south contains just about 40 percent of the nation's land mass. In its populace coastal provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan live 1,888,000 people. This area is also the rice bowl of the central section of Vietnam and a valuable prize for he who controls and harvests it. Cutting across the region from northwest to southeast is the rugged Annamite Cordilla and almost hidden behind them you find the Central Highlands with grass lands reminiscent of western United States.

This is the battleground. And a valuable one it is to he who will govern the Republic and achieve military victory.

On this battleground, under control of Force One and exclusive of the Republic of Vietnam forces, we find one American division, the highly mobile and successful---1st Air Cavalry Division with a home station at An Khe half way between the port city of Qui Nhon and the highland capital of Pleiku; one Korean division---the respected Republic of Korea Capital or "Tiger" Division ---plus two U. S. and one Korean brigade---the battle tested 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, the "vagabonds" of the Vietnam war who have found themselves in almost constant combat since their arrival last July; the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division who made Pleiku their home and have been patrolling in the shadow of the Cambodian border almost in a police beat status and the Korean Marine Brigade which although they are home based at Cam Ranh Bay have been protecting the Tuy Hoa area since January.

(MORE)



3/3/3/3/3/3

The record of these combat troops under the direction of Major General Stanley R. (Jwede) Larsen has been distinctive in terms of not only body count---the unofficial yard stick of success the Saigon press corps has adopted, but also in slowly bringing peace to a troubled country side. Valuable land lines of communication such as Highway 19 from Qui Nhon, a major logistical installation, to An Khe have been secured and a minimum force is needed to provide security the rest of the way to Pleiku. No Allied forces or convoys have suffered the fate of the French's ill-fated Groupment 100 which was destroyed by the Viet Minh in the treacherous Mang Yang Pass just east of the Air Cav's home at An Khe. The guerrilla has still the capability of isolated sniping and an occasional mining but for all practical purposes he hasn't had the capability of halting Allied use of the road.

A valuable side effect of the arrival and success of Force One has been its effect on the morale and combat capability of the Army of Vietnam. At the time of the mass American arrival in II Corps they were a battered but still valiant fighting force. Today they maneuver in areas they never entered before. Their confidence and aggressiveness stands as a mark of progress.

The success of the opening of Highway 19 west of Qui Nhon goes to the tough BUK Tiger Division. Although their operations have not been spectacular as far as thousands of enemy dead are concerned, the Tigers have systematically worked to clear the area of VC and helped push the Republic Revolutionary Development program, one of the national objectives, ahead on a daily basis. Commanded by Major General Chae, Myung Shin the Tigers have earned the right to their nickname.

(MORE)

4/4/4/4

A number of names among the twenty-two operations stand out and will long be remembered by the American public and her military community. Names such as Gibraltar, Chu Phong-La Drang, Van Buren, Masher- White Wing, Lincoln, Austin 6, Davy Crockett, Paul Revere, Hawthorn, and very recently Nathan Hale. The majority of the monickers bring back the memory of fine American history and rightfully so as the young men who fought them have performed in the finest American tradition. Offering their lives for a cause they knew and felt to be right and just. For if there is one person who has blunted the Communist dream of a quick take over in Vietnam it is the American Fighting Man.

Probably the most significant of the operations were Chu-Phong-La Drang; Van Buren; Masher-White Wing; Lincoln; Austin 6, Davy Crockett, Paul Revere, and Hawthorne. Each of these added something to the receipt of success for the Government of Vietnam cause and a bit more bitter medicine for those in Hanoi.

Chu Phong and La Drang in October began as the 1st Air Cavalry Division came to the assistance of the beleaguered Special Forces Camp of Plei Me south of Pleiku. That the Cavalryman didn't pack up and go back to An Khe once the job was accomplished could well have been the key. Instead they stayed and shadowed the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the area until on the 24th of October they landed at historical Landing Zone "X Ray." From then until 28 November when the NVA broke contact and fled, American soldiers fought their most historic and fierce battle since the Korean War. Air lifting 105 mm Howitzers into positions to pound the hard pressed Communist, the Cav was magnificent. The box score was 1,511 NVA killed by body count and another 2,187 estimated killed. In addition 895 individual and 166 crew served weapons were captured and would never fire at a charging US infantryman again.

(More)

2/9/2/2/2

In Van Buren, Vietnamese, Korean, and American Soldiers fought for a different objective: rice. Although they managed to kill 672 Communists; mainly from the 95th VA Regiment, their important contribution was the protection of 30,000 tons of rice which the hard pressed Communist in Phu Yen valley badly needed. The 101st, the Korean Marines, and the 47th ARVN Regiment severely hurt the Communist attempt to isolate Phu Hoa and to gain the confidence of the 56,182 farmers and refugees who had crowded into the coastal town. Since the operation which terminated in late February, the villagers have moved back to their farms knowing they will have the protection of the Allied Forces.

Maesar-White Wing marked the first entrance of U.S. military force into populated Binh Linh, long considered a Communist stronghold. Held by many as Force One and the 1st Air Cavalry Division's most successful victory, it produced 1,808 Viet Cong and NVA dead and sent the highly vaunted Communist force who had been propagandizing themselves as invincible, high-tailing it into the mountains. Entire enemy units were decimated and one Viet Cong heavy weapons company lost not only their company commander captured but all of two of their 12.7 machine guns destroyed or captured. Commanded by Col. Hal Moore's III Cav Brigade, once again the enemy proved no match for massed U.S. coordinated air power and fire power.

Operation Lincoln, late March and early April, was dubbed by many as "Oma Phong Revisited" and that's exactly what it was. Once again the Cav visited LZ "X-Ray" and again found a tough fight on their hands. But again when the VC broke and headed for the border, they left 453 of their fellow Communist lying dead on the mountain redoubt. And if the Reds were surprised by the Cav coming back to Oma Phong they were just as surprised when they found Hal Moore's Sky Troopers raiding back into Bong Son in Binh Linh. For twelve days the battle raged and again the Communist came out on the short end of the stick. Three hundred and forty-four were killed, along with the capture of 40 individual and 12 crew served weapons. Nearly one million piasters of North Vietnamese money was confiscated by the Cav.

(MORE)

A regular NVA regiment was caught flat footed trying to infiltrate into Phuoc Long Province by the paratroopers of the 101st in Operation Austin 6. Ironically 101 of them will never fight again after tangling with the Screaming Eagles.

In their first big fight, the Bronco Brigade of the 3rd of the 25th Division did battle with three well known NVA Regiments -- the 32d, 33rd, and 66th in Operation Paul Revere which kicked off west of Pleiku in the border area in early May. In the heavy combat that followed the lightning division infantryman killed 424 while suffering only light losses themselves.

Katharine and Nathan Hale aren't history- they are still news. Capt. Bill Carpenter's dramatic decision to call napalm on his own position to save his hard pressed and encircled troops captured the imagination of the American Press and the American people. In rugged mountain terrain that was so rough that med-evac choppers could not even find a place to settle down, the 101st under the direction of Brigadier General Willard Pearson struck hard at the NVA 24th Regiment and sent them reeling away, without 842 killed by the Diplomat and Warrior soldiers.

Nathan Hale marked the first time the Cav and the 101st had teamed up to give the Communist the one-two punch. The fight began when elements of the 2d of the 327th Airborne looked onto two companies of well equipped Communist troops. Again, it was Hal Moore and his 3rd Brigade which came in to reinforce with two of his battalions and hit back hard at a stubborn enemy. Again the results were strongly in the victory column.

Yes, it's been a long time since Task Force Alpha formed up at Fort Hood and made a move to Vietnam. But, with the Communist monsoon offensive destroyed last year and bruted strongly by the end of June of 66, the enemy force in II Corps certainly must dread the day they ever heard of Swede Larsen and his Force I.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1st FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO US Foross 96240

AVF-10

13 May 1966

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet - "The Nine Rules"

TO: See Distribution

The attached fact sheet, "The Nine Rules," is intended for the use of unit commanders and section leaders in order to properly brief their personnel on the importance of conducting themselves in accordance with the Nine Rules. This topic should be presented to all personnel during the month of June.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

  
R. G. BALDWIN  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- A
- Plus
- 2 - COMUSMACV ATTN: MACVIO
- 3 - USARV, INFO OFF
- 1 - 13th Mil Hqs Det: G5
- 20 - AVF-10

*Handwritten:* Incl 57

## THE NINE RULES

A small card called the Nine Rules, is issued to every serviceman who comes to Vietnam. Though the card is little, its meaning is BIG. These rules apply to every serviceman in Vietnam. If properly applied they will assist in making your tour here more rewarding in the knowledge that you have done your part in upholding the proper image of an American in the eyes of the Vietnamese people.

Let's have a brief look at the "Nine Rules" and what they really mean.

1. Remember we are guests here. We make no demands and seek no special treatment. When coming to a foreign country many things are very different; people, clothes, living conditions, and customs to name a few. Because their way of life is different from what you are accustomed to, you should not take the attitude that they are backward or ignorant. You should act as an American; do the things you have been taught and respect their ways. You are here to assist a country that needs help. To accomplish this you must have the support and respect of every Vietnamese.

2. Join with the people - Understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and law. To mingle with the Vietnamese is both important and interesting. The ability to be able to communicate with them can be very helpful to you and your host. By teaching him a few phrases of English, and you learning Vietnamese you will be able to understand each other better. Their customs will appear unusual to you until you take time to understand them.

3. Treat women with politeness and respect. A woman is a woman whether she be Vietnamese or American. She deserves politeness and respect at all times. The color of her skin, the difference of her features does not alter the fact that she is a woman.

Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people. The Vietnamese are our allies, their soldiers stand beside us. Making friends with the soldiers and the people can make your work easier and your tour more enjoyable. More important you may form an enduring and meaningful friendship.

5. Always give the Vietnamese the right of way. It's doubtful if you've ever had to share the road with bicycles, cyclos, motor scooters, and pedestrians as you do in Vietnam. Here it's very common. The driving and walking customs here are different from what you are accustomed to back home. So, for safety's sake, be alert; don't rush, be observant so that you can avoid accidents. Practice defensive driving, it's a must.

6. Be alert to security and ready to react with your military skill. Be alert for acts of terrorism. The VC often place claymore mines near bus stops or other places where people gather. A favorite trick is to set another mine to go off minutes after the first in order to hit the crowd that has gathered. Exercise extreme caution if you are near or at a place where one of the bombs go off.

Always use the buddy system. It's the best practice while on the streets after dark. Don't wander off by yourself down dark deserted streets.

The Army has taught you how to react. Remain calm and remember what you've been told.

7. Don't attract attention by loud, rude, or unusual behavior. As a representative of the United States in a foreign country you are a symbol of America. If you conduct yourself in a rowdy, adolescent manner, and are slovenly in appearance, you will ruin the good image the Vietnamese people have of Americans. Be a gentleman at all times.

CORRECTED COPY  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96240

AVF-10

3 May 1966

SUBJECT: Troop Topic--- Star Spangled Security

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION


1. The enclosed troop topic will be presented to all personnel during the month of May.

2. Commanders at all echelons will insure that their personnel are fully informed of the importance of the Savings Bond Program.

3. Staff sections will insure that all officers and noncommissioned officers read the Troop Topic.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

  
R. C. HALLOWAY  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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2 - COMUSMACV ATTN: MACVIO

3 - USARV: INFO OFF

1 - 13th Mil His Det : G3

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## "STAR SPANGLED SECURITY"

Are you getting the most out of your tour in Vietnam? Are you making any plans for the future? For instance, are you putting money away for your return to the States.

Many of us have a hard time saving money. We make all kind of plans on how much we will save but when it comes down to it, we usually find some place to spend it. Usually on something we think necessary and important.

The smart way to save some money and also make money is pretty obvious. It's the Payroll Savings Plan where a portion of your pay is deducted each month and goes for the purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds!

Last February, President Johnson increased the interest rate on Savings Bonds from 3-3/4 percent to 4.15 percent. This means much more money to you when the bonds reach maturity. By saving as little as \$1.70 a week, you could be on the start in a program that will maybe make the down payment on that house you plan on buying when you retire or maybe get started in that business you have always wanted to own.

Another important factor about the Savings Bond Program is the distinct tax advantage you get. Interest earned each year need not be reported as income until bonds reach maturity.

There is no problem in getting enrolled in the Payroll Savings Plan. All it takes is a brief visit to your finance clerk. Just tell him you want to buy a bond every month, or every three months if you prefer, whichever is convenient to you, and you won't be bothered with putting out the money. You will have to fill out an allotment and from then on, you will be on the way to making money.

(MORE)

Incl 1

2/2/2/2/2/

As a closing thought we might add something President Johnson said about the Savings Bond.

"The Savings Bond Program is both prudent and patriotic. It is prudent because it strengthens the security of our own family. It is patriotic because it strengthens the economy of our country, it supports our fighting men in Vietnam who need to be supported at this very hour, and it supports the cause of our freedom everywhere in the world. It helps to preserve the buying power of the American dollar."

By participating in the Savings Bond Program, you will also help curb inflation which is spreading throughout the Republic of Vietnam. By saving money through bonds you will be helping withdraw money from the Vietnamese economy and thereby lessen the inflationary effect of our spenders. In the end result you profit, your country benefits and inflation, an enemy of our mission here, is given a setback. Remember, U.S. Savings Bonds give you Star Spangled Security- use them and profit!

Incl 1

## INFLATION

Can cycle drivers and bar-girls lose the war on the home-front that allied military forces are apparently winning against the Viet Cong?

Who is the average GI hurting when he gives a cute Vietnamese street urchin a 20 piaster note or when he overpays a cycle driver 30 piasters?

Who wants to drink warm beer in a tent when he can sip cool American beer in a bar while holding hands with a cute bar-girl?

Yes, cycle drivers and bar-girls can do a lot to undermine the war effort of American forces. No one wants to drink warm PX beer when he can have female companionship and cold beer at the same time. But consider the consequences involved—who is the GI hurting? He is hurting himself, his buddy and most importantly he is serving to undermine the Vietnamese economy.

Inflation is the problem that lies at the base of all these questions. Just what is inflation? Inflation is a state of affairs when you never had so much or parted with it so fast. Instead of having more money than you ever had, inflation means you've got twice as much. But, it's only worth half of what you would have if you had what you haven't got.

Doesn't make much sense does it? Neither does the fact that the cost of living in the South has risen 60% in the past year. This skyrocketing increase in the cost of living is caused in no small part by the fact that the majority of American servicemen overpay and thereby cause this inflation.

There are now more than 70,000 Vietnamese in the employ of the United States Government.

The average salary of the common laborer, 3,200 V\$ per week, surpasses that of the professional Vietnamese because the common laborer is allowed to put in a large amount of overtime thereby pushing his salary up so that it far outstrips that of a school teacher, or other professional person.

The average American corporal makes more than a Vietnamese Lieutenant Colonel. This fact is indicative of the large amount of currency that American servicemen have to pump into the Vietnamese economy.

There are two general causes of inflation in South Vietnam. The shortage of goods in many areas resulting from inadequate distribution or unavailability of supplies is one cause. A large part of this results from the lack of road security, some from the remoteness of the areas and some from the fact that certain types of products are generally scarce in Vietnam.

Inflationary pressures of this type can be reduced by opening roads and obtaining goods through foreign aid but this type of inflation will probably exist even after security is assured because of the nature of the Vietnamese economy. The second class of inflation results from the excessive amount of piasters flowing into the hands of Vietnamese from U.S. sources without a compensating increase in consumer goods.

The people who are hurt most by inflation are those such as teachers, civilian government employees, military personnel and students. They make, perhaps, 2,200 V\$ a month, whereas big spending Allied Forces may push a bar girl's salary to that much in a week.

These "fixed income" people are the influential class in South Vietnam and will be the people that determine the future of the government here. Therefore, control of the inflation becomes critical to their wellbeing and to the political stability of the government of South Vietnam.

11/15/53

Much has to be said about the "black market" here in South Vietnam. One can easily see that the purchase of cigarettes and beer from the PX and the subsequent resale of these items to "black market" merchants is hurting not only yourself in the long run in that it may endanger your military career and scar you for life. It also deprives your fellow soldiers of the items that they could normally purchase in the PX.

Therefore, the only person who benefits from the "black market" is the merchant who has little or no interest in the governmental stability of South Vietnam.

This particular individual is simply out for a "fast buck" and as long as there are unscrupulous individuals who will purchase commodities from the PX and then resell these items, this individual will not certainly regret.

In a free economy it is natural for a merchant to attempt to get as much as he can for his product. In a seller's market sometimes the prices can become exorbitantly ridiculous. Prices can be held down. Determination on the part of U.S. servicemen not to pay the exorbitant prices of the merchants will serve to bring these prices back into line.

If the average serviceman would remember to send home all excess funds and keep the bare minimum on hand to suffice each month, he would be in much better shape. Buy in the PX. If you feel the compulsion to buy downtown, offer the merchant 25% of what he wants and don't pay more than 50%.

It is the natural American tendency to tip profusely. Watch this! Some of the tips Vietnamese receive are in excess of what they sometimes make for an hour's work.

Be cognizant of the fact that cyclo-drivers, bar-girls and maids are often making more than you. Security has improved immeasurably over the past few months, but instances of individuals losing possessions from rooms or on the beach are still prevalent. Watch all the possession you value!

Cyclo fares have been established as follows:

- a. One trip within one kilometer (0.62 miles) 10VNS
- b. Over one kilometer (0.62 miles) 5VNS for each additional 100m
- c. From 2200 hours to 0500 hours the next morning rates will increase 50%
- d. One hour of riding with intermittent stops 35VNS
- e. One hour of continuous riding - 45VNS
- f. Rates will increase 50% if heavy cumbersome baggage is to accompany passenger. (Baggage should in no way impair the visual range of the driver.)

If a place charges excessive prices---stay out of it. Again this can only force that establishment to bring prices into line. If this place doesn't do this it will soon be forced to close its doors.

Why not make your tour here in Vietnam one in which you can save money. Keep only the portion of your pay that is essential to live on. Send the rest home and at the end of your tour you will find that you have accrued a nice little nest egg.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
AFU 96240

AVF-10

9 June 1966

SUBJECT: Troop Topic---Truths An American Weapon

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The inclosed troop topic will be presented to all personnel during the month of June.

2. Staff sections will insure that all officers and noncommissioned officers read the topic and commanders at all echelons will insure that their personnel are fully informed of its importance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



A. C. BALDWIN  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

1 Incl.  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

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- Plus
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- 20 - AVF-10

Incl 54

## TRUTH: AN AMERICAN WEAPON

Throughout the years the American Armed Forces have found justifiable pride in their record of keeping their servicemen informed.

There was no "grand decision" on the part of anyone, it is a simple fact of the American way of life. The military leaders of the United States throughout the history of our country have believed that "an informed soldier is a better soldier." In reality, truth is an American weapon.

In Vietnam today, the Communist are making an increasing effort to try to destroy the morale of the American fighting man through the use of propaganda. It is easy to see why the rulers of Hanoi and Peking have increased their efforts through such outlets as Radio Hanoi and Radio Peking.

Unlike the conditions which exist in a totalitarian communist state, American authorities in Vietnam make no effort to hide or shield their soldiers from Red propaganda. Any soldier who has the money can buy a radio with a short wave band in the Post Exchange and if he is so inclined he can tune into Hanoi Hanna or Peking Folly without any repercussions from his commander.

How is this possible? The reason is simple: We firmly believe that the American fighting man, with the truth as his best weapon, can easily sift Communist half-truths and lies out of the Red message. This trust has been renewed by American fighting men throughout history. Such vehicles like Troop Topics like this one; Stars and Stripes, Armed Forces Radio and free access to news from home are used by our government to present all sides of an issue to the soldier.

But it isn't enough to just shrug off Communist propaganda. Each of us must be able to recognize Communist propaganda for what it is. Simply stated, any propaganda is only the use of words, pictures or sound to convince someone to act or believe in a manner favorable to the propagandist. Not all Communist propaganda is lies. The Reds have long since realized that a little truth intermingled with half-truths and outright falsehoods go a long way. They'll try to interest you with the truth, keep your interest with the half-truths, and then socko: the hard Communist propaganda line hits you in the face. They'll try to use your fears, frustrations, or the sometimes uncertainty of a situation to make you doubt your own cause and the cause of your country. Rumors are a favorite vehicle for the Red message.

One of their favorite targets are minority groups. The Communist continually try to split a unit or a group apart by playing friend against friend. In this way he hopes to destroy the trust, respect and friendship that built up between members of a squad, a platoon, a company or higher units. They have played highly the demonstrations at home and will continue to give stress to events that they can parlay into solid evidence of non-support of the home front. He cares not if this line of reasoning be totally untrue.

Unfortunately the actions and behavior of some of us serving in Vietnam provide fuel for the Communist propaganda fire. A drunken soldier who engages in a verbal or physical assault on a Vietnamese citizen is surely making the Communist image of the American Imperialist soldier more believable to some. Remember the Nine Rules. No matter how simple they sound, they are the basic document for your conduct here in Vietnam.

In summary, we can say that keeping ourselves informed is the best weapon we have available to refute Communist propaganda. Keep your eyes and ears open for wild ridiculous rumors which might have been started by someone less than friendly to your country. Remember your nation from the days of the Minute Men to today has always fostered the ideal that "an informed soldier is a better soldier." Our democratic way of life is based on this ideal. With truth as your best weapon we have faith that you will continue to serve your country in the admirable fashion you have done already.